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Almost three decades have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Since then, a whole new generation has grown up with no personal mem-
ory of the Soviet era. Clearly, however, the disintegration of a former 
superpower cannot happen in such a manner that its heritage would 
disappear without a trace. 
The idea to study in detail what remains of the former Soviet Union 
emerged during a brain-storming discussion among researchers from 
the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in the early autumn of 2016. 
The research project proper started in early 2018, after we received the 
crucially important support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. A project 
workshop was held in Helsinki in April 2018 allowing the contributors to 
comment on each other’s work while receiving a comprehensive impres-
sion of the project’s contents. The chapters of the report were finalised in 
the summer and early autumn of the same year. 
The aim of the project is to take stock of the process of erosion in the 
post-Soviet space that has been going on since the break-up of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. We wanted to analyse the remaining material and other 
structural legacies of the USSR to find out, among other things, whether 
re-integration of the post-Soviet space, or a part thereof, around Russia 
was still possible and what kind of centrifugal and centripetal forces were 
still at play. In other words, the intention was to assess whether it still 
makes sense to speak about post-Soviet space as a collective region.
A major problem to solve was, of course, how to define post-Sovi-
et space geographically and politically and to decide which countries 
to include in the research sample. On the basis of both institutionalist 
INTRODUCTION
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and constructivist arguments we decided that the Baltic states would be 
largely excluded from the analysis. Even though all three of them were 
forced to be part of the Soviet Union, they all put up fierce resistance 
and managed to preserve the political traditions and institutions of their 
interwar era of independence. Moreover, from as early as 1989 they all 
declared their unwillingness to be involved in any form of reformed Soviet 
Union or any post-Soviet integration projects. Instead, they made it clear 
that restoring full and uncontested national independence was their main 
objective. Finally, the accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union in 2004 fully 
anchored these countries in the Euro-Atlantic world. That said, certain 
ties inherited from the Soviet period still play a role today, specifically 
related to energy, demographics and the concept of the ‘Russian world,’ 
however dubious it is. For this reason, the respective chapters dealing 
with these topics occasionally briefly touch upon the Baltic states as well.
Given that the Russian Federation still is and will probably remain 
the largest and the strongest player in the post-Soviet region and is the 
only potential centre of any trend towards re-integration, most chapters 
pay particular attention to Russia. However, the report is not structured 
around Russia’s political effort and behaviour in the region. 
Rather, and this is the main novelty of the project compared to previ-
ous studies focusing on individual countries, such as Andrew Monaghan’s 
influential book The New Politics of Russia (2016) and Matthew Frear’s 
Belarus Under Lukashenko: Adaptive Authoritarianism (2018), we ap-
proach the research questions from the perspective of cross-cutting issues 
that encompass the region as a whole. In other words, our aim was not 
to study how the post-Soviet states were faring almost three decades 
after the transition. Instead, we focus on key themes such as defence 
relations, energy and economic ties, as well as on various efforts to create 
integration structures that would again unite at least parts of the region.
In terms of timeframe, the objective was to provide an overview of 
the main trends and defining factors of integration and disintegration 
in post-Soviet space since 1991. The chapters therefore mainly follow a 
chronological order, starting from the late Soviet period and gradually 
approaching the 2010s. Given that many of the issues under study are in 
constant flux, and in particular that the availability and accuracy of cer-
tain data have significantly deteriorated since 2014 following the breakout 
of the crisis in Ukraine, no exact end date was defined for the research. 
Nevertheless, the authors have done their best to provide as up-to-date 
assessments as possible.
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The Report is divided into three thematic parts. The first part con-
cerns the structural issues of post-Soviet politics and policies. Peter van 
Elsuwege discusses the particularities of post-Soviet constitutional de-
velopment, especially the similarities and differences and the reasons 
behind them. Gudrun Persson’s chapter covers defence-related ties in 
the post-Soviet space and pays particular attention to the dominant 
military power of the region, Russia, as well as to the regional conflicts. 
Sergey Utkin examines in detail the foreign policy choices and options of 
post-Soviet countries after 1991, and where these choices have led them 
three decades later. Concluding this part of the report, Ekaterina Furman 
and Alexander Libman analyse in detail why various integration projects 
in the post-Soviet region failed to produce a cooperative body that would 
even come close to the model of the European Union.
The second part comprises two studies dealing with the economic ties 
that still exist among the countries of the former Soviet Union. András 
Deák gives an overview of the economic linkages between these coun-
tries, and assesses both the developmental perspectives and the limits of 
their complementarity from the vantage point of strong intra-regional 
integration. Thereafter, Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega discusses in detail 
how the post-Soviet energy sector has developed since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and demonstrates the key and still definitive importance of 
the structures inherited from the pre-1991 era.
The third and final thematic part of the report deals with the soci-
etal aspects of the question. Liliya Karachurina provides a detailed and 
statistically solid account of the demographic trends in the post-Soviet 
region, pointing out that many of the current definitive trends took root 
before 1991, and assessing the continuing presence of ethnic Russians 
in the successor states. Following the same logic, Veera Laine analyses 
Russia’s political, cultural and church-related efforts to create a “Russian 
world” in the region. Finally, Mark Galeotti takes a closer look at a strong-
ly under-researched aspect of the persisting ties linking the post-Soviet 
countries, namely those related to organised crime.
The author collective consisted of scholars based in Europe, Russia and 
the United States, which enabled us to work with sources, both primary 
and secondary, published in several languages. Complementing the pub-
lished material, reference is made in some cases to personal interviews 
conducted by the authors, but none of these were used as a decisive source 
of argumentation.
This report could not have been prepared without the support of the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office for the Baltic States and Nordic 
Countries, led by and represented in the project by Elisabeth Bauer. Her 
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enthusiasm and commitment to the research idea gave us all strong 
motivation. We would also like sincerely to thank our colleagues from 
the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, particularly Maija Salonen, 
whose help was invaluable in terms of organising and facilitating the 
opening workshop of the project in Helsinki. We are also grateful to Anna-
Kaisa Hiltunen for the editing, to Joan Nordlund and Lynn Nikkanen for 
the language editing, and last but definitely not least to Director Teija 
Tiilikainen for her support and her insightful comments.
The views presented in the Report are those of the authors. Any mis-
takes that may remain in the text despite the best editing efforts are the 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union not 
only fundamentally changed the political landscape in Europe but also 
raised significant constitutional challenges. Most notably, traditional 
features of the communist constitutional system such as one-party rule, 
central planning and collective ownership had to be replaced. Inspired by 
the experience of liberal-democratic constitutionalism, concepts such as 
the separation of powers, representative democracy and judicial control 
of fundamental constitutional rights all found their way into the consti-
tutional order of the Newly Independent States.1 This implied a renewed 
emphasis on legalism and the rule of law in contrast to the ideological 
approach to the role of constitutions during the Soviet period.
However, transitional constitutionalism is not a linear process but 
proceeds in the context of political evolution in a rather fragile environ-
ment.2 This is particularly true in the post-Soviet space in which new 
constitutional frameworks had to be designed from scratch in the absence 
of deep-rooted experience with the rule of law. In this respect, it is note-
worthy that the understanding of the ‘rule of law’ – as defined within the 
context of the Council of Europe and the European Union – fundamentally 
differs from the Soviet experience with socialist legality. The latter basi-
cally allowed any action by public officials as long as it was authorised by 
law. This interpretation followed the Soviet legal theory that there can 
1 The term ‘Newly Independent States’ does not include the Baltic States, which regained their independence 
on the basis of the international law principle of state continuity. See Van Elsuwege 2007, pp. 59–86. 
2 See Sadurski 2005, pp. 9–24.
1. THE LAW AND POLITICS OF POST-
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be no legality (pravo) outside of statute law (zakon). The notion of rule 
by law, in Russian verkhovenstvo zakona, has to be distinguished from 
the rule of law, in Russian verkhovenstvo prava.3 
Although superficial at first sight, this linguistic distinction is of fun-
damental importance in that a formalistic interpretation of the ‘rule of 
law’ permits authoritarian actions by governments and undermines the 
very essence of the concept. Moreover, it allows for the instrumental use 
of the constitution as a tool to achieve political objectives. Hence, formal 
commitment to basic constitutional principles such as the rule of law, 
democracy and respect for fundamental rights – which are to be found 
in the text of all post-Soviet constitutions – is insufficient to assess their 
evolution in the countries concerned. 
As Rett Ludwikowski observes in his comparative study on constitu-
tion-making in the region of former Soviet dominance, “constitutions 
are like seedlings of plants carefully chosen from different gardens and 
implanted, piece by piece, into living, all the time changing, vegetation 
composed of legal rules, norms and institutions.”4 This living, dynamic 
nature of constitutions implies that there is no single post-Soviet model 
of constitutional development. Despite the shared legacy of communism, 
domestic constitutional politics as well as external factors resulted in an 
increasingly differentiated landscape. 
The aim in this contribution is to map out and shed light on the major 
constitutional changes and general trends in the region, while acknowl-
edging the unique situation of each state. After a brief reflection on the 
general preference for presidential systems in most post-Soviet constitu-
tions (1), the focus shifts to domestic constitutional developments in the 
region (2). The constitutional implications of regional actors (the Council 
of Europe, the EU and the EAEU) are considered next (3) and finally, the 
role of national constitutional courts, one of the major innovations of the 
post-Soviet period, is assessed (4). 
1.2 CONSTITUTIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: 
A PREFERENCE FOR PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES
One of the fundamental issues of post-Soviet constitutional reform con-
cerned the institutional choice between a presidential and a parliamentary 
form of government. Presidential systems, most of which reflect the 
3 The distinction between pravo (law) and zakon (statute law) also exists in other languages and legal systems, 
as in the Roman jus and lex, the German Recht and Gesetz and the French droit and loi. See Burluyk and 
Axyonova 2018, p. 34.
4 Ludwikowski 1996, pp. 234–235. 
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American constitutional experience, have a directly elected president 
as the head of state with the power to appoint members of the cabinet 
(subject to their confirmation by the elected representative assembly). 
The head of state in most parliamentary systems, in turn, is not directly 
elected by the people but is rather appointed by parliament. Legislative 
power controls the executive in the sense that a parliamentary majority 
is required for the formation of a government. This implies that ministers 
are politically responsible to parliament, which can vote them out of office. 
In addition to these essentially presidential or parliamentary regimes are 
mixed forms of governance such as the French presidential-parliamentary 
system, with a directly elected president and the possibility for parliament 
to vote the government out of office. 
The key criteria determining the position of particular countries are 
whether the government’s survival is more dependent on the president or 
on parliament, and whether the president or parliament has the principal 
authority over the government. Neither the president nor parliament has 
such combined power in mixed systems. In practice, however, the con-
stitutional reality is often more complex with various forms of semi-pres-
idential or semi-parliamentary rule. Hence, instead of proceeding from 
a traditional presidential-parliamentary dichotomy, it seems more ap-
propriate to start from a continuum ranging between the archetypes of 
presidential and parliamentary regimes.5 
Significantly, the choice of a presidential instead of a parliamentary re-
gime is not innocent: academic scholarship hints at a correlation between 
presidential systems and authoritarianism.6 The personalisation of power 
in strong presidential regimes tends to impede democratic competition 
and the participation of opposition forces. At the same time, such regimes 
guarantee stability and allow for rapid decision-making in transitional 
periods. Parliamentary systems, on the other hand, are deemed to foster 
democratic consolidation but may be prone to political instability. 
In this context, it is noteworthy that the post-communist experience 
of the former Soviet republics fundamentally differs from that of the for-
mer Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs). The latter 
almost universally preferred some form of parliamentary regime whereas 
a form of presidentialism was the predominant option in the post-Soviet 
states. There may be several explanations for this noticeable constitutional 
difference. First, it has been argued that the structure of the old regime 
elites determines institutional choice in the transition phase.7 A form of 
5 Shugart 1993, pp. 30–32. 
6 See e.g Linz 1990, pp. 51–69; Ishiyama and Velten 1998, pp. 217–233. 
7 Easter 1997, pp. 184–211. 
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presidentialism was preferred when these elites remained structurally 
intact and experienced little internal fragmentation, as was the case in 
the former Soviet Union, so as to maintain access to the state’s power 
resources. On the other hand, when the old elites had dispersed and 
new political actors such as opposition movements and popular fronts 
gained power, as was the case in the CEE countries, parliamentarism was 
the predominant choice. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Baltic 
states, in which strong popular movements evolved at the end of the 
Soviet period, opted for a parliamentary form of governance whereas the 
Central Asian republics, which did not have such movements, installed 
strong presidential regimes. Second, the context of social, economic 
and political uncertainty after the demise of the Soviet Union provided 
a fertile ground for the establishment of strong presidential leadership. 
Third, existing models of presidentialism provided a significant source of 
inspiration during the process of drafting new post-Soviet constitutions. 
Boris Yeltsin’s initial proposals for the new Russian constitution borrowed 
heavily from the American constitutional experience, for example. Even 
though not all these suggestions were eventually included in the final 
text of the 1993 Russian Constitution, which has been described as “a 
model that combines French and American features”, the preference for 
a strong presidential regime was clear from the outset.8 A similar trend 
could be observed in other post-Soviet states in which the newly adopted 
constitutions of the 1990s established semi-presidential or strong pres-
idential regimes. Only Ukraine, the last post-Soviet country to adopt a 
new constitution in 1996, opted for what was called a “hybrid semipres-
idential-semiparliamentary” system with the President as head of state 
and Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) as the highest state authority.9 
The constitutional drafting process in Ukraine deserves particular 
attention in that it illustrates quite well the societal challenges in the first 
years after the end of the Soviet Union. Despite the general consensus 
concerning the desire for independence in 1991, the Ukrainian political 
elite was divided on the adoption of Ukrainian state symbols such as a 
national coat of arms, the definition of the official language and the es-
tablishment of state institutions and structures.10 This clash of identities 
and struggle for power resulted in the 1996 compromise constitution. 
Even though the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe initially 
welcomed the new constitution as “an important step in the establish-
ment of the country’s basic institutional setup”, it soon criticised the gap 
8 Ludwikowski, op. cit. p. 67. 
9 Sharlet 1998, p. 65.
10 Wynnyckyj 1997.
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between law and practice.11 In particular, the concentration of power in 
the hands of the president and the constant confrontation between the 
legislative and executive branches were deemed problematic. Ukraine 
witnessed several constitutional revisions in the years that followed, all 
of which took place against a background of tense political crisis. It is not 
necessary to go into the details of the various constitutional amendments: 
it is sufficient to point out the instability of the Ukrainian constitution-
al system in the post-Soviet period and the close connection between 
domestic political developments and constitutional changes. The 2004 
revision introducing more parliamentary powers coincided with the so-
called Orange Revolution. The return to a more presidential-type system 
in 2010 followed the election of President Victor Yanukovich, and another 
major round of constitutional amendments was initiated following the 
Maidan revolution of 2014.12 
1.3 PATTERNS OF DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
The oscillation in Ukraine between presidential and parliamentary sys-
tems of governance illustrates quite well the dynamics of domestic con-
stitutional politics. This essentially implies attempts among the ruling 
political elites to consolidate their power on the basis of constitutional 
engineering. There are visible patterns of domestic constitutional politics 
in the post-Soviet space, which vary in terms of the existence of internal 
cleavages and rigid constitutional-amendment procedures depending on 
the local context. 
First, presidents in countries such as Belarus and Kazakhstan quickly 
strengthened their powers on the basis of constitutional referenda. In 
Belarus, the referendum of 1996 gave President Lukashenko the power 
to rule by decree and to control the state budget. The 2004 referendum 
eliminated the term limits of the presidency.13 In Kazakhstan, President 
Nazarbayev initiated a constitutional-reform process leading to the adop-
tion of a new constitution in 1995 after approval following a people’s 
referendum. Whereas the first constitution of 1993 allowed the legislature 
to control the executive branch headed by the President, the new version 
laid the foundations for an authoritarian mode of government. Under this 
constitutional regime, which has been described as ‘super-presidential’, 
11 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) 2010.
12 Petrov 2018a, p. 92.
13 Burkhardt 2016, pp. 463–493. 
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the President has almost unlimited powers.14 He is the guarantor of the 
inviolability of the constitution and the rights and freedoms of individ-
uals. Moreover, he acts as “the arbiter ensuring concerted function-
ing of all branches of state power.”15 Strong presidential regimes also 
emerged in the other Central Asian republics, albeit with certain varia-
tions. Kyrgyzstan, for instance, experimented as the only Central Asian 
Republic with a form of parliamentarism in the wake of the 2005 Tulip 
Revolution.16 In the Southern Caucasus, the constitutional history of 
Azerbaijan stands out as an example of direct presidential interventionism. 
The constitution has been amended twice so far, and on each occasion 
there was a direct link with the succession of presidential powers. The first 
set of amendments, introduced in 2002, facilitated the transfer of power 
from President Heydar Aliyev to his son, Ilham. The second amendment 
of 2009 removed the limits on the number of terms a president may serve 
in office.17 In Moldova, on the other hand, an attempt by President Petru 
Lucinschi to reinforce his presidential regime failed in 1999 and triggered 
a parliamentary response, which resulted in a constitutional amendment 
and the introduction of a parliamentary system in 2000.18
The ruling presidents in several other post-Soviet republics have used 
more subtle techniques to consolidate their power. The first example 
concerns the initiative of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to organise 
a referendum in April 2000 on constitutional amendments that would 
significantly increase his presidential powers. Despite a positive out-
come in the popular vote, the changes were never implemented because 
the required approval by a two-thirds parliamentary majority was not 
achieved.19 It is noteworthy that a few years later, in 2003, President 
Kuchma tried to shift the balance of power from the President to the Prime 
Minister when he reached the second and last term of his presidency in an 
atmosphere of scandal. Although he formally presented these reforms as 
part of Ukraine’s democratisation process, some analysists perceived his 
initiative as an attempt to safeguard his personal interests. In particular, it 
has been argued that he feared criminal charges after the election of a new 
president and therefore decided to weaken this position even though he 
had consistently reinforced the President’s role when he was in power.20 
14 Kembayev 2011, p. 438. 
15 Article 40 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan.
16 Newton 2017, p. 185.
17 La Porte 2016, pp. 104–105. 
18 Fruhstorfer 2016, pp. 368–371.
19 Gallina 2016, p. 502.
20 Protsyk 2003, p. 1087. 
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Constitutional politics further explain the Ukrainian constitutional reform 
of 2010 when President Viktor Yanukovich initiated the return to a more 
presidential-type regime even if he had advocated exactly the opposite 
before he came to power.21 
In Georgia, the constitutional changes initiated in 2010 transferred 
powers from the President to the Prime Minister. Given that the entry 
into force of the revised constitution coincided with the end of Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s final presidential term, this development has been per-
ceived as an example of constitutional politics – albeit unsuccessful in 
that Saakashvili’s United National Movement lost the 2012 parliamen-
tary elections.22 
The latest example of constitutional politics was the constitutional 
referendum in Armenia that was held in December 2015 with a view to 
changing from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system of govern-
ance.23 The constitutional amendments significantly curbed the powers of 
the President, who would no longer be directly elected by the population, 
in favour of the Prime Minister. This evolution was generally regarded 
as an attempt to consolidate the position of incumbent President Serzh 
Sargsyan after the end of his second and last presidential term. However, 
large-scale protests were held in the streets of Yerevan when a majority 
in parliament nominated Sargsyan for the position of Prime Minister in 
March 2018. Under pressure from the demonstrations, Sargsyan resigned 
on 23 April 2018, which paved the way for the nomination a few weeks 
later of opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan as the new Prime Minister. The 
Armenian ‘Velvet Revolution’ reveals the limits of constitutional politics 
in post-Soviet societies. Moreover, it shows that domestic constitutional 
developments should not necessarily be seen through the prism of anti- or 
pro-Russian sentiments, as has often been the case with respect to the 
coloured revolutions and their aftermath in other former Soviet republics 
such as Georgia and Ukraine. 
Finally, constitutional developments in the Russian Federation de-
serve a special mention given that the concentration of power around 
President Putin took place without the adoption of a new constitution. The 
1993 Russian Constitution nevertheless envisaged some formal amend-
ments. Most of these concerned the administrative division of the Russian 
Federation, in other words the number of federal territories or subjects of 
the Federation (Article 65 of the Constitution). In general, these changes 
did not spark much controversy. Even the amendment on the inclusion 
21 Tatarenko 2014.
22 Corso 2010.
23 The Guardian 2015.
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of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014 was not really contested in the domestic 
constitutional order, notwithstanding its problematic nature in light of 
international law. Other revisions concerned the extension of the terms 
of office for the President from four to six years, and for members of the 
Duma from four to five years (Articles 81 and 96), the abolition of the 
Supreme Arbitration Court (Article 127) and changes to the composi-
tion of the upper chamber of parliament, the Federation Council (Article 
95).24 In general, however, the stability of the constitutional framework 
is remarkable. This does not mean that there have been no major chang-
es, but they are based on ordinary laws that do not affect the text of the 
constitution but nevertheless change the substance of the political regime. 
Significant examples concern the establishment of federal districts and the 
appointment of governors on the initiative of the President, introduced in 
the wake of the Beslan school siege (2004), and changes in election laws 
(2005) that de facto consolidated the dominant position of Putin’s United 
Russia Party in the Duma.25 
The Russian model thus differs from the models in countries such as 
Belarus and Kazakhstan on the one hand, where ruling presidents amend-
ed the Constitution to stay in power, and in countries such as Ukraine, 
Georgia and Armenia on the other in which constitutional amendments 
shifted the balance of power from the president to the prime minister. 
Most significantly, however, substantial changes to the institutional set-
up of the political system in Russia strengthened the position of Vladimir 
Putin without changing the constitution. The clearest example of this is 
the office swap between Putin and Medvedev in 2008, which implied 
that the constitutional provision prohibiting more than two consecutive 
presidential terms (Article 81 of the Constitution) was being formally 
respected. Along the same lines, Putin’s re-election to the presidency in 
2012 was de jure not in breach of the constitution. In practice, however, 
the concentration of power transformed the constitutional regime, which 
is formally based upon the principle of the separation of powers (Article 
10 of the Constitution) in a centralised, authoritarian political system.26 
Hence, whereas constitutional developments in the post-Soviet re-
publics differ as a result of divergent domestic circumstances, attempts at 
power consolidation by the ruling elites constitute the common denomi-
nator. Whether or not such attempts are successful depends largely upon 
the particular domestic context in every post-Soviet state. It therefore 
appears to be increasingly difficult to treat the post-Soviet space as one 
24 For an overview of these constitutional amendments, see Petersen and Levin 2016, pp. 527–532. 
25 See Lemaître 2006, pp. 369–41; Oversloot 2007, pp. 41–64. 
26 Petersen and Levin, op. cit., p. 538. 
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homogenous group. At best, certain patterns of constitutional politics 
are discernible, ranging from the constitutional consolidation of strong 
presidential regimes established in the 1990s, with Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan as archetypes, to the particular presidential model 
of Russia under Vladimir Putin and experiments with various forms of 
(semi-)presidentialism and (semi-)parliamentarism in countries such as 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. The domestic power struggle 
between the legislative and executive branches of government in the 
latter group of countries coincided with the process of national identity 
formation and internal cleavages concerning the foreign-policy orienta-
tion. In particular, the ambition of integration into the European Union 
(EU) and the largely competing model of Eurasian integration within the 
framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) influenced the process 
of domestic constitutional development.27 
1.4 THE INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL ACTORS: THE COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EURASIAN 
ECONOMIC UNION
Constitutional developments in the post-Soviet space cannot be discon-
nected from the broader regional context. In the first place, six former 
Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine) are members of the Council of Europe and, as such, are formally 
committed to respecting the core values of human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law. However, the true impact of this membership and 
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – the 
so-called ‘Strasbourg effect’ – is subject to discussion.28 In any event, 
the presumption in the 1990s that accession to the Council of Europe 
would almost automatically entail the establishment of liberal democ-
racies has proven to be overtly naïve. This does not mean that there has 
been no effect at all. Human-rights concerns can no longer be simply 
ignored, and judges increasingly refer to decisions of the ECtHR and other 
international courts even though this does not necessarily happen in 
a completely systematic manner. At the same time, there is a certain 
tension between the reasoning of the ECtHR and the constitutional tra-
ditions and practices of certain post-Soviet states. This is most visible in 
relation to the Russian Constitutional Court, which on several occasions 
threatened to ignore the ECtHR judgments when they affected Russia’s 
27 Petrov and Van Elsuwege 2018.
28 See Mälksoo and Benedek 2017.
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sovereignty and fundamental constitutional principles. One notable ex-
ample is the case of Konstantin Markin, a divorced father of three minor 
children working in the Russian armed forces. His request for three years 
of parental leave was rejected by his military unit because, according 
to Russian law, this can only be granted to female military personnel. 
Whereas the Russian Constitutional Court did not find any contradiction 
with the principle of equality between men and women as guaranteed 
by the Russian Constitution, given the specific conditions of working 
in defence of the country the ECtHR ruled that the refusal to grant pa-
rental leave to Mr. Markin violated Articles 14 and 8 of the ECtHR that 
deal with the prohibition of discrimination and the right to respect for 
one’s private and family life.29 The Russian authorities reacted fiercely 
and suggested that ECtHR judgments should only be executed when the 
Constitutional Court declared the Russian law unconstitutional. This re-
sulted in a highly controversial amendment to the Federal Constitutional 
Law in the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, giving the latter 
the power to declare decisions of international courts unenforceable.30 
In two cases, the Constitutional Court confirmed the supremacy of the 
Russian Constitution in relation to judgments of the ECtHR even though 
it also stressed the exceptional nature of disagreements and the need 
to find a ‘reasonable balance’ between the requirements of the Russian 
constitutional order and the ECtHR.31
The European Commission for Democracy through law, the so-called 
Venice Commission, plays an important role in reconciling the constitu-
tional traditions and practices of post-Soviet states with the standards of 
the Council of Europe and the ECtHR. The Venice Commission was estab-
lished in 1990 as the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional 
matters, and currently comprises constitutional experts from 61 states 
– the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe and 14 other countries 
including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.32 The Venice Commission offers 
legal advice in the form of (non-binding) opinions on draft legislation 
or legislation already in force, upon the request of the Council of Europe 
Member States, its institutions or other international organisations. The 
Commission may also issue opinions at the request of a constitutional 
court or the ECtHR. Significantly, the work of the Venice Commission 
29 ECtHR 2012.
30 Federal Law of the Russian Federation no. 7-KZ introducing amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law 
no. 1-FKZ of 21 July 1994 on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, adopted by the State Duma 
on 2 December 2015, ratified by the Federation Council on 9 December 2015 and signed by the President 
on 14 December 2015. For comments on these amendments, see the Interim and Final Report of the Venice 
Commission, No. 832/2015, issued on 15 March 2016 and 13 June 2016, respectively.
31 ECtHR 2013 and 2011. For comments, see Kalinichenko 2018, pp. 174–176. 
32 On the history and development of the Venice Commission, see Venice Commission 2018a.
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is not limited to the Member States of the Council of Europe. It has, for 
instance, issued several opinions on the state of the rule of law and human 
rights in Belarus.33 Since 2007, it has also established various projects on 
constitutional assistance, elections and reform of the judiciary in Central 
Asia. It has also adopted opinions with respect to constitutional develop-
ments in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.34 
It is almost impossible to measure the precise impact of the Venice 
Commission, but it is generally accepted that its opinions are an impor-
tant source of reference.35 It is noteworthy, for instance, that the Russian 
Constitutional Court echoed the comments of the Venice Commission 
when it called for a dialogue between the ECtHR and national consti-
tutional courts.36 Moreover, post-Soviet states frequently consult the 
Venice Commission on their own initiative in order to receive feedback 
about draft constitutional amendments or reforms concerning the election 
code or the re-organisation of the judicial system.37 The involvement of 
the Commission may thus facilitate the domestic acceptance of certain 
reforms. It could also be perceived as acknowledgement that the country 
is concerned about compliance with general democratic standards, the 
rule of law and human rights. It seems no coincidence that this option 
has generally, although not exclusively, been used by countries with an 
ambitious transformative agenda such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
Reaction to the work of the Venice Commission tends to be more nega-
tive when the opinion procedure is initiated by a third party such as the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, rather than by the 
countries themselves. The Russian government, for instance, heavily crit-
icised requests from the Parliamentary Assembly related to laws dealing 
with election legislation, combating extremism and the status of NGOs.38 
It has been argued that the impact of the Venice Commission’s opinions 
increases when they are embedded in a more comprehensive strategy.39 In 
this respect, reference could be made to the role of the EU as a promotor 
of respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Whereas the 
EU did not play a very active role in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s, 
particularly in comparison to its engagement with the countries of Central 
33 For an overview, see Venice Commission 2018b.
34 For the text of the opinions, see Venice Commission 2018c.
35 Hoffmann-Riem 2014, pp. 579–597. 
36 Kalinichenko, op. cit. p. 175. 
37 See, for instance, the Opinion on the amendments to the organic law on the constitutional court and to the 
law on constitutional legal proceedings in Georgia, which was delivered upon request by the President, the 
Government and the Parliament of Georgia, Opinion 849/2016. 
38 Hoffmann-Riem, op.cit., p. 592. 
39 Ibid. 
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and Eastern Europe, the situation significantly changed after its eastward 
enlargement. With the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) in 2004 and the elaboration of a specific Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
in 2009, the EU offered the prospect of closer political, economic and legal 
relations in return for domestic reforms. This resulted in an increasingly 
differentiated landscape as far as its relations with its eastern neigh-
bours were concerned. The EU concluded a new generation of Association 
Agreements (AAs) with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It also upgraded 
its bilateral legal framework with Armenia and Kazakhstan through the 
conclusion of a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement 
and an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, respectively. 
It further seeks to increase its interaction with Azerbaijan and Belarus. 
One does not need to embark on a comparative analysis of the re-
spective agreements to see the divergent implications for the national 
constitutional framework of the countries concerned. In particular, the 
AAs with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine set in motion the further revi-
sion of these countries’ constitutions.40 A clear example is the 2016 re-
vision of the Ukrainian Constitution introducing new provisions on the 
independence of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court and the public 
prosecutor’s office with a view to achieving the objectives of the EU-
Ukraine AA on justice, freedom and security.41 Moreover, Article 8 of the 
EU-Ukraine AA concerning the International Criminal Court (ICC) resulted 
in an amendment of Article 124 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which 
now unequivocally states that Ukraine may recognise the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. This amendment is notable in that it overruled a decision of the 
Ukrainian Constitutional Court from 2001 when it turned out that such 
recognition was unconstitutional.42 In addition to instigating the textual 
amendments of the Constitution and related changes to the law on the 
Constitutional Court and the procedure for the appointment of judges, 
the establishment of close relations with the EU also affects the daily 
practices of Ukrainian judges. Even though EU law and the case law of 
the European Court of Justice are not directly applicable in the Ukrainian 
legal order, Ukrainian judges increasingly refer to EU legal principles and 
doctrines as a persuasive source of interpretation in their decisions.43 A 
similar evolution is evident in Georgia and Moldova.44 This form of judi-
cial activism illustrates how foreign-policy choices serve as a catalyst for 
40 Petrov 2015, pp. 241–254. 
41 Petrov, 2018a, p. 95. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Petrov 2018b, p. 111. 
44 See the contributions by Gaga Gabrichidze (on Georgia) and Mihaela Tofan (on Moldova) in Petrov and Van 
Elsuwege 2018, pp. 105–130. 
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constitutional change. The latest trend in this respect concerns the con-
stitutionalisation of foreign-policy objectives. A broadly formulated clause 
on integration into the EU and NATO was introduced in the Constitution 
of Georgia as part of the 2017 revision package.45 The government and the 
Constitutional Court in Moldova have already approved the introduction 
of a European integration clause, although President Igor Dodon declared 
that he would do ‘anything possible’ to block this constitutional amend-
ment, which still had to be adopted by Parliament at the time of writing 
this contribution.46 In Ukraine, President Poroshenko announced his 
intention to submit constitutional amendments to Parliament in order 
to consolidate the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.47 Hence, there 
is a certain convergence in the constitutional developments of Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine. In all three countries the constitutionalisation of 
their so-called European choice is intended to ensure that this orientation 
cannot simply be changed when political changes take place in the future. 
Although revolutionary in the post-Soviet space, this evolution follows 
the example of several countries from Central and Eastern Europe that 
introduced more or less similar European-integration clauses in their 
constitutions in the framework of their accession to the EU.48 
The impact of the European-integration process on the constitu-
tions of the associated countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) is 
quite visible, but less so with respect to the other post-Soviet repub-
lics. Notwithstanding the existence of commitments regarding legal ap-
proximation, the agreements between the EU and the non-associated 
post-Soviet republics did not lead to major constitutional changes. At the 
same time, however, members of the EAEU – Armenia, Belarus, Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – are facing the constitutional implications 
of the process of Eurasian integration. 
In particular, the issue of direct applicability in the case of decisions 
adopted by EAEU institutions remains controversial. In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that all EAEU member states adopt a rather cautious approach 
towards the implications of acts adopted in the context of international 
organisations. The Russian Constitutional Court holds “an increasingly 
defensive and isolationist position justified by the objective of guarding 
the national sovereignty and protection of the domestic constitutional 
45 Article 78 of the revised Constitution provides that “The constitutional bodies shall take all measures within 
the scope of their authority to ensure the full integration of Georgia in the European Union and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation“. See Constitution of Georgia 2018. 
46 See Crime Moldova 2018.
47 See President of Ukraine 2018.
48 Albi 2005, pp. 399–423. 
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principles against the influence of international law.”49 A similar trend 
is visible in other EAEU member states. Despite the provisions on respect 
for the supremacy of principles of international law in the Belarusian 
Constitution, the Belarusian Constitutional Court confirmed its right to 
check the compatibility of decisions of the EAEU Commission with nation-
al laws and decrees.50 The case of Armenia also shows that the objective 
of ‘guaranteeing state, national and domestic sovereignty’ remains the 
priority of the national constitutional system. The Constitutional Court 
is unequivocal in insisting that the application of the decisions of supra-
national bodies in Armenia is only possible within certain constitutional 
limits.51 Finally, the Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan determined 
that ratified international treaties have only ad hoc superiority within 
the Kazakh legal system. In the case of conflict the direct application of 
international treaties does not imply invalidation and abolition of the 
respective national laws. Accordingly, the Constitutional Council, which 
is strongly influenced by the President, may block the implementation 
of any international treaty and decisions of international organisations.52 
Hence, the EAEU has not yet brought about formal constitutional amend-
ments amongst its members, although the further process of Eurasian 
integration, and in particular the evolving case law of the EAEU Court, 
may bring this issue back onto the agenda. 
1.5 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: OBEDIENT TOOLS OF THE 
RULING POLITICAL ELITES? 
Apart from Turkmenistan, which has followed its own trajectory,53 all 
former Soviet republics created constitutional courts in the 1990s. These 
post-Soviet constitutional courts, modelled on the Russian Constitutional 
Court, acquired far-reaching prerogatives, inter alia, the constitutional 
review of international agreements, laws, presidential and governmental 
acts, and of the validity of elections and disputes between the branches 
of government, as well as the authority to review complaints about the 
violation of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens.54 This was a 
major innovation in comparison to the Soviet period, when constitutions 
49 Kalinichenko op. cit., p.176. 
50 Karliuk 2018, p. 155. 
51 Delcour and Ghazaryan 2018, p. 140. 
52 Kembayev 2018, p. 192. 
53 See Newton 2017, pp. 23–31.
54 For a comparison of the institutional settings of constitutional courts in post-Soviet countries and their 
formal empowerment, see Mazmanyan 2015, p. 205. 
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did not constrain the use of state power and could not be regarded as a 
meaningful source of individual rights notwithstanding their enumeration 
in virtually all constitutions in the region. Hence, the expectation was 
that the newly established constitutional courts would play a defining 
role in transforming the Soviet constitutional culture so that the power 
of the political branches would be subject to effective judicial review.55 
The first test case was the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis. In this 
context, the Russian Constitutional Court and its chairman, Valery Zorkin, 
played a pivotal role in declaring Boris Yeltsin’s attempt to dissolve par-
liament unconstitutional, and later ruled on the validity of the April 1993 
referendum.56 At the same time, the crisis also exposed the limits and 
pitfalls of the Court’s judicial activism in this period. President Yeltsin 
suspended the Constitutional Court in November 1993 and it was only in 
February 1995 that it could resume its activities. In this second period of 
its existence its rulings strongly converged with the position of the ex-
ecutive in so far as reference is made to the existence of “a tacit alliance 
between the Court and the Presidency”.57 Striking examples concern the 
Chechnya case, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
military intervention, and endorsed Vladimir Putin’s decision to abolish 
the election of regional governors and the restrictive interpretation of the 
implications of ECHR judgments in the Russian legal order. It is notewor-
thy that Valery Zorkin, brought back as chief justice by Vladimir Putin in 
2003, is currently regarded as a loyal ideological ally of the President.58 
The fate of Russia’s Constitutional Court in 1993 was not an isolated 
case. The constitutional court of Kazakhstan was abolished in the consti-
tutional reform of 1995, to be replaced with a much weaker Constitutional 
Council. As a result, any serious judicial review on the exercise of presi-
dential powers disappeared. President Lukashenko forced the resignation 
of judges in Belarus, and from 1996 onwards started appointing loyal 
allies. With regard to the Central Asian republics, too, the judicial in-
dependence of the constitutional bodies appeared largely declaratory in 
nature. In practice, the newly established presidential regimes exercised 
significant political control over the justice system.59 Hence, more often 
than not post-Soviet constitutional courts are regarded as obedient tools 
of the ruling political elites. A case in point is the 2010 decision of the 
Ukrainian Constitutional Court to invalidate the post-Orange-Revolution 
55 Teitel 1994, p. 169. 
56 Schwartz 2000, pp. 132–136. 
57 Mazmanyan, op. cit., p. 213. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Newton 2017, p. 194. 
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constitutional amendments after President Yanukovych returned to pow-
er. According to Armen Mazmanyan, “the partisan nature of [this] de-
cision was doubted only by the naïve”.60 The Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission refrained from taking a position on whether the decision 
was justified or not, but nevertheless considered it “highly unusual that 
far-reaching constitutional amendments – including the change of the 
political system of the country – […] are declared unconstitutional by a 
decision of the Constitutional Court after a period of 6 years”. It further 
delivered the explicit message that “as constitutional courts are bound by 
the Constitution and do not stand above it, such decisions raise important 
questions of democratic legitimacy and the rule of law”.61 
Notwithstanding their questionable reputation, the role of constitu-
tional courts in shaping their respective countries’ post-Soviet identities 
should not be underestimated. This is obvious in the case of Moldova, for 
instance, in which the constitutional court ruled on a number of politi-
cally sensitive issues related to the official state language and the coun-
try’s foreign-policy orientation. First, the definition of the official state 
language goes to the heart of Moldova’s complex history and identity, 
with its close relations with Romania on the hand and the Soviet legacy 
and the influence of Russia on the other.62 This duality acquired a sig-
nificant constitutional dimension because Article 13 (1) of the Moldovan 
Constitution provides that ‘[t]he State language of the Republic of Moldova 
is the Moldovan language based on the Latin alphabet’, whereas the 1991 
Declaration of Independence identifies Romanian as the official language. 
The Constitutional Court ruled on this issue in 2013 when it decided that 
the Declaration of Independence had superiority over the text of the 
Constitution.63 This decision in favour of Romanian as the official state 
language has had major political ramifications. It underlines the coun-
try’s European orientation and dismisses the promotion of a separate 
Moldovan linguistic identity as a relic of the Soviet past. Along the same 
lines of argumentation, the Constitutional Court ruled in 2014 that “the 
Declaration of Independence marked the detachment from the totalitarian 
Soviet area of values and the reorientation of the new independent state 
towards the European area of democratic values” when it confirmed that 
the EU-Moldova Association Agreement complied with the Moldovan con-
stitution.64 The Court even explicitly stated that “any adverse orientation 
60 Mazmanyan, op. cit. p. 215.
61 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) 2010, para. 33–36.
62 For an account of the background behind Moldova’s complex history and identity, see King 1999. 
63 Decision of the Moldovan Constitutional Court No. 36 2013.
64 Decision of the Moldovan Constitutional Court No. 24 2014.
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is unconstitutional a priori”.65 This conclusion implies that the ambitions 
of President Dodon to foster close relations with the EAEU raise signifi-
cant constitutional challenges. Moldova’s current observer status did not 
cause major concern, essentially because decisions adopted within the 
EAEU framework are not binding on an observer country. However, any 
further steps in the direction of EAEU membership will inevitably lead to 
incompatibilities with the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and the 
country’s constitutional identity as defined by the Constitutional Court. 
The temporary suspension of President Dodon’s powers after he re-
fused to appoint ministerial nominees and his controversial annulment 
of the mayoral elections in Chisinau are the most recent illustrations of 
Moldova’s turbulent political situation. It is noteworthy that on both 
occasions the key players openly questioned the impartiality of the con-
stitutional court. According to President Dodon, the Court is nothing 
more than “an obedient political instrument” of the government.66 Andrei 
Nastase, who won the mayoral election in Chisinau, declared that the 
President of the Constitutional Court, Mihai Poalelungi, was behind the 
judicial decision to invalidate the result.67 These public statements are 
quite illustrative of the lack of trust in the post-Soviet judicial system. 
Despite the creation of new institutions, initially constitutional courts, 
this remains a crucial problem in the entire region. 
1.6 CONCLUSION
The adoption of new constitutions in this specific geopolitical context after 
the demise of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a transformative 
process that still continues. The initial expectation that all former Soviet 
republics would go through a period of constitutional transition and de-
velop along the lines of Western liberal-democratic models has proven to 
be overly simplistic. More than 25 years after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union the outcomes are rather diverse, with very strong presidential 
and often authoritarian regimes on one end of the spectrum and various 
models of semi-presidential and semi-parliamentary systems on the other. 
It thus seems to be impossible to identify one single model of post-Soviet 
constitutional development.
The domestic political context and the pre-Soviet history of each coun-
try, as well as external factors such as the influence of regional-integration 
65 Ibid. 
66 See Deutcshe Welle 2018.
67 These statements provoked a remark by the President of the Constitutional Court in which he rebutted all 
allegations. See Poalelungi 2018.
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processes explain the increasing constitutional differentiation. The con-
clusion of bilateral agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova 
and Georgia, for instance, sparked a process of constitutional revision in 
each of the associated countries, whereas the establishment of the EAEU 
challenges the interpretation of national sovereignty in the countries 
concerned (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan). On 
top of this, internal cleavages on issues of national identify formation and 
foreign-policy orientation are opening up throughout the region. 
At the same time, the common legacy of the Soviet period cannot 
be totally ignored. It seems to be no coincidence, for instance, that all 
post-Soviet republics score relatively badly on major global indexes of 
the rule of law, democracy, corruption and governance.68 There are, nat-
urally, certain differences within the region, Belarus, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan being the worst performers and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
achieving comparatively higher scores, be it with certain variations over 
time. In general, however, every country of the former Soviet Union 
still suffers from a lack of judicial independence and an instrumental 
approach to the law. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Armed Forces represented one of the pillars of the great power 
status of the Soviet Union. In terms of nuclear weapons, the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union had reached parity. On the eve of the breakup of the latter 
the number of military personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces was esti-
mated at 3.5 million: 350,000 troops were based in East Germany, 44,000 
in Poland, 75,000 in Czechoslovakia and 60,000 in Hungary.
A brief flashback to the situation in December 1991 reveals that 61 of the 
101 army divisions, 7 of the 10 air armies and 9 of the 15 air defence armies 
were based in the Soviet Union, outside of Russia proper. Furthermore, 
44 per cent of the entire manpower of the Soviet Armed Forces was sta-
tioned outside Russia, as were 43 per cent of its tanks, 50 per cent of the 
strategic air force and, significantly, 28 per cent of its intercontinental 
ballistic missiles.1
During the 27 years that have passed since then, Moscow has tried – 
in various ways in different countries – to retain some of its influence, 
in other words to build up its military capabilities to be able to project 
military power beyond Russia’s borders in different strategic directions. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania immediately turned to NATO to safeguard 
their national security, whereas some of the other new countries – not 
all – have been collaborating in various multilateral organisations and 
bilaterally with Russia.
1 Rogov 1993.
2. CONFLICTS AND CONTRADICTIONS: 
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Obviously, Russia has several means at its disposal with which to se-
cure its influence, including soft power. The Russian language is still used 
in the armed forces in parts of the CIS area, and Russia sponsors military 
education. For instance, Uzbekistan and Russia signed an agreement 
in 2018 enabling soldiers of the Uzbekistan armed forces to study and 
attend courses at military academies in Russia for the first time in ten 
years. Economic means such as selling armaments at significantly lower 
prices are also in the toolbox. The focus in this chapter, however, is on 
military policy and concepts, armed forces and armed conflicts in the 
region.2 In view of Russia’s dominance in this sphere, the analysis focuses 
on the relationships between the member states of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and Russia. 
The objective is to assess military relations following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and the demise of the Soviet Armed Forces. Hence, the 
chapter will contribute to the overall theme of this book in considering 
the military aspects of the question, if it still makes sense to speak about 
the post-Soviet space as a collective region.
The historical background is briefly outlined next, then the focus turns 
to the main bodies of multilateral cooperation in the military sphere. The 
bilateral dimension is also taken into consideration. Special attention is 
given to the impact of the wars in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (from 2014 on) 
and Azerbaijan-Armenia (2016). Finally, conclusions are drawn based on 
current trends.
2.2 SETTING THE SCENE
There were some initial, albeit feeble attempts to create a unified armed 
force within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Article six of 
the Belavezha Agreement of 8 December 1991 stipulates that CIS members 
should “keep and support under a unified command a common military 
strategic space.”3 
In line with this objective of creating a unified CIS armed force, Air 
Marshal Evgeny Shaposhnikov was appointed Supreme Commander of 
the CIS Armed Forces in February 1992. A CIS military doctrine was draft-
ed in early 1992, containing the proposal to create a unified, combined 
armed force that would serve all the CIS member states.4 However, when 
Shaposhnikov left his position in November 1992 the Russian Defence 
2 Armed forces here include the forces under the ministries of defence. Forces belonging to other ministries 
and agencies are not included unless explicitly stated.
3 Ispolnitel’nyi Komitet SNG (1991)
4 de Haas 2001.
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Minister, Pavel Grachev, took control of a set of nuclear-weapon codes 
that had been Shaposhnikov’s responsibility. Control over nuclear weap-
ons was formally transferred to Russia from the General Headquarters 
of the Joint Armed Forces in 1993, which was formally disbanded on 15 
June 19935. The position of Shaposhnikov’s successor was downgraded, 
and Colonel General Viktor Samsonov was appointed Chief of the United 
Staff for the Coordination of Military Cooperation.
Meanwhile, it became clear that the member states did not support 
these plans to maintain a unified military structure, and instead they 
started the process of creating national armed forces. Not even Russia, 
the de jure successor state of the Soviet Union and the dominant military 
power, was willing to preserve the CIS military structure. A substantial 
blow to the establishment of joint CIS forces came in May 1992 with the 
creation of the Russian Armed Forces. By that time, all CIS countries 
except Tajikistan (due to the civil war) had started to build their own 
national armies (see Table 1).
The reasons for this development lie beyond the scope of this analysis, 
but it supports the argument that a country’s armed forces do not exist in 
a vacuum, and rather reflect the society as a whole. As historian Michael 
Howard observes, “The military system of a nation is not an independent 
section of the social system, but an aspect of it in its totality.”6
5 Zagorski 1998. 
6 Howard 1991.
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Obviously, the mere numbers (Table 1) do not reveal very much about 
a country’s military capability. However, Russia’s military might – in-
cluding its nuclear weapons – was and remains undisputed.
The most pressing issue in the 1990s concerned the nuclear weapons 
that remained in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, although the re-
maining Soviet troops and military objects7 in the Baltic states and East 
Germany were also of major concern.
With regard to nuclear capability, the initial idea of CIS control of 
Soviet nuclear weapons was dropped, and Russia eventually took over 
those that remained in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. For a while 
Ukraine had been ambivalent about giving up the nuclear weapons on 
its territory, but the issue was resolved with some financial help from 
the United States and in exchange for the security guarantees in the 
Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994. The last remaining ex-Soviet 
7 In Russian, voennye ob’ekty, military installation with personnel, not a base.
1993 2000 2018
Armenia 20,000 44,500 44,800
Azerbaijan 42,600 72,100 66,950
Belarus 102,600 83,100 45,350
Georgia n/a 26,900 20,650
Kazakhstan 40,000 (Army) 64,000 39,000
Kyrgyzstan 12,000 (Army) 9,400 10,900
Moldova 9,400 9,500 5,150
Russia 2,030,000 1,004,100 900,000
Tajikistan - 6,000 (Army) 8,800
Turkmenistan 28,000 (Army) 17,500 36,500
Ukraine 438,000 303,800 204,000
Uzbekistan 40,000 59,100 48,000
Table 1: Manpower of the national armed forces in the CIS, 1993, 2000 and 2018.
Source: The Military Balance: 1993. Russia, 93:1, 93–106; 1993. Central and Southern Asia, 93:1, 
134–145; 1993. Non-NATO Europe, 93:1, 66–92; 2000. Russia, 100:1, 109–126; 2000. Central and 
South Asia, 100:1, 158–177. 2000. NATO and Non-NATO Europe, 100:1, 35–108; 2018. Chapter Five: 
Russia and Eurasia, 118:1, 169–218.
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nuclear warheads were withdrawn from Kazakhstan by May 1995, Ukraine 
by May 1996 and Belarus by November 1996.
Agreements were also reached on Soviet troop withdrawal from the 
Baltic states and Eastern Europe. This process was largely completed 
by 1994 – although it took until 1998 for the Skrunda radar station in 
Latvia to close. According to the former Chief of the Russian General Staff, 
Nikolai Makarov, the withdrawal was messy when troops and equipment 
returned to Russia. A lot of the military equipment was left out in the 
open and rusted. As he wrote: “When it was decided to begin cutting the 
numbers of the returning troops there was no one left to take care of the 
military equipment. Where the disbanded military units had been located, 
cemeteries of military equipment arose.”8 
Another key development during the early 1990s was the signing of the 
Tashkent Treaty on 15 May 1992, the Collective Security Treaty (CST) that 
was the embryo of the later Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO. 
The Collective Security Treaty came into force in 1994. It stipulated that a 
Collective Security Council should be created, consisting of the “heads of 
participating states and the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed 
Forces.” When this ambition failed to materialise the treaty was revised 
and the words about joint CIS Armed Forces disappeared.
It should also be noted that almost every CIS member had joined the 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme by 1995.
Thus, by 1995, the situation could be illustrated as below:
8 Makarov 2017, p. 348.
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2.3 MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
Russia’s strategy for military security in the CIS area leans on multilateral 
approaches on the one hand and bilateral mechanisms on the other. This 
section focuses on the different multilateral organisations. 
2.3.1 Commonwealth of Independent States – formal military 
cooperation
The highest-level body for defence policy and defence cooperation is the 
Council of Defence Ministers (CDM), which was created on 14 February 
1992. Its secretariat is located in Moscow. However, the Staff of this 
Council was dissolved in 2005 at the request of Kazakhstan, its functions 
being divided between the CSTO and the secretariat of the CDM.
Military cooperation within the CIS has focused over the years on 
peacekeeping and air defence. A CIS air-defence treaty was signed in 
Almaty in February 1995. However, of the original ten signatories, three 
countries have left – Ukraine, Georgia and Turkmenistan. The remaining 
CIS Treaty CST Nato P f P
Armenia x x x
Azerbaijan x x x
Belarus x x x
Georgia x x x
Kazakhstan x x x
Kyrgyzstan x x x
Moldova x x
Russia x x x




Table 2: Countries signing the CIS Treaty, Collective Security Treaty, and Nato P f P 1995.
Note: The CST was signed for a five-year period, and in 1999 Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan 
decided not to continue their participation.
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members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and 
Tajikistan. Uzbekistan participates in the joint air defence exercises, not 
as a full member but through a bilateral agreement with Russia.
2.3.2 CIS Peacekeeping and unresolved conflicts
There were several armed conflicts in the area during the 1990s, which 
had an impact on the proposed collective defence cooperation. Russia’s 
dominant position in peacekeeping operations in the CIS area led to ques-
tions about its real intentions. Further influencing the cooperation was the 
simple fact that the newly formed states were struggling primarily with 
their own internal development and establishing national armed forces. 
CIS peacekeepers have been involved in the following four conflicts 
during the post-Soviet period, all of which remain unresolved and some 
of which erupted following Russian military intervention. 
Transnistria. Limited fighting broke out between Russian-backed se-
cessionist paramilitaries and Moldovan police and military forces in 
November 1990. The conflict intensified in March 1992, lasting until 
a ceasefire was established on 22 July 1992. Russian support was evi-
dent not least in the military sphere. The remaining Soviet 14th Army 
stationed in and around the largest Transnistrian city Tiraspol was 
quick to supply secessionist paramilitaries with arms, ammunition, 
expertise and manpower.9 
Tajikistan. The CIS Council of Heads of State authorised a Russian peace-
keeping mission in Tajikistan’s civil war in 1993. Russia’s 201st Motor 
Rifle Division was deployed in Soviet Tajikistan in 1989 after the with-
drawal from Afghanistan and turned “peacekeeper” under the CIS 
mandate four years later. The CIS acted without any mandate-granting 
authority in international law. The UN accepted this pretence, fielding 
a symbolic mission of observers (UNMOT) alongside Russian troops 
in Tajikistan. This was the first Russia-led collective operation with 
real participation by other CIS countries. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan each provided company-sized units, working alongside 
the then 11,000-strong 201st Division. 
Abkhazia. The war in Abkhazia lasted from August 1992 to May 1994. 
Russia initially took an ambiguous stance and supported both sides, but 
later increased its military support of the Abkhazian part. The Abkhaz 
counter-offensive in summer 1993 forced almost the entire Georgian 
9 Büscher 2016.
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population of Abkhazia to flee. A ceasefire agreement in May 1994 
ended the fighting. The CIS nominally supplied the peacekeeping force 
stipulated in the agreement, but the operation comprised only Russian 
troops. A UN Observer Mission in Georgia was to monitor the cease-
fire. Abkhazia was almost entirely isolated after 1994 when Georgia, 
followed in 1996 by the CIS, imposed an economic embargo. Russia 
supported the embargo in return for Georgia’s antiterrorism coop-
eration (i.e. against the Chechen separatists who had taken refuge in 
the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia). 
South Ossetia. Russia adopted a different strategy in South Ossetia. In 
1992 it forced an isolated Georgia to accept a format that included 
North Ossetia (in Russia) and South Ossetia (under Russian-controlled 
authorities, inside Georgia’s territory), alongside state actors Russia 
and Georgia, with the OSCE in the role of observer and facilitator. This 
involved a Joint Control Commission and Joint Peacekeeping Forces 
under Russian command.10
In sum, Russia played a key role in all these conflicts, initially attempt-
ing to legitimise its military interventions as international peacekeep-
ing.11 Moscow largely failed to convince the international community 
about this given that the agreements were signed after Russian forces 
had enforced ceasefires and changed the balance of military advantage 
on the ground. The presence of Russian peacekeeping troops in Moldova, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia cemented the conflict and created trilateral, 
consensus-based settlement mechanisms that empowered the separatists 
to block any progress in finding a solution. Thus, the Russian ground 
forces guaranteed the military security of the separatists.
2.3.3 The Collective Security Treaty Organization
The Collective Security Treaty Organization, CSTO, was established on 
7 October 2002. It currently comprises six member-states including 
Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and 
has observer status in the United Nations. Uzbekistan joined in 2006 but 
suspended its participation in 2012. The member states pledge to create a 
‘collective security system, including the creation of coalition (collective) 
forces of the Organization, regional (united) groups of armies (forces), 
peacekeeping forces, united systems and the bodies governing them, 
10 Socor 2011.
11 Allison 2013, p. 129.
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military infrastructure.’12 Its stated ambition is to coordinate foreign 
policy. The supreme political body of the organisation is the Collective 
Security Council, which consists of CSTO Heads of state. Russia is the 
dominant power – militarily and financially – whereas the other member 
states primarily provide political legitimacy. Significantly, since 2004 the 
member states have been able to procure arms from each other at friendly 
prices, which in practical terms means additional Russian leverage in 
the organisation.13
The CSTO has five types of forces at its disposal. Of these, three are 
regional groups. The first one, the Collective Rapid Deployment Force for 
Central Asia, established early on in 2001, is earmarked for intervention 
in Central Asia, probably in response to the Tajikistan civil war and the 
tensions around the Ferghana Valley.14 The second regional group includes 
the Russian-Belarusian CSTO Group of Forces in the Eastern European 
Region (Russia – Belarus), which at the same time comprises the bilat-
eral Union State’s (see below) armed forces: it has some joint capability. 
The third group is the Russian-Armenian CSTO Group of Forces in the 
Caucasus. The fourth type is the Collective Operational Reaction Forces, 
CORF, created in 2009 and consisting of around 20,000 troops. Finally, 
the 4,000-strong Peace Keeping Force (PKF) is a smaller mobile unit that 
can also be deployed in UN operations.
All these forces conduct exercises regularly in various constellations.
During the initial years of CSTO’s existence the likelihood of achieving 
many of the goals seemed remote and cooperation was still limited. Its 
development since then has been described as ‘contradictory.’15 There 
was general agreement on the issue of counter-terrorism, but the other 
member states seemed to doubt Russia’s capacity for effective and impar-
tial counter-terrorist military intervention in Central Asia and elsewhere.
The situation has been evolving in the 2010s, and the authoritarian 
leaders are continuously revising their views. The Arab Spring started to 
have an impact. The CSTO came to be seen as an instrument for obtaining 
Russian support – including military support – for regime security. This 
development is clear in spite of the events in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 when 
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted. The CSTO did not intervene, 
despite the fact that country’s new leadership had asked for its help.
12 CSTO 2010. 
13 The Protocol was signed on 19 September 2003 in Yalta. For the original see: http://www.mfa.kz/
files/010_5815d0e1e8984.pdf. For the latest version see: http://odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.
php?ELEMENT_ID=1685. 
14 Norberg 2013, pp. 21–23.
15 Golub and Golub 2018.
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that various military exercises are 
held within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO). The Peace Mission drills, which are Russian-Chinese led, have 
become the standard form of exercise. The message behind this show 
of force is to make it clear who is in command, both to the West/USA 
and to internal or regional adversaries such as the Uyghurs in China and 
separatist movements in Central Asia. Conversely, the anti-terror war 
games concentrate on improving counter-terror techniques and related 
cooperation within the SCO.16 Russia and China are the most frequent 
participants in these exercises. Three of the four Central Asian member 
states of the SCO — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — regularly 
take part in the drills, albeit in different compositions.
The SCO is more of a political-economic entity with a security com-
ponent, focusing on fighting “the three evils”, terrorism, separatism and 
extremism, whereas the CSTO purports to be a fully-fledged military and 
security alliance. Moreover, the SCO has two dominating actors, Russia 
and China, whereas Russia is the only major actor in the CSTO. 
2.3.4 Bilateral mechanisms
Throughout the 1990s Russia concluded a number of bilateral military 
agreements with various countries in the aftermath of the Soviet break-
up.17 
One of the most significant of these bilateral relationships was the one 
with Belarus in the western direction. Belarus is strategically important for 
Russia in that it borders on Latvia and Lithuania. Moreover, the Russian 
exclave of Kaliningrad oblast, which hosts the Baltic Sea Fleet, is enclosed 
within Lithuania.
A Union State treaty was signed by the heads of state of Russia and 
Belarus in 1999, according to which they agreed to have a united de-
fence policy and to cooperate militarily.18 In hindsight, without delving 
too deeply into the details of cooperation, it is clear that Russia-Belarus 
defence relations have remained solid. In turn, current Russian military 
doctrine stipulates that “an armed attack on the state-participant in the 
Union State, as well as all other actions involving the use of military force 
against it,” should be deemed “an act of aggression against the Union 
State”, authorising Moscow to “take measures in response.”19 
16 de Haas 2016, p. 388.
17 Persson 1995.
18 Dogovor o sozdanii Soiuznogo gosudarstva 1999, article 18. 
19 Voennaia doktrina RF 2014.
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Armenia is particularly important in the southern direction. Not only 
is it highly dependent on Russia for its military security, it is the only 
country in the CIS that has been provided with the Iskander short-range 
ballistic missile system, much to the concern of Azerbaijan. 
Kazakhstan is a core strategic ally of Russia in Central Asia, and the 
two countries signed bilateral agreements on military cooperation early 
on. The agreement signed in January 1995 even mentioned the intention 
to create unified armed forces, and although this has not materialised, 
military cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan has remained close.
2.4 WARS IN THE REGION 
During the 1990s Russia considered instability in neighbouring states a 
threat to its own weakened state. It feared that the conflicts would es-
calate beyond the local framework and have a direct destabilising effect 
beyond its borders. Although it used some of the conflicts to exert pres-
sure, its policy was primarily to end the wars and settle the conflicts.20 
This would change during the 2000s. Russia agreed at the Istanbul OSCE 
summit in 1999 to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia, but 
excluded Russian peacekeeping forces from this obligation. Moscow grad-
ually came to rely more and more on these troops, particularly given the 
deterioration of relations with the West in the wake of the Kosovo War of 
1999. The so-called colour revolutions in the first half of the 2000s, in oth-
er words the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine in 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and the 
subsequent Second Kyrgyz Revolution in 2010, heightened the tensions.
The emerging discussion on NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia 
made the situation worse. Whereas Moldova and Georgia saw the pre-
dominantly Russian peacekeepers as de facto occupying forces, for Russia 
they served as a bulwark against NATO expansion. Russian policy became 
increasingly militarised.
Russia-Georgia, 2008. The first real sign of this militarisation was in 2008. 
21 The Russo-Georgian War in August was a turning point for both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Not only did Russia win the war and was 
free to establish a permanent military presence in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, Moscow also recognised the areas as independent states. In 
doing so, Russia openly and for the first time broke its commitment to 
20 Fischer 2016, p. 15.
21 Allison 2008.
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maintain existing post-Soviet borders. It is significant that no other 
CIS or CSTO member has done the same, which reflects the weariness 
and suspicion of Russia’s goals in many of the states in this region. As 
a direct result of this war, Georgia left the CIS a year later.
The performance of the Russian Armed Forces in the war was care-
fully studied in Moscow. A major military modernisation process was 
launched, including a richly funded re-armament programme.22 
Russia – Ukraine, 2014. The next step under Russia’s more assertive pol-
icy was to annex the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and instigate military 
conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk. The de facto loss of Crimea was a 
serious blow to Ukraine: within a few weeks it lost two million of its 
citizens and all of its 193 military bases and installations on the pen-
insula, including its two naval bases.23 
Russia supports separatist forces in Donetsk and Luhansk. Thus far, 
almost 11,000 people have died and millions have fled.24
The Russian annexation of Crimea combined with the military 
conflict in the east of Ukraine was a rude awakening not only in the 
West, but also across the whole CIS territory. Russia’s military actions 
in 2014, coupled with the political concept of the “Russian world”, 
Russkiy mir, caused serious concern amongst its partners, in particular 
Kazakhstan but also Belarus. 
Azerbaijan-Armenia, 2016. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the long-
est and the bloodiest of all following the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
The war was fought between 1991 and 1994 and is estimated to have 
cost between 22,000 and 25,000 lives.25 
Russian influence in this conflict was weaker than in any of the 
conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia – mainly because 
its troops are not present in the separatist territory. Russia played an 
important role in the early phases, but later on Armenia gradually 
assumed the function of Nagorno-Karabakh’s political, economic and 
societal patron. Russia has close bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, 
is formally allied with Armenia both bilaterally and within the CSTO 
framework, and provides weapons to both sides.
Whereas Armenia is militarily dependent on Russia, Russian in-
fluence on Nagorno-Karabakh is more limited. The conflict escalated 
22 Vendil Pallin and Westerlund 2009; Renz 2018, pp. 61–76.
23 Hedenskog 2014. 
24 See e.g. Westerlund and Norberg 2016.
25 Hedenskog et al. 2018, pp. 91–93.
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in April 2016 (The Four-Day War) in what was the worst outbreak of 
violence since the ceasefire signed more than two decades ago. 
In sum, no CSTO mechanisms were involved in any of these conflicts. 
Nor was the CSTO involved in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, when ethnic violence 
erupted between the Kyrgyz people and Uzbeks, as mentioned above, or 
in The Four-Day War in 2016.
The inability of this multilateral organisation to act in unison when 
armed conflicts spark illustrates the limits of multilateral military co-
operation.
2.5 NEW STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS
The annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in the east of Ukraine 
had a profound impact throughout the CIS. It was perceived as a game 
changer in terms of military relations. Several countries, including Russia, 
consequently updated their military doctrines and national security doc-
uments. Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan have released new strategic plans, and in 2016 the CSTO 
adopted a new Collective Security Strategy extending to 2025.26 
These documents reflect some of the current concerns among the polit-
ical and military leadership in the countries concerned. At the same time, 
they serve the bureaucratic function of achieving consensus among state 
institutions and thereby may have a lowest-common-denominator aspect. 
In Russia they have been described as “what is left on the battlefield after 
the fight”. Whether the declared threat perception is based on real facts 
or on imaginary scenarios conjured up to serve the purposes of domestic 
politics is a fair question. What is clear, however, is that the threats – as 
formulated in the doctrines and strategic documents – convey useful 
information about the attitudes of the current political leadership, even 
if they do not reveal how the individual countries mentioned above will 
deal with them on the policy level.
According to the Russian view, the unpredictable nature of contem-
porary military conflicts allows less time to prepare for military actions.27 
One reason for this development is the increased use of non-military 
means. Contemporary military conflicts are characterised as the “inte-
grated use of military force, and by political, economic, informational 
or other means of a non-military nature through the wide use of the 
26 CSTO 2016.
27 Voennaia doktrina RF 2014, Articles 9–16.
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population’s protest potential or of special operations troops”. The doc-
trine points to the use of various means such as hypersonic weapons, 
electronic warfare and UAVs. Furthermore, the Military Doctrine men-
tions the use of “irregular armed forces and private military companies” 
in military operations, as well as “indirect and asymmetrical methods”.
The military doctrines of Belarus and Kazakhstan are also pre-occu-
pied with the threat from the so-called colour revolutions and “hybrid 
wars”. The Kazakhstan doctrine explicitly states that hybrid methods of 
conflict present a military threat. 28 With regard to the Belarusian doc-
trine it appears that CSTO membership had some impact: in a published 
draft version the use of Belarusian armed forces outside the territory of 
the country was prohibited. However, this immediately raised objections 
from Armenia, a CSTO member, because Yerevan interpreted the text as 
a possible breach of the collective defence commitment. Consequently, 
this provision was not included in the final version.29 
Armenia updated its doctrine in the wake of the Four-Day War with 
Azerbaijan.30 It replaces the Armenian military’s Soviet-style “Static 
Defence” doctrine, and paves the way for an Armenian pre-emptive strike 
if an assault by the adversary is deemed to be “imminent”.
Both the colour revolutions and the hybrid threats are mentioned in 
the CSTO Strategy. Perceptions of a hostile West, not least the US Missile 
Defence threat, now constitute the common denominator not only among 
CSTO members collectively but also individually in Russia and Belarus. 
Georgia and Ukraine stand out at the other end of this spectrum. They 
clearly declare that Russia constitutes a threat to their national securi-
ty. Both documents codify the ambition of becoming future members 
of NATO.31 
2.6 THE RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE CIS AREA
Moscow has the advantage of having military bases in all the strategic 
directions of Russia’s potential war theatres. The largest base by far is 
that of the Black Sea Fleet in the annexed Crimea with around 28,000 
troops, and Russia has established a joint inter-service force group under 
28 Voennaia doktrina respubliki Kazakhstana 2017, article 2.10.1.
29 Rácz 2016. The Belarusian military doctrine can be found at http://www.mil.by/ru/military_policy/
doktrina/. 
30 Abrahamyan 2017. 
31 The Georgian Strategic Defence Review 2017–2020. For the Ukrainian military doctrine from 2 September 
2015 see President of Ukraine 2018.
    FEBRUARY 2019    57
its command. This primarily strengthens Russia’s own defence perimeter, 
and its air and sea power projection in the Black Sea region.
The armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk are estimated to com-
prise around 34,000 troops, according to The Military Balance. It is im-
possible to establish how many of these belong to the Russian Armed 
Forces, but it is clear that Russia’s military role in Donbas is mainly about 
providing advisors and senior officers to support operations, and sup-
plying military equipment.32 Although Russia denies that its troops are 
involved, President Vladimir Putin has openly admitted that Russian 
military advisors are present in Donetsk and Luhansk: “We’ve never said 
there are no people there who deal with certain matters, including in the 
military sphere, but this does not mean that regular Russian troops are 
present there. Feel the difference.”33
The Southern Military District also controls three military bases abroad, 
namely the Russian bases in Abkhazia (7th) and South Ossetia (4th), with 
a total of 7,000 personnel. These military bases provide Russia with both a 
key lever against Georgia and a structural advantage in potential military 
operations in the region. Another significant Russian military presence 
is the 102nd Military Base in Armenia with around 3,300 soldiers. An air 
defence regiment and an airbase are also located in Armenia, giving Russia 
additional air power.34 
Russia’s smallest military base is to the west, in Transnistria, Moldova’s 
separatist region. This currently consists of the Operational Group of 
Russian Forces (OGRF) directly controlled by Russia’s Western Military 
District, with reportedly around 1,200 military personnel. There is also 
a 400-strong Russian peacekeeping contingent. 
Russia requested permission to open an air base in Belarus in 2015, 
but Minsk refused. On the other hand, Russian pilots regularly practice 
in Belarusian air space, and Russia could easily redeploy its forces should 
the need arise.35
In the eastern direction the 201st Military Base is located in Tajikistan 
with around 5,000 troops, which under the current bilateral treaty with 
Russia can stay until 2042. There is also an Optical Space Monitoring 
Station in Nurek, engaged in finding and identifying objects in space.
Kazakhstan leases the Baikonur Cosmodrome to Russia – under the 
current treaty until 2050. To reduce its reliance on Kazakhstan, however, 
Russia is building the Vostochnyi Cosmodrome in the Far East. 
32 However, Russian Armed Forces units were involved in the battles of Ilovaysk in 2014 and Debaltseve in 2015. 
See McDermott 2015. 
33 President of the Russian Federation 2015.
34 Hedenskog, et. al. 2018, p. 46. See also, Makienko (ed.) 2018, pp. 106–118.
35 Moshes 2017.
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A radar node of the 3rd Space and Missile Defence Army of the Russian 
Aerospace Defence Forces is also located in Kazakhstan as part of a joint 
missile attack warning system. Russia has a testing range located north-
west of lake Balkhash, and an air regiment provides transportation for 
other Russian military installations.36 
Russia has been leasing the Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan since 2003. It 
has been subordinated to the 14th Air Force and Air Defence Army since 
January 2017 when a Russian military base was established under unified 
command.37 The 14th Air Force and Air Defence Army is under the control 
of the Central Military District, its roughly 500 troops mainly supporting 
the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force. The military base also houses 
an anti-submarine testing centre in Karakol, a communications centre 
in Chaldovar and a seismic station that detects nuclear blasts. The Manas 
Air Base was used by the United States Air Force to support the campaign 
in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014, but it is once again operated by 
Kyrgyz forces.
It is worth pointing out that there is no longer any Russian military 
presence in Azerbaijan. The contract for the lease of the Gabala radar 
station was not renewed in 2012, allegedly because of a substantial pay-
ment increase demanded by Azerbaijan. Russia has since built a station 
in Armavir to compensate for the loss of Gabala.
The Joint CIS Air Defence System still exists, but the most significant 
air defence is based on bilateral agreements independent of the CSTO and 
the CIS. The Belarusian-Russian system has been in operation since 2009 
and another one involving Armenia and Russia is being developed, as is a 
joint regional air defence system involving Kazakhstan and Russia. These 
agreements give Moscow control over issues connected with the defence 
of the respective air space of the signatories.
The significance of these military bases is both military and political. 
With Russia again striving to achieve great power status in global affairs, it 
has to be able to project military power. Furthermore, in the aftermath of 
the Crimean operation, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued decrees 
in 2015 and 2017 enabling foreign nationals to serve under contract in 
the Russian armed forces – and to take part in Russian military opera-
tions abroad.38 The potential future competition for personnel could raise 
political concerns in some countries, but it does not have a significant 
military impact.
36 Regnum.ru. 2015.
37 Rossiiskaia gazeta 2017.
38 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2017.
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It is worth noting with regard to the radar stations lost in 1991 that 
Russia has built its own by way of replacement. The bilateral air defence 
cooperation further strengthens its defence boundary.
2.7 FUTURE PROSPECTS
The fall of the Soviet Union led not only to the creation of new states but 
also to a geopolitical vacuum and strong tensions regarding relations with 
Russia. Russia again sees the CIS in terms of 19th-century rivalry over 
spheres of influence. The armed forces constitute one of the instruments 
used to enforce this view. The defence policy has become more militarised 
over the past ten years.
The multilateral approach to collective security in the area has been 
fraught with problems. One obvious reason is that not all the states cre-
ated in 1991 have the same national interests: they selectively opt out, 
effectively hindering the multilateral approach. Cooperation under du-
ress obviously resulted in rising tension and suspicion in several of the 
original CIS members, most notably Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. It is 
of significance that the Soviet legacy of ethnic tensions and the weariness 
of Moscow affected military relations after the dissolution.
The current trend in Russia’s military relations is to work closely and 
bilaterally with a core group of countries to build joint capabilities and 
air defences.
A primary group has emerged as a military alliance in the area, namely 
Russia’s relations with Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan. These countries 
play a key role in three strategic directions: Belarus in the west, Armenia 
in the south and Kazakhstan in the east/Central Asia. 
Nevertheless, all these countries have developed their own sense of 
identity, and Moscow cannot always count on their unwavering support 
in the international arena. After a quarter of a century of independence 
they have a clearer sense of their national interests, and will insist on 
foreign engagement on equal terms. Armenia, for instance, regularly takes 
part in NATO Pf P exercises in Georgia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in turn, 
have close military ties with Russia given its military bases on the ground. 
Uzbekistan has long kept Russia at arm’s length in Central Asia, avoiding 
binding military alliances and other relationships that might cede some 
aspect of its sovereignty. Recently however, military cooperation with 
Russia has accelerated: in October 2017 Russia and Uzbekistan held joint 
military exercises for the first time in twelve years. 
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It could be argued that the security architecture created by Russia, 
including instruments such as the CSTO and its military bases, are not 
primarily intended to guarantee stability and security to Central Asia, but 
are rather aimed at strengthening Russian influence.
At the opposite end of the core group are Ukraine and Georgia. They 
have moved from being part of a Soviet military command system to 
openly naming Russia as a threat. It thus seems that some of the disinte-
grational factors that contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
are still influencing the dynamics within the region.
Turkmenistan is in a category of its own. It relinquished its CIS mem-
bership in 2005, but retains observer status. Having been militarily in-
tegrated in Soviet times, Russia and Turkmenistan currently have no 
significant military relations.39
Looking ahead, one could state that future developments in military 
relations face severe challenges. On the one hand there are unresolved 
conflicts that are unlikely to be settled in the near future: Russia’s military 
actions in Ukraine have added yet another complication, this time with 
serious repercussions in terms of relations with the West. On the other 
hand, however, military relations with CSTO member states have matured, 
and are strong within a core group led by Russia.
The influence of China is on the rise in Central Asia. Strengthening 
competition with Russia is to be expected, but not confrontation – the 
costs are too high. Consequently, when the Russian Armed Forces con-
ducted its Vostok-18 strategic exercise in September, China was invited to 
take part. At the same time, the West is scaling down its military presence 
in Central Asia.40 
With regard to the overall question addressed in this book, whether it 
makes sense to speak about the post-Soviet space as a collective region, 
the answer on the military dimension is “No”. The issue is much more 
complex. Ukraine and Georgia have clearly moved farthest away declaring 
Russia to be a menace. At the same time, Russia is the militarily superior 
power in the CIS by far and will continue to influence military relations 
for years to come.
39 Kazantsev 2017, pp. 67–70. See also Yermakov 2017, pp 221–236.
40 The French base in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) was closed in 2013, the American base in Manas (Kyrgyzstan) in 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Before its collapse the Soviet Union famously reformed many of its foreign 
policy premises, offering the world “new political thinking”, as Mikhail 
Gorbachev proclaimed. Gorbachev’s vision and actions, although semi-
nal, ended in an attempted conservative1 coup d’état in August 1991, and 
eventual failure. What was discussed and fought over in international 
politics before the autumn of 1991 rested on the assumption that the USSR 
would continue to exist as a state entity. As events unfolded in a different 
direction, sovereign republics abruptly faced different challenges from 
those the Soviet government was addressing in the world arena.
One of the unwelcome legacies of the USSR was the failing economy 
that pushed the republics toward painful reforms. Foreign policy tools had 
to be developed to overcome these weaknesses. Most of the post-Soviet 
counties are significantly limited in term of resources, demographics and 
territory as a result of their unexpected independence. Members of the 
senior diplomatic services were used to representing a much bigger coun-
try. Nationalism is a strong psychological and political force, however, 
which is helping to shape the new narratives and the new foreign-policy 
strategies, among other things.
Building up new relationships with other parts of the world was a 
challenge, but a potentially bigger one was to rethink the ties between 
the former Soviet republics and to tackle the international repercussions 
of political conflicts in some of them. The republics, excluding the Baltic 
1 The word “conservative” is used in this chapter to describe an overall preference for political traditions and 
choices reflecting Russia’s imperial and Soviet past. 
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states and Georgia, established the Commonwealth of Independent States 
following the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991, recognising 
the principles and standards of international law and human rights2. As 
is often the case, abiding by the principles turned out to be harder than 
agreeing to them. 
This chapter reviews these post-Soviet nations’ foreign policy in terms 
of strategic options and choices, as well as the key outcomes achieved or 
aimed at in their relations with foreign states. Many countries have basic 
strategic documents that reflect their principle foreign-policy positions, 
but the officially adopted texts cannot reflect the reality in its entirety. In 
this sense, even a brief survey of the respective countries’ foreign policy 
should include a critical overview of their realised goals and achievements. 
To highlight continuity and change it is necessary to consider the initial 
stages of policy formation, which may well establish long-term trends.
Post-Soviet states could be classified in groups based on geographical3 
or geopolitical4 criteria. Both dimensions are important, but they incor-
porate only some of the facets required to shed light on the foreign and 
security policies of the respective countries. Each one inevitably takes 
these dimensions into account, but in different ways. The present analysis 
of the foreign-policy choices of post-Soviet countries does not cover their 
joining of any blocs, given that this aspect is covered in other chapters 
of this volume. Moreover, although such blocs may be instrumental in 
securing limited benefits, in many cases such benefits are not decisive. 
What is significant is the nature of the political systems intertwined with 
the preferences of the political elites. Sub-regions of the post-Soviet space 
are used to structure the chapter, and Russia is singled out as by far the 
biggest state with a presence in each one.
3.2 RUSSIA: COPING WITH ITS HERITAGE
Declared the successor state to the USSR, Russia ensured the continuity of 
treaties signed and obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union, replacing 
it in international organisations, most notably the UN as a permanent 
member of the Security Council. President Boris Yeltsin and his supporters 
tried to make use of the thaw in relations with the West, which Gorbachev 
initiated. However, when it came to the possible intentions of the new 
Russia in the post-Soviet space there was no historical record available to 
2 The New York Times 1991.
3 E.g. Batalden and Batalden 1997.
4 E.g. Popescu 2014.
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be used as a guideline. Both the Russian Empire and the USSR considered 
separatist movements an existential threat they had to supress. Yeltsin set 
a precedent in utilising separatist intentions in the USSR to free himself 
from the supreme authority of Soviet state structures. 
Yeltsin facilitated the collapse of the USSR. This was a key political 
victory for him, whereas the opposition, primarily the communists but 
also large and influential groups in state service, saw it as a national and 
personal catastrophe. Russia’s first and most pro-Western Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozyrev, made this infighting shockingly clear 
to his foreign counterparts in December 1992 at a ministerial meeting 
during the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 
Stockholm: he “threatened to use force against other ex-Soviet repub-
lics and accused NATO of interfering in Russia’s backyard. He described 
the territory of the former Soviet Union as ‘a post-imperial space where 
Russia has to defend its interests by all available means, including military 
and economic ones’. He demanded an end to United Nations sanctions 
against Serbia and expressed Slavic solidarity with Serbian nationalists”5. 
In the next sitting he explained that this was not a change in Russia’s 
foreign policy but a description of what awaited the world if Yeltsin’s 
opponents were to win.
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation signed by 
President Yeltsin in April 19936 acknowledges the “interim importance” 
of Gorbachev’s “new political thinking” but criticises it for abstract 
“non-conflictual globalism” and the maintenance of an outdated view of 
the world order as a competition between socialist and capitalist systems. 
Although this was clearly a reflection of the uneasy relationship between 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the more specific message was that the new Russia 
would not repeat Gorbachev’s mistake of being too naïve. The key foreign 
policy goals declared in the Concept included the termination of armed 
clashes and the resolution of conflicts around Russia, as well as guaran-
teeing full respect of human and minority rights in the “near abroad”, 
especially among ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people. 
A further complaint was that the “formation of foreign policy in a 
number of CIS states is marked by an emphasised willingness to distance 
themselves from Russia, a characteristic of the emerging independence”, 
as well as by territorial disputes and “a kind of allergy to anything that 
resembles the former dependence on Soviet structures”. The resulting 
landscape is described as a “complex process of forming the near geopo-
litical surroundings of Russia, the outcome of which will depend largely 
5 The Independent 1992.
6 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik 1993, pp. 3-23.
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on our ability, by persuasion or as a last resort by force, to ensure the 
principles of international law, including the rights of minorities, to fight 
for a solid, good neighbourhood”. Russia is referred to as a “great power” 
that has to bear “the principle burden of peacekeeping in the CIS”.
The CIS is extensively discussed in the Concept as a regional organisa-
tion that Russia strongly supported, although it is assumed that the en-
thusiasm might not be shared by other members demanding the “flexible” 
and “multi-speed” development of CIS structures. The growing influence 
of third states in post-Soviet space was seen as a risk in terms of Russian 
interests on the one hand and an inevitability on the other. 
The primary international security concern in the early 1990s was to 
secure Russia’s control over the Soviet Union’s entire nuclear arsenal – a 
move decisively supported by the West. The 1993 Concept places great 
importance on establishing close bonds between the EU, NATO, Western 
Europe and the “shaping security system of the CSCE”. Russia also aimed 
at diverse and intensive cooperation specifically with NATO. 
If it was to contribute to resolving the severe economic problems, for-
eign policy had to ensure the maintenance and further development of the 
common economic space on “former USSR territory”, as well as obtaining 
consultative and other support from the West. Other priorities included 
strengthening Russia’s role as a leading power in space exploration and 
arms exportation, while striving to reach international agreement on 
prohibiting the export of weapons to conflict zones.
The goals listed in the 1993 Concept under the sub-heading “Western 
Europe” were largely achieved in the subsequent years. They included 
the conclusion of an agreement on multi-dimensional cooperation with 
the EU (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1994), accession to 
the Council of Europe (Russia joined in February 1996), participation in 
sub-regional organisations and the development of bilateral ties. It was 
believed among the Russian leadership in the early 1990s that Russia’s 
active participation in regional multilateral arrangements would compen-
sate for its economic weaknesses and make it equally or more important 
for Western partners than other newly independent states. 
As far as “Eastern Europe”, meaning the former Eastern Bloc and the 
newly independent states in the region, were concerned the 1993 Concept 
proclaimed a “completely new strategy” devoid of the “imperial ar-
rogance and egocentrism” of the USSR. This was the message that was 
meant to allay the already evident worries of former allies, and to relieve 
Russian citizens of the burden of foreign-policy adventures. The strategic 
goal had to be “to avoid the transformation of Eastern Europe into a sort 
of buffer that would isolate us from the West”. On the other hand, Russia 
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had to avoid being pushed out of Eastern Europe by the West. Specific 
tasks referring to “Eastern Europe” were purely bilateral or related to 
conflict resolution (primarily in Yugoslavia). The potential geopolitical 
risks for Russia, which shaped Russian policy discourse in the following 
decades, were immediately recognised but there was no clearly formu-
lated and tangible plan to mitigate them. The principle reason for this 
was that Russia and other parts of the former Eastern Bloc faced similar 
challenges related to economic and institutional transformation. Russia 
was looking for financial and technical help itself, and could not become 
a source of help among its neighbours. Moreover, the formal diplomatic 
peer-to-peer relationships of the newly independent states naturally 
required time to take shape. 
The 1993 Concept formally remained in force for the rest of Boris 
Yeltsin’s presidency, until 2000. It was reviewed four times in the years 
that followed – reflecting the changes in leadership (Yeltsin-Putin in 2000, 
Putin-Medvedev in 2008, Medvedev-Putin in 2013) and the consequences 
of the Ukraine crisis in 2016)7.
The year 1993 ended for Russia with a limited but violent civil con-
flict in Moscow, when President Yeltsin brought down the conservative 
parliament and adopted the new Constitution that remains in force a 
quarter of a century later. It states: the President “shall determine the 
guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the State”, and “govern 
the foreign policy of the Russian Federation”8. The conservative mood 
openly expressed by the opposition-driven parliament did not soften. 
Conservatism, or in more general terms realpolitik, which is considered 
by actors in the area of foreign and security policy in particular to be the 
only feasible alternative to ensure the protection of the national interest, 
has been Russia’s mainstream policy for most of the time since the col-
lapse of the USSR. Minister Kozyrev and any other liberal voices in the 
government were almost immediately deprived of any direct influence 
on hard security issues. When the military had the final word, diplomats 
were left to deal with the consequences.
This effect of this was most obvious in the more prolonged post-Soviet 
conflicts in which Russia played a role, positioning itself as a mediator 
but de facto taking sides. The proponents of this approach considered it 
necessary to support entities appealing for Russia’s help, framing it as “us 
against them”, and seeing the collapse of the USSR as unfinished business 
that did not give those seeking reunification with Russia a chance to secede. 
This inevitably resulted in tensions among a number of post-Soviet states. 
7 The updates did not always appear in same the year as the events that caused them.
8 Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993. Article 80 (3), 86 (a).
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Russian efforts at conflict resolution were genuine in many respects, 
but were conditional upon a commitment to closer ties. The dominant 
vision was that after a period of time the post-Soviet states would redis-
cover the potential benefits of permanent cooperation with Russia. The 
more divergent the foreign-policy visions of the conflict-torn post-Soviet 
states became, the less inclined the Russian government was to facilitate 
the reunification of the separatist “us” with “them”.
The ghost of the Cold War re-emerged in Russia’s relations with 
the West on a number of occasions. It was prevalent at the Budapest 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in December 
1994: Russia protested against NATO enlargement, whereas the West com-
plained about Russia’s military support for opponents of the separatists in 
Chechnya, referring to “tanks and modern fighter-jets without insignia”9. 
All-out war broke out in Chechnya immediately afterwards, to the further 
detriment of the relationship. 
Andrey Kozyrev resigned as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 
1996, to be succeeded by Evgeniy Primakov, an academician and the head 
of the Foreign Intelligence Service in 1991-96. He emphasised the need to 
develop a multipolar world in which Russia wold play a notable role as 
part of a strategic triangle with India and China10. This counter-balance 
to the West was not meant to be adversarial. Minister Primakov invested 
in fostering relations with the West, which improved at that time.
In line with Russia’s influential business representatives, the West 
preferred the re-election of Yeltsin in the summer of 1996 to a looming 
communist revanche. The First Chechen War ended with the Khasavyurt 
Accords in August 1996 and the withdrawal of Russian federal armed forc-
es from the region. In May 1997 Russia and NATO signed the Founding Act 
that helped to resolve issues arising from any enlargement of the Alliance. 
President Yeltsin and Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma signed a bilat-
eral treaty in the same month, which was ratified by the Russian State 
Duma in December 1998 after a heated debate over the fate of Crimea. By 
July 1997 Russian participation had turned G7 into G8. The 1999 Kosovo 
crisis dealt a further blow to Russia’s relations with the West. An at-
tempt to resolve various European security concerns in a package deal 
was made at the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999 but failed over 
the longer term.
During his first two terms in office Vladimir Putin made efforts to 
form an allied relationship with the West, which were successful in part. 
He offered the USA much-needed support in its Afghanistan campaign 
9 Kommersant 1994. 
10 Simha 2015.
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(2001), built advanced bilateral relationships with a number of European 
states, agreed on the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (2002), 
and on the concept of “common spaces” with the EU (2003). Russia signed 
a visa-facilitation agreement with the EU (2006), which is still in force, 
and started negotiations on a new treaty. As time went on the President 
became increasingly sceptical about Russia’s chances of becoming a re-
spected player in the Western team. He revealed his frustration in his 
famous speech11 at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007: it 
was probably meant to be honest talk but it was understood as a decla-
ration of Cold War. The last months of Putin’s second presidential term 
were marked by a US-driven campaign to recognise Kosovo and a NATO 
Bucharest summit putting on paper12 future membership for Ukraine and 
Georgia. Russia has clearly seen NATO as a vehicle for strengthening the 
US presence in Europe and making it permanent. As far as Georgia, and 
especially Ukraine, are concerned this could involve the most sophisti-
cated military facilities and equipment with direct access to vast parts 
of European Russia. The impression of the Russian leadership was that 
whatever it said or did, their concerns were increasingly ignored by the 
powerful and confident West.
Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency could have been an opportunity for 
a new beginning. Indeed, his proposals, first and foremost on European 
security13, were designed as such. Instead, it will be remembered for the 
war in Georgia, the disputed recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s 
independence, and the Arab spring culminating in the 2011 Libya cam-
paign mainly involving Western powers. NATO intervention in Libya was 
facilitated by UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Russia abstained from 
voting following the deliberate and, in the eyes of Russian security circles 
mistaken, decision by President Medvedev, who probably saw it as a way 
of establishing Russia as an indispensable and cooperative Western ally. 
Putin, at that time the Prime Minister, openly spoke against the Resolution, 
calling it “handicapped” and “resembling calls for Crusades”14. His return 
to the presidency was obviously met with little enthusiasm in the West. 
The displeasure with Medvedev’s “interregnum” in security circles was 
further confirmed in an unprecedented documentary with comments 
from high-level military personnel openly blaming Medvedev’s alleged 
indecisiveness during the 2008 Georgia war15.
11 Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy 2007.
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The 2014 Ukraine crisis further aggravated the Cold War-like atmos-
phere and delineated Russia’s immediate environment in Europe as com-
peting for influence. For the first time since the early 1990s a completely 
new16 conflict involving Russia erupted in the East of Ukraine, with no 
end in sight. The Russian President seems to believe that giving up is not 
an option, and that in the longer run his policies will help Russia to se-
cure its interests. In the meantime, the Russian government is acting as a 
“pivot to the East”, intensively developing relations with key Asian states 
that do not see the events in and around Ukraine as a stumbling block.
3.3 EASTERN EUROPE: MAKING A CHOICE
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and arguably for centuries be-
fore that, the fate of Ukraine has been seen pivotal to the future of the 
sub-region. As US strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is of Polish descent, 
famously claimed, “[i]t cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, 
Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subor-
dinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire”17. Conservative Russian 
observers happily refer to these words, which they see as a manifestation 
of the irreconcilable divergence of interests between the West and Russia, 
the former determined to prevent the success of the latter by any means. 
Whether being an empire represents success is arguable at best, but in the 
conservative worldview the empire is the only form of Russia’s histori-
cal existence, and on this basis Brzezinski’s words could be interpreted 
as an outright willingness to destroy Russia. The Ukrainian nationalist 
movement was among the key targets of the tsarist and Soviet security 
apparatus. Russia and Ukraine developed a complicated but peaceful 
relationship that lasted for more than two decades until the 2014 crisis 
separated the two neighbours for the foreseeable future. 
In July 1993 the Ukrainian Parliament adopted Key Foreign Policy 
Guidelines18 that describe relations with Russia as a “special partnership” 
that “will to a large extent define the progressive democratic development 
of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and stability in Europe and 
the world”. The same passage includes a pledge to counteract territo-
rial claims and attempts to meddle in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. The 
Guidelines specifically mention an “extremely important task” to make 
16 In spite of the fact that vast regional differences in Ukraine were well known and used as one of the political 
instruments, for most people in and outside the conflict zone the military escalation came as an unexpected 
shock.
17 Brzezinski 1994. 
18 Postanovlenie ob osnovnikh napravleniyakh vneshney politiki Ukrainy 1993.
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both Ukraine and Russia aware of the perils of confrontation. Among re-
gional organisations the CSCE and NATO are prioritised such that Ukraine’s 
involvement would “gradually transform” NATO structures, eventually 
making them “elements of a new all-European security system com-
patible with the Helsinki Process”. Given the changes resulting from the 
collapse of the USSR Ukraine’s declared willingness to be neutral and 
non-aligned had to be “adapted to the new circumstances” and could not 
be seen as an obstacle to full participation in the “all-European security 
structure”. The Guidelines confirm Ukraine’s determination to become 
a non-nuclear state, first declared in October 1991.
Ukraine also aimed at membership of the Council of Europe, which 
was achieved by late 1995. Membership of European Communities “and 
other Western European and all-European structures” was defined as 
a possible future goal, “unless it would be harmful to [Ukraine’s] na-
tional interests”. In this sense the Partnership and Cooperation with the 
European Union Agreement (concluded in 1994) was the first step, to be 
followed by associated and then full membership. The CIS is referred to 
in the Guidelines as a useful consultation mechanism, mainly because it 
was way of dealing with the Soviet legacy.
The strategic choices made by Ukraine in the early 1990s were sus-
tained in spite of multiple domestic turbulence, but significant adjust-
ments were necessary. Over the course of 25 years the country had five 
presidents and 15 ministers of foreign affairs. President Kuchma de-
clared the country’s willingness to join NATO in May 2002. The winners 
of the 2004-05 Orange revolution maintained this goal until 2010, when 
President Viktor Yanukovich decided that a non-bloc status was best for 
Ukraine19. The Euromaidan of 2014 turned the tables again. The public 
revolt was triggered by the refusal of President Yanukovich to enter into 
an Association Agreement with the EU, which was eventually signed by 
the victors in mid-2014 and came into force in 2016-1720. Ukrainians 
acquired the right of visa-free travel to the EU in 2017 (Ukrainian visas 
for EU and US citizens were unilaterally abolished in 2005). President 
Petro Poroshenko declared his intention to insert the imperative of EU/
NATO integration into the country’s constitution. Given the outcomes of 
the 2014 ground-breaking crisis the appeal and significance of Western 
institutions for Ukraine strengthened dramatically: an all-European se-
curity structure was dropped as an unfulfilled dream, whereas relations 
with Russia deteriorated to a level that was considered a risk to be avoided 
a quarter of a century previously. 
19 NATO 2015.
20 EEAS 2016.
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In the case of Belarus its initial attempts to define its place in the world 
largely resembled Ukraine’s priorities described above,21 but most of its 
post-Soviet history since 1994 has been marked by the long presidency of 
Aleksander Lukashenko. Determined to strengthen presidential powers 
and to marginalise the opposition Lukashenko soon soured relations with 
Western institutions that accused him of violating commonly accepted 
norms. The Belarusian application to join the Council of Europe has been 
frozen since 1997. The country’s leadership was on the receiving end of 
EU sanctions and the US reflected Western attitudes to the repression 
of the opposition after the presidential elections of 2006 and 2010. The 
authorities ordered the expulsion of Western diplomats on several occa-
sions. The negative dynamics in the Belarus-Western relationship started 
to change during the Ukraine crisis, when the dramatic developments 
involving Belarus’ neighbours helped the country to position itself as a 
balanced and predictable mediator. Minsk has been the venue for regular 
talks on Donbass since 2014.
At the same time as Belarus became relatively isolated from the West 
it strengthened its relations with Russia. They formed a community in 
April 1996, and the Union State of Russia and Belarus a year later. The 
Belarusian President’s relationship with Russia has had many tactical ups 
and downs but he nevertheless remains Moscow’s closest ally. Belarus also 
benefits from providing the key energy and goods transit route between 
Russia and the EU. 
The 2005 Guidelines on Belarus’ home and foreign policy are delib-
erately broad22. The document lists general principles and policy tools 
but does not define its relations with particular partners. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs does list regional priorities, however,23 which highlight 
the importance of post-Soviet regional organisations such as the CIS, 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO). Attention is paid to the broadly defined prospect of 
normalising relations with the EU and the US. 
The President of Belarus is regarded as a sophisticated player who is 
using the mutual suspicion between Russia and the West to ensure his 
sovereignty. At the same time, the outcomes of this policy line remain 
ambiguous. Belarus remains the only country in the EAEU, and one of the 
few in the world, that has not joined the World Trade Organization, which 
would benefit business and future EAEU cohesion. Any formal legal-
ly-binding agreements between the EU and Belarus remain complicated 
21 Snapkovskiy 2016.
22 Pravo.by 2005. 
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus 2018.
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given the long-felt Western scepticism towards the Belarusian political 
system. On the other hand, Belarus’ sudden unilateral visa liberalisation 
for a large number of countries24 led to the reintroduction of irritating 
border checks with Russia, which has a much more conservative visa 
policy. The intention of the Belarusian authorities to make the country 
more accessible to foreigners clashes with its unchanged internal power 
mechanisms.
Moldova emerged as an independent state in the midst of political 
infighting around Transdniestria and the looming option of unification 
with Romania, which remains unexplored. Its 1994 Constitution declares 
“permanent neutrality”25. The foreign-policy concept26 adopted by the 
Moldovan Parliament in 1995 could have been inspired by the Ukrainian 
Guidelines discussed above. 
Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were highlighted as a prior-
ity that would “to a large extent define political stability and the success of 
political and economic reforms” in Moldova. On the other hand, Romania 
was seen as the country that could help Moldova to overcome “one-sid-
ed economic dependence” and facilitate its accession to the European 
community (obviously understood more broadly than the EU, of which 
Romania was not yet a member). Accession to the Council of Europe was 
listed as the primary goal (accomplished in 1995) and membership of 
the EU in the longer term. As Moldova saw it, the signing of the 2014 
Association Agreement and visa-free travel in the same year were steps 
in this direction, even if EU membership has not yet been sanctioned by 
Brussels. Moldova, as Ukraine did at around the same time, declared sup-
port for the gradual transformation of NATO structures into the elements 
of a new European security system.
Although Transnistrian conflict is not specifically mentioned in the 
1995 Concept, in recent decades it has been one of the key topics of dis-
cussion between Moldova and its foreign partners. What was commonly 
referred to as the easiest frozen conflict to resolve27, however, still lacks 
a mutually acceptable outcome.
In spite of the direct proximity and economic importance of the EU, 
Moldova keeps struggling with geopolitical choices and governance issues. 
The country’s President since 2016, Igor Dodon, is exploring the possibility 
24 Belarus.by 2017
25 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, Article 11. 
26 Postanovlenie Nr.368 ob utverzhdenii Kontseptsii vneshney politiki Respubliki Moldova 1995.
27 The hostile phase of the Transnistrian conflict was short and limited in scope. It would seem to be a question 
of linguistic rights rather than ethnicities. Direct communication between Chisinau and Tiraspol officials, 
as well as transport connections, are far from perfect but extensively normalised in comparison with other 
protracted conflicts.
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of EAEU engagement. Moldova became the first EAEU observer state in 
2018 – there had been no such status previously. The higher level of policy 
coordination with Russia could be interpreted as an attempt finally to 
resolve the Transnistria conflict. However, Dodon’s ideas are vehemently 
opposed by supporters of European integration. Most of the country’s 
political class is seen in the West as astonishingly corrupt, which further 
complicates the integration of the republic into Western institutions.
3.4 SOUTH CAUCASUS: ETHNIC FAULT LINES
Georgia in the early 1990s was in a state of domestic turmoil and at war 
with separatists. When former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard 
Shevardnadze was appointed leader he tried to use the relationship with 
Russia to resolve the separatist conflicts. As President he decided to join 
the CIS In December 1993, when Georgia was in the midst of a real eco-
nomic disaster28. In line with many other European countries in the 1990s, 
Georgia developed a partnership with NATO.
The ground-breaking change came with the Rose Revolution in 
November 2003 and the election of Mikheil Saakashvili as President ear-
ly in 2004. Saakashvili’s ambition was to reshape the country’s identity 
and policies. He enjoyed strong support from the West, while arousing 
suspicion in the Russian leadership. 
Georgia is aiming at NATO and EU membership, claiming that these 
goals are potentially attainable even if the territorial disputes remain 
unresolved. The example of West Germany, which joined the Atlantic 
Alliance in 1955 while maintaining non-recognition of East Germany, is 
often mentioned as a valid precedent. Georgia along with Ukraine indeed 
received encouragement from NATO at the 2008 Bucharest summit, and 
were promised future membership. The 2014 Association Agreement 
with the EU and the visa-free travel introduced in 2018 are also seen as 
stepping stones leading to full participation in key Western institutions, 
which would exclude even the theoretical possibility of EAEU membership.
The 2008 war strengthened these trends. When Russia recognised the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia the Georgian government 
severed diplomatic relations with Moscow and left the CIS. Some form of 
economic interaction and diplomatic dialogue with Russia were subse-
quently restored, however, when Saakashvili left the presidential office 
in 2013. The Georgian government’s position on diplomatic relations has 
not changed. 
28 Kommersant 1993.
    FEBRUARY 2019    77
The initial formation of state policies In Armenia was also heavily in-
fluenced by an armed conflict. The intense phase of the Karabakh war 
ended in 1994 but the long-standing enmity is not even close to being 
resolved. Turkey, which is supportive of Azerbaijan, did not establish 
diplomatic relations with Armenia and blocked the Turkish-Armenian 
border. Armenia found itself in a unique geostrategic position. Hemmed 
in by two of its neighbours it had two lifelines: one passed through Iran, 
a country that faced heavy international sanctions most of the time, and 
the other went through Georgia. 
Given Georgia’s difficult relations with Russia the likelihood of de-
veloping an infrastructure connecting Armenia and Russia via Georgia 
is limited. At the same time, Armenia was never completely isolated. It 
enjoys the support of the vast and influential diaspora and successfully 
developed bilateral relations with many Western states. Whereas the re-
lationship with Russia is important for historical, economic and political 
reasons, Russia’s balancing act on the Karabakh issue frequently attracts 
criticism from the Armenian elite. Armenia is one of the founding mem-
bers of the CSTO, and it had to drop the idea of entering into an Association 
Agreement with the EU in 2013 in order to join the EAEU. Nevertheless, 
in November 2017 it signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership 
Agreement29 with the EU that did not interfere with the rules of the EAEU 
customs union. The country experienced a peaceful change of political 
leadership in 2018, which raised the question of whether the level of mu-
tual understanding with the Russian government would be maintained. 
Most experts concluded that given the difficulties in the immediate neigh-
bourhood it would be the interest of any future Armenian government30.
The Karabakh conflict meant the de facto loss of substantial territo-
ries for Azerbaijan, although de jure Karabakh independence remains 
unrecognised by UN members including Armenia. The population of 
Azerbaijan is three times as big as that of Armenia, its GDP (PPP) is six 
times bigger, and it generates revenue from its vast natural resources. In 
the eyes of many in Azerbaijan the imbalance constitutes the grounds for 
a future revanche through negotiation or by force. The tension between 
the two nations is possibly stronger and more dangerous than in any other 
post-Soviet crisis zone.
Azerbaijan, in line with a number of oil-rich states, is more sceptical 
than its neighbours about economic integration. On the military level it 
also prefers to avoid multilateral alliances that would in all probability 
remain unhelpful should the Karabakh situation escalate. For the West, 
29 EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 2017.
30 E.g. Shakarian 2018.
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Azerbaijan is one of the sources of energy that is an alternative to Russia, 
and could be used to boost the diversification of supply. This strong in-
terest31 has significantly reduced the volume of Western criticism of the 
country’s government regarding democratic standards and respect for 
human rights. At the same time its hereditary presidents – Heydar Aliyev 
and Ilham Aliyev – who benefited in the past from being in Soviet elite 
circles, manage to maintain stable and friendly relations with the Russian 
leadership. Importantly for Russia and other neighbours, Azerbaijan is 
one of the Caspian states co-deciding the fate of the resource-rich basin. 
States of the South Caucasus enjoy a unique geographical position that 
they cannot exploit to the full on account of the acute conflicts that give 
no reason to hope for a resolution in the near future. Given the adjacent 
surroundings shaped by Russia’s troubled North Caucasus, Iran, which 
is highly likely to experience growing tensions with the USA and the 
turbulent Middle East, the long-term future of this Eurasian powder keg 
will require further stabilisation efforts on the international level.
3.5 CENTRAL ASIA: THE CROSSROADS OF EURASIA
Contrary to multiple concerns related to radical movements and an in-
stability spill-over from Afghanistan, Central Asian states have man-
aged either to avoid or resolve the kind of disputes still going on in other 
sub-regions of the post-Soviet space. These states are often discussed 
in terms of unfinished political transition, although the basic structures 
may still successfully cope with major risks in the future. Policies are 
strongly influenced by leaders, who cannot remain in power forever, 
but this will not necessarily alter understanding of the national interest 
in foreign affairs.
The international environment in Central Asia is shaped by Russia and 
China, as well as by the frequently difficult relationships among the states 
and with other countries that willingly engage with the resource-rich re-
gion. China has the potential to become the dominant player. This carries 
both risks and opportunities, but China is more readily considered a risk. 
Nursultan Nazarbayev has been President of Kazakhstan since before 
its independence. He was one of the most promising representatives 
of the younger generation in the Soviet leadership, and has been a key 
proponent of Eurasian integration as a way of uniting the efforts of core 
post-Soviet states struggling with many economic-development issues. 
Kazakhstan was therefore one of the founders of the EAEU. Nazarbayev 
31 Coffey and Nifti 2018.
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also understood that foreign policy for a country situated between Russia 
and China was inevitably a balancing act that should at best involve other 
power centres. 
Kazakhstan’s President approved a newly drafted Foreign Policy 
Concept in 201432. Unsurprisingly, the country’s priorities include stabil-
ity in Central Asia, Eurasian economic integration, agreement on borders 
in the Caspian Sea, and participation in global and regional multilateral 
organisations. Kazakhstan is aiming at “full-scale relations” with the EU, 
including the prospect of visa-free travel, and both parties concluded 
a new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in October 
201533. Relations with China are described in the Policy Concept as a 
“comprehensive strategic partnership”. A new bilateral treaty signed 
in 2013, which refers to Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia in terms of 
good neighbours and allies,34 is also a military alliance of sorts, given 
Kazakhstan’s participation in the CSTO.
Uzbekistan, the country with the biggest population in Central Asia, 
recently experienced a major change of political leadership. President 
Islam Karimov headed the country for 27 years and gradually, after several 
ups and downs, stated a preference for economic and political isolation-
ism. The Collective Security Treaty – the basis of military cooperation 
– was signed in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. However, President 
Karimov declined prolonging the Treaty in 1999 and opted instead to 
join the GUAM – a loose Russia-free cooperation format set up in 1997 by 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. After a few years, however, 
Karimov became disillusioned with GUAM and left it as well. His rela-
tions with the West soured following violent clashes in the Uzbekistan 
city of Andijan in May 2005. He joined the CSTO in 2006, and then again 
suspended membership in 2012.
The President’s successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, came to power 
in December 2016. He showed a willingness to make adjustments to 
Uzbekistan’s policies, which now seemed to aim at more but still limit-
ed and controlled openness. Many foreign partners see this as a chance 
to reboot their relations with the country, as neighbours of which the 
previous president had been openly suspicious. 
Kyrgyzstan could be considered the least autocratic country in Central 
Asia. Starting from 2005 it experienced multiple changes of political lead-
ership, which did not bring economic success. Its first President Askar 
32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2014.
33 EU Delegation to Kazakhstan: 1 December 2017.
34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia 2013.
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Akayev attempted35 to benefit from the idea of a new Silk Road before 
it came into fashion as a result of Chinese efforts. China is Kyrgyzstan’s 
big and powerful neighbour, which brings both opportunities and risks. 
At the expense of territorial compromise and notable political fighting, 
Kyrgyzstan managed to resolve border issues with China in 2002. 
The relative enthusiasm demonstrated by Kyrgyzstan’s leadership for 
different forms of post-Soviet integration could be attributable in part to 
a desire to counter-balance China. However, it also reflects the search for 
economic leverage and a generally positive assessment of the outcomes 
of the Soviet era. Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU in August 2015, six months 
behind the founding members, which ignited worries related primarily 
to the role the country might play in “grey” imports from China. 
Tajikistan, on the other hand, remains outside the EAEU framework. 
Its border with Afghanistan is seen by EAEU members as another security 
risk, hence they are in no rush to bring the country on board. Tajikistan, in 
turn, is trying to leave all options on the table and is assessing the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of membership36. The country, headed 
by Emomali Rahmon since 1992, has set three strategic foreign-policy 
goals: energy independence, breaking the communications deadlock (i.e. 
access to ports and other infrastructure) and food security37. Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan are the leading recipients of development assistance in 
Central Asia38.
Tajikistan is ethnically and linguistically close to Iran, but this does not 
necessarily promote a flourishing relationship. President Rahmon seems 
to be increasingly concerned about Iranian influence on the economic, 
political and religious level39. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are CSTO members that form the southern 
flank of the organisation. Given the continuous instability in Afghanistan, 
Russia is motivated to maintain a modest but permanent military presence 
in the republics. The USA has expressed a similar interest, and extensively 
uses the Manas airbase to support its Afghanistan campaign. 
The strictest political regime in the post-Soviet space, Turkmenistan, 
uses its vast natural reserves to refrain from close alliances, which re-
sembles Azerbaijan’s strategy. The change of leadership in 2006 did not 
alter the essence of the regime. It seems to be reviving its participation 
in the most loose of the post-Soviet organisations – the CIS – at a very 
35 Dundich 2012.
36 Azernews 2018.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tadjikistan 2018.
38 Mirovaya Economika i Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya 2018.
39 Sputnik Tadjikistan 2018.
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steady pace: it chaired the organisation for the first time in 2012 and is 
expected to do so again in 201940. Turkmenistan, like Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Azerbaijan, is a Caspian state involved in negotiations on its status that 
recently produced a somewhat positive result41. Its Foreign Policy Concept 
declares that the state is prioritising environmental and water diplomacy42. 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
In the third decade since their political, economic, social and ethnic “di-
vorce”, the post-Soviet states naturally feel further apart. Each of them 
followed its own path of political evolution, including foreign policy. What 
initially looked like a similar set of challenges defined by deep transforma-
tion towards a market economy, turned out to be different and driven by 
“destiny” – an abundance or lack of resources, a more or less encouraging 
regional environment and the availability of welcoming alliances.
These post-Soviet states use their membership of multilateral institu-
tions as a tool to serve their national interests. The different foreign-policy 
choices being made depend on the political regime and the immediate 
geographical surroundings, but what is common to them all is that they 
look at foreign policy as a manifestation of their sovereignty and as a way 
of strengthening it.
All post-Soviet states were aware of the leading role played by the 
West in the world arena in the early 1990s, and many attempted to benefit 
from cooperating with them. Over time their expectations became more 
realistic, as open frustration surfaced. The uneasy relationship between 
Russia and the West cannot be ignored by the other post-Soviet states, 
which try to avoid negative repercussions for themselves. Ukraine and 
Georgia are different in that they are already engaged in a tug-of-war to 
an extent that makes them believe joining the West is the only workable 
security guarantee for them.
Countries cannot choose neighbours, and the post-Soviet states quick-
ly learned that many of their foreign-policy concerns related less to their 
political leadership and more to their immediate geographical environ-
ment. Some countries are luckier than others in this regard, but most have 
to deal with the fact that their neighbours are also going through difficult 
internal transformation. Neighbouring states may become suspicious of 
one another, or even adversarial, regardless of the rational conclusion 
40 Trend 2018.
41 BBC News 2018.
42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan
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that they would derive mutual benefit more readily from constructive 
cooperation than from rivalry. 
Sovereignty implies the development of national elites, including in 
foreign policy, who proudly defend their countries’ national interests. 
The worst possible scenario would be for them to give up the right to a 
hypothetical Eurasian political union. The post-Soviet regional organisa-
tions will continue to develop in a flexible, sometimes amorphous manner, 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most visible legacies of the Soviet Union still persistent in the 
political life of the Eurasian countries is a wide array of organisations 
for regional integration, which have been flourishing in the region since 
the early 1990s and remain active almost thirty years later.1 Post-Soviet 
Eurasia is not unique in this sense and is probably comparable to vari-
ous post-colonial commonwealths (such as the British and the French). 
However, Eurasian regional organisations go well beyond most other 
commonwealths in their ambitions. In fact, a persistent goal of Eurasian 
regionalism, which the actors involved repeatedly proclaim, is to create 
some sort of “Eurasian EU” – in a nutshell, an organisation with open 
borders allowing the free movement of people, capital and goods, with a 
high level of policy coordination and institutions similar to those of the 
European Union. This is not to say that all post-Soviet countries have al-
ways embraced this idea, and certainly not that they would be willing to 
implement it: on the contrary, even the most pro-integrationist powers 
such as Kazakhstan put very clear limits on how far the integration should 
go. Nevertheless, politicians from Eurasian states have been willing to 
engage in repeated integration games for three decades, during which 
time agreements have been signed and goals proclaimed that serve as 
milestones on the way to a “Eurasian EU”. 
Clearly, the Eurasian states did not manage to create their own EU 
analogue. Even the Customs Union of 2010 fell far short of European 
1 Furman, Rácz, and Ushkalova 2013, pp. 255–268.
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integration.2 This is not surprising: the EU is and will probably remain a 
unique case in the universe of regional organisations in terms of its ac-
torness and policy impact. Nevertheless, such organisations are the most 
visible sign of the promotion of the post-Soviet space as a specific region 
in world politics. Even if they have little policy impact, as long as they 
attract sufficient attention from politicians and the general public they 
will strengthen the perception of the former Soviet Union as a distinct area 
comprising countries that belong together in some sense.3 It is therefore 
necessary to understand how and why these organisations evolved if 
one wishes to explore the surviving legacy of the Soviet Union in Eurasia. 
The aim in this chapter is to study the evolution of the Eurasian model 
of regionalism, and more specifically to shed light on the specific insti-
tutional forms its member states have chosen. We consider the imitation 
of regionalism in the broader context of the imitational regimes that 
emerged in most Eurasian countries. These polities, which on the formal 
level resembled the institutions of advanced democracies, for the most 
part relied on informal practices that safeguarded the power of the au-
tocratic elites. We suggest that the nature of these imitational regimes 
affected the way in which post-Soviet regional organisations developed 
and the integration results they achieved at various stages of their evo-
lution. This, in turn, had an effect on the extent of interdependence and 
commonality among Eurasian countries. We consider the current situation 
in light of the pre-1991 state.
4.1.1 Why Eurasian states were unable to create their own EU
Three former Soviet republics signed the Belavezha Accords officially 
disbanding the Soviet Union on 8 December 1991. Only two months lat-
er, on 7 February 1992, members of the European Community signed 
the Maastricht Treaty, which was the cornerstone in the establishment 
of the European Union and a new step in the development of European 
integration. These two events – the fragmentation of the Soviet Union 
and a major step towards European integration – almost coincided. On 
an official level the Belavezha Accords were perceived as a tool for main-
taining the integrated economic and social space of the Soviet Union 
by means of international regional-integration initiatives, which over 
time came closer and closer to the blueprint of the EU (in the form of the 
2 The EU has a developed supranational decision-making mechanism, a strong court systematically promoting 
an integration agenda, regulatory power in numerous policy fields, substantial authority in terms of 
protecting the internal market (including antitrust), and a Common Security and Defense Policy. The 
Customs Union, on the other hand, has no elements of political and security integration, much more limited 
regulatory powers and a much weaker essence of supranationality (if any at all). On measuring the extent of 
integration in regional organisations see Hooghe et al. 2017. 
3 Libman,and Vinokurov 2012.
    FEBRUARY 2019    89
Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS). The irony of post-Soviet 
integration is that it did not start out to integrate the region it comprised, 
but rather emerged as a by-product of its disintegration. Still, the point 
of time at which Eurasian regionalism emerged made reference to the EU 
as a blueprint and its emulation a natural choice for post-Soviet countries.
The close economic and social ties between the Eurasian countries 
in the 1990s appeared to form a solid basis for the development of a re-
gional-integration initiative. The main function of this initiative was to 
preserve – and possibly to build upon – existing connections such as 
cooperation between enterprises and a common infrastructure, as well 
as to resolve issues associated with the Soviet legacy of interdependence 
including safeguarding pension payments to citizens of the new independ-
ent states and the mutual recognition of university degrees, for example. 
Whether regional integration following the EU example (including specific 
governance mechanisms and a specific sequence of steps towards region-
alism) would preserve or re-establish the economic, political and social 
ties severed by the collapse of the Soviet Union remains an open question, 
however. There are several reasons for arguing that this is unlikely. 
To start with, post-Soviet countries in Eurasia were already very highly 
integrated economically and socially at the onset of their independence, 
and it was essentially a matter of preserving existing connections rather 
than building new ones. The European project was not built on such ex-
tensive ties, nor was it about maintaining a particular mode of interaction. 
Eurasian regionalism did not have a technocratic stage of development 
when it was ignored by the public, which made the implementation of 
initiatives much easier: from the very beginning it was very highly po-
litical because it was part of the major phenomenon that concerned all 
post-Soviet countries, in other words the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Second, the post-Soviet space is characterised by a high level of eco-
nomic and political asymmetry. Russia has the lion’s share of resourc-
es, military potential and population, but also (especially in the early 
1990s) sufficient bureaucratic capacity to govern regional organisations. 
High asymmetry makes it particularly difficult to design an appropriate 
decision-making scheme: if voting rights are more fairly allocated the 
hegemon fears losing its influence within the given integration structure, 
and even in bilateral relations with a concentration of power in the hands 
of the hegemon, smaller countries are concerned about becoming even 
more highly dependent. 
Third, the shadow of the past also affected how the interaction among 
Eurasian countries was traditionally organised. Regionalism almost 
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coincided with the former space of the Soviet Union,4 which was governed 
through a clearly hierarchical structure. Major decisions were made in 
Moscow and other territories either complied or negotiated (sometimes 
successfully) with the Kremlin. Following the collapse of the USSR it was 
a non-trivial task for the elites to make the transition from this model of 
relations to the equitable dialogue that is inherent in the EU model. Thus, 
Boris Yeltsin was irritated when Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey 
insisted on using a translator in the negotiations in the early 1990s.5 A 
further source of friction was the firm conviction of the Russian elites that 
they fully understood the processes going on in other Eurasian countries. 
Consequently, they ignored the need to study political developments in 
what was referred to as the “near abroad”, and frequently misjudged 
the direction in which the politics of the new independent states were 
going. In addition, in its imperial past the space in which Eurasian inte-
gration occurred (with boundaries determined by the Soviet Union and 
to a large extent earlier by the Russian Empire) included highly hetero-
geneous countries. 
Finally, the authoritarian nature of the political regimes of the key 
Eurasian countries (which became more pronounced over time) is a ma-
jor problem in terms of regionalism. Authoritarian regimes find it much 
more difficult to delegate power to supranational bodies, and to con-
strain their autonomy in any way: bureaucrats and elites may perceive 
even self-imposed constraints as a sign of weakness of the incumbent. 
Such regimes also lack credibility in terms of commitments: because it 
is easy for them to reverse their policy decisions, other countries are less 
likely to trust them. Although some Eurasian organisations managed to 
overcome this problem, for others it remained a key obstacle. Somewhat 
paradoxically, for instance, the implementation gap in organisations 
comprising countries with a lower level of economic interdependence 
was narrower, basically because their members were less concerned that 
other countries would abuse this dependence and were more willing to 
go further with establishing functioning regional-integration institutions 
rather than merely discussing it. This, as one of the co-authors of this 
chapter has shown,6 is one of the reasons why the Customs Union of 2010 
(with much looser economic ties between its key members – Russia and 
Kazakhstan – than in the 1990s and early 2000s) was more successful than 
4 The main exceptions are the Baltic states, which have never been involved in any Eurasian regional-
integration project. Turkmenistan declared itself an associated member of the CIS in 2005. Turkmenistan and 
Ukraine did not ratify the CIS Charter either, although they did ratify the Treaty on establishing it. Georgia 
left the CIS in 2009. 
5 Furman and Abasov 2001.
6 Libman and Vinokurov 2018, pp. 334–364.
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its predecessors established by virtually the same set of countries. The 
authoritarian nature of the Eurasian states, combined with their strong 
interdependence inherited from the Soviet era, required them to become 
less interdependent first in order to advance regionalism. 
In sum, creating a “Eurasian EU” was a task the countries of the 
post-Soviet space were unlikely to accomplish from the start. At the 
same time, for decades they successfully managed to imitate such a un-
ion, in other words they systematically engaged in integration rhetoric 
and rituals that appeared to be directed towards its creation, but they 
never succeeded in implementing this regional-integration approach in 
practice. Below we discuss the evolution of this imitational regionalism 
and how it changed over time. 
4.2 THE 1900s: WHY AND HOW THE EURASIAN STATES 
DECIDED TO IMITATE THE EU
The hopes observers expressed about democratisation in post-Soviet states 
in the early 1990s quickly vanished. Although most countries in post-So-
viet Eurasia adopted the political institutions of advanced democracies 
(elections, multiple political parties and constitutions proclaiming the 
separation of powers between the executive and the legislative, for in-
stance), political practices typically did not echo the transplantation of 
these formal institutions. As a result, post-Soviet Eurasia became the do-
main of what is frequently referred to as “electoral authoritarian regimes”.7
In the view of the authors of this chapter, the most important char-
acteristic of these regimes is the systematic imitation of democratic 
practices. There are elections, for example, but they are manipulated so 
as to ensure the success of a particular group, although this manipula-
tion does not necessarily take the form of direct falsification. Systematic 
imitation emerged for two reasons: as a result of biased perceptions and 
ideas about how democratic political systems work,8 and as a conscious 
attempt among ruling elites to stay in power at the same time as achieving 
democratic legitimacy. The reference to legitimacy is significant here: 
it was essential for the newly independent states to look like and to be 
perceived as recognised democratic governments. However, being a 
European democracy as far as the elites and, to some extent, the popu-
lation of these Eurasian countries were concerned, also implied being part 
of the European Union – a regional organisation focusing on economic and 
7 Furman 2009, pp. 3–15; Schedler 2002, pp. 36–50.
8 Furman 1996, pp. 42–61.
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political integration and the free movement of trade, capital and labour 
(the development of which was boosted in the 1990s after Maastricht).
Given that joining the EU was not an option during that era (enlarge-
ment towards Central and Eastern Europe had yet to happen), post-Soviet 
countries opted to develop their own analogue to European integration 
in the form of Eurasian regionalism. There is a major difference, however. 
The main goal for the European countries was to integrate their economies 
and societies. The logic of regionalism for the Eurasian countries, on the 
other hand, is best summarised as follows. Existing economic, social 
(and even psychological) ties pushed them towards regional integration. 
The nature of their political regimes, based on imitation of the rules and 
practices of so-called civilised democratic countries encouraged them 
to pursue a particular integration project in terms of design, goals and 
structure – one that resembled the European Union. However, as with the 
imitation of democracy on the domestic level, the interest of the elites in 
rent-seeking and power and the lack of knowledge about how regional 
integration is supposed to function9 prevented the implementation of this 
project. Thus, regionalism in Eurasia was imitational in nature.
The narratives of Eurasian regionalism, used by the Russian elites dur-
ing that period, were also imitative. The CIS treaties and the general dis-
cussion during that era highlight two goals of the organisation: the need 
to ensure a “civilised divorce” among the former USSR republics by re-
ducing any tension associated with the division of common property and 
responsibilities, and developing a common economic space connecting 
the new independent states, based on the European experience. In 1997, 
Tatiana Valovaya, who was responsible for interaction with CIS bodies in 
the Russian presidential administration, described the future of the CIS 
in terms of the following dilemma: “are we going to follow the way of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, an organisation that is not useless, but 
lacks a solid economic foundation? Or is our guide the European Union, 
which is moving towards full-scale economic, currency and political 
union?”10 As the head of administration at the Executive Secretariat of 
the CIS, Aleksandr Shevchenko, clearly stated in the same year: “from the 
first days of its existence, the CIS in many respects followed the example 
of the European Union”.11 Even those who questioned the wisdom of 
blindly copying the EU, as the then Executive Secretary of the CIS Boris 
9 This, again, could be seen as part of the Soviet legacy: most of the politicians and bureaucrats who witnessed 
the beginning of regionalism in Eurasia were former nomenklatura officials (and some were members of the 
Soviet intelligentsia), with a very limited and often ideologically biased understanding of the inner workings 
of European regionalism.
10 Valovaya 1997. 
11 Shevchanko 1997.
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Berezovsky did in 1998, referred only to two models of regionalism – the 
EU and EFTA.12 
From the perspective of the Eurasian elites, the advantages and disad-
vantages of economic integration were evenly balanced. On the one hand, 
as pointed out in the previous section, the close economic ties between the 
Eurasian states made the fragmentation of the common economic space 
extremely costly (at least in the short term) and probably exacerbated 
the generally difficult economic situation in most of the countries con-
cerned. On the other hand, the fragmentation in itself was instrumental 
in achieving two major goals: rent-seeking (e.g., protectionist support 
of privileged enterprises and massive public investment in the new infra-
structure the independent states needed) and nation-building (requiring 
clear separation from the former metropolitan power rather than inte-
gration). Hence, actively pursuing an integration agenda was unlikely to 
be attractive to many post-Soviet elites. This, again, strengthened their 
interest in imitation rather than true, functioning regional integration.
The first institutions of Eurasian regionalism, as mentioned in the in-
troduction, emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and were, to a 
large extent, a reaction to the fragmentation of the single state rather than 
an outcome of any design. Thus, several republics signed the Economic 
Community Treaty as early as in October 1991, and whereas some of these 
already saw themselves as independent states, others intended to remain 
part of the USSR. The main integrated institution of 1992–1993 was the 
Rouble Zone – an informal monetary union based on the de-facto control 
by the Russian Central Bank of the rouble – the former Soviet currency 
still used in most post-Soviet republics. During this period, some ob-
servers (in both Eurasia and the West) hoped that the Rouble Zone would 
herald a new integration format, but in the end the disagreements among 
the post-Soviet states precluded such a development.13 
From 1993 onwards the imitational approach towards regionalism 
became increasingly predominant. In a nutshell, it is characterised by 
three common features:
• The regular signing of agreements and treaties by countries that fail 
to implement them later (and arguably did not intend to implement 
them in the first place);
• Chaotic sequences of agreements that do not necessarily follow a 
clear path of integration, are duplicative and significantly overlap, 
12 Berezovsky 1998.
13 Pomfret 2002, pp. 37–47.
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and the content is determined by the short-term preferences of the 
particular incumbent rather than general integration logic;
• Adherence to rhetoric and institutional forms borrowed from the 
European Union without due consideration of their relevance to 
post-Soviet Eurasia.
For example, in 1993–1994 the CIS countries signed the following agree-
ments: the CIS Economic Union (September 1993); the CIS Free Trade Area 
(April 1994); and the CIS Payment Union (October 1994). Even though the 
original CIS treaty included provisions related to abolishing customs duties, 
the same objectives were set out in the frameworks of the first Customs 
Union (1995–1996) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC, 
2000), which included only a sub-set of CIS countries. The language of 
EU regionalism is easily recognisable in the CIS treaties (even the idea of a 
Payment Union was borrowed from the European integration experience). 
The Customs Union and the EurAsEC also clearly take European regionalism 
as a benchmark in terms not only of the sequence of integration steps, but 
also of governance institutions and forms of interaction. There is an even 
more striking example: the post-Soviet states established the Euro-Asian 
Association for Coal and Metal (EAACM) in 1993, clearly resembling the 
setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (although unlike 
the latter, the EAACM did not produce any results apart from a series of 
financial irregularities discovered by the auditors in 2000, it was poorly 
funded and it was ultimately abolished in 2005).14
The regional integration organisations that existed in Eurasia during this 
period produced little in the way of policy output and failed to achieve any 
meaningful economic or political integration across countries. At the same 
time, however, they served the important purpose of imitation, creating 
an illusion of vibrant regionalism in line with European standards and 
bringing Eurasia closer to the developed world. The imitation also served a 
number of further goals. Given that regional integration remained a popular 
concept in many Eurasian countries, political leaders such as Belarusian 
President Alexander Lukashenko could use it to strengthen their regimes 
and to brand any opponents “enemies of integration”. Again, this is a 
specific Soviet legacy, driven by widespread nostalgia on the one hand 
and the existence of a large number of people with relatives and friends in 
other post-Soviet countries interested in maintaining open borders on the 
14 Vinokurov and Libman 2017.
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other.15 The integration rhetoric essentially furthered protectionist goals, 
allowing domestic lobbying groups to secure access to rents.16 
4.3 THE 2000s: THE LIMITS OF IMITATION AND RESHAPING THE 
GLOBAL WORLD ORDER
Although the idea of integration into the global community of demo-
cratic nations was one of the main sources of legitimacy for post-Soviet 
regimes in the early 1990s, over time it lost its appeal in quite a few of 
them, including Russia. The economic growth in the region starting in 
the early 2000s increased the level of self-confidence among Eurasian 
authoritarian regimes. The economic hardships of the 1990s weakened 
public confidence in the concepts of democracy and a market economy;17 
and as a result the elites in the post-Soviet countries relied less and less 
on them for self-legitimation.
The evolution of Putin’s regime in Russia (which is of special signifi-
cance for this analysis) is particularly telling. When Putin came to power 
as the designated successor of Boris Yeltsin in the early 2000s he im-
mediately positioned himself as offering an alternative to the unstable 
1990s, namely an era of political and economic stability. The Yukos deal in 
2003 marked the end of the pro-market-reform agenda, and since then 
the Russian economy has slowly but surely moved in the direction of an 
increasing public-sector presence and renationalisation. Putin lost his 
original willingness to cooperate with the West, and became more and 
more open in his criticism, specifically for not recognising Russian inter-
ests. This culminated in his famous Munich speech of February 2007. In 
sum, although the imitation of democracy was an attractive strategy used 
by the Russian regime in the 1990s to achieve legitimacy, by the second 
half of the first decade of the 2000s it had become equally important to 
achieve equal standing with the West and to be recognised as a sovereign 
power with a respected sphere of influence. This, again, strengthened the 
legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the public, and probably reflected 
the intrinsic goals of the Russian elites.18 
Thus, in light of Russia’s regime evolution in the 2000s, the old ap-
proach seemed less attractive. Instead, regionalism assumed a new mean-
ing among the Russian elites – a marker of great power status and of a 
15 Drakokhrust and Furman 1998. 
16 Yevstigneev 1997.
17 Neundorf 2010, pp. 1096–108.
18 Sokolov et al. 2018.
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privileged Russian sphere of influence. Analysis of the rhetoric of Russian 
intellectuals and politicians on the topic of Eurasian regionalism reveals 
a very specific underlying worldview.19 In the eyes of Russian decision 
makers and experts, the world is divided into several competing blocs 
attempting to restructure the global economy and world politics. This 
worldview could also be seen as a legacy of the past – this time of the 
Cold War. For a global power to participate in this competition it needs 
its own bloc of loyal allies. Eurasian regionalism could serve as such a 
bloc, thereby ensuring Russia’s status as a global power. However, if it is 
to be recognised by other powers the bloc has to follow the same global 
blueprints: the only blueprint known to the Russian elites and intellec-
tuals was the EU.20 Furthermore, if the objective is to gain respect and to 
achieve equality with Western powers it would seem only logical to use 
a similar institutional design. Hence, the Eurasian integration bloc ought, 
in the eyes of the Russian elites, to emulate the EU – and not only on a 
purely rhetorical level.21
In other words, whereas Russia and other post-Soviet countries sought 
to establish a Eurasian EU in the 1990s as part of a general tendency to 
imitate Western institutions, Russia sought to establish a Eurasian EU 
in the 2000s so as to be recognised by the West as an equal power. This 
Eurasian EU could not have been purely imitational: a powerless and de-
funct organisation could hardly expect recognition from foreign partners 
or serve as a real marker of Russian influence. Russia’s goal thus became 
to establish a functioning Eurasian EU, but the real goal of economic in-
tegration in this case still remained secondary. Russia’s foreign-policy 
focus was directed less towards the Eurasian countries and more towards 
the West and, in particular, the EU. One could speculate that Russia’s 
purpose in supporting the Eurasian EU was not so much to integrate with 
the Eurasian states as to develop its relations with the West.22 This also 
happened because the extent of EU activism in the post-Soviet space had 
increased substantially since the 1990s. EU involvement in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership was much heavier 
in post-Soviet Eurasia. Although the EU presented this involvement as 
purely value-driven, Russian elites, given their general worldview,23 per-
ceived it as a case of geopolitical struggle for power and encroachment into 
19 Libman 2017.
20 Libman 2012.
21 On the attitudes of the Russian elites towards Eurasian regionalism, see also Furman and Simon 2014.
22 See Meister 2015. 
23 Morozov 2005.
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Russian interests. From this perspective, creating a functioning regional 
organisation could provide a viable alternative to the EU.24
Thus, the approach towards Eurasian regionalism changed substan-
tially in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s. Instead of cre-
ating purely imitational institutions, Eurasian countries (and Russia in 
particular) sponsored regional organisations with real policy impact and 
authority. The Eurasian Development Bank established in 2006 was the 
first example of this new wave of institutions: unlike its predecessor (the 
Interstate Bank), which lacked funding and a real agenda, it received 
substantial resources from member states and became a functioning 
institution of development financing. There was a more substantial leap 
forward in 2010 when the trilateral (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) 
Customs Union (CU) came into existence. Although essentially following 
the same agenda as its predecessors of the 1990s, unlike them the CU was 
implemented. In particular, it managed to abolish customs duties and 
remove internal customs borders, as well as to delegate decision-making 
on trade issues to a single supranational body – the Commission of the CU 
(and since 2011 to the Eurasian Economic Commission, EAEC).
The EAEC is a good example of how the new institutions of Eurasian 
regionalism were constructed during the era under discussion. On the 
one hand, the very name of the organisation suggests a clear link with 
the European blueprint – the EU Commission. In terms of design, the 
EAEC Board closely resembled the EU Commission in its constitution – 
with individual ministers representing particular spheres of integration 
(such as trade, antitrust and agriculture). However, unlike its predecessor 
agencies such as the EurAsEC, the EAEC was endowed with a very large 
bureaucracy (of over 1,000 people). EAEC decisions within its sphere of 
competence are enshrined into the national law of member countries and 
do not require additional national acts to come into force.25
At the same time, Russia intensified its efforts to ensure that the CU was 
perceived as a counterpart of the EU. In fact, Russian leadership explicitly 
called for a dialogue between the CU and the EU (which at that time met 
with a lot of reluctance from the EU bureaucracy). The CU advanced its 
integration agenda: first it established the Common Economic Space (lib-
eralising the movement of people and capital), and in 2015 it became the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with an ambitious integration agenda 
24 Delcour and Kostanyan 2014.
25 See: Eurasian Economic Commission 2014. This does not imply that all the provisions of the EAEU treaties 
are automatically implemented by member states: on the contrary, the EAEC keeps a catalogue of existing 
implementation issues (see: https://barriers.eaeunion.org/). The decisions of the EAEC Board can be 
overruled by the EAEC Council, which includes ex officio deputy prime ministers of each member country. 
However, if the EAEC Council does not overrule the decision, the acts of the EAEC become part of the national 
law without further actions of the member states. 
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and two additional members – Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Between 2010 
and 2015 Russia put substantial effort into ensuring that the countries in 
the shared neighbourhood of Russia and the EU joined the CU. This was 
particularly important because the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) became the EU’s main integration instrument. Given 
that it is impossible for members of a customs union to negotiate a free-
trade agreement unilaterally, Eurasian countries joining the CU would 
immediately lose the opportunity to sign the DCFTA: making them join 
was thus a ploy to keep them in Russia’s orbit.26
Russia’s policy appeared to be successful in the case of Armenia, which 
decided in 2013 not to join the DCFTA and instead to become part of the 
CU and the EAEU (which did not happen until 2015). In the view of some 
observers the Armenian decision was directly influenced by pressure 
from Russia. Others are more circumspect, however, pointing out that 
Armenia did not have many policy options other than to follow Moscow’s 
lead: it was dependent on Russia both economically as the main investor 
in its economy and politically as a guarantor of security because of the risk 
of war against Azerbaijan and the blockade at the border with Turkey.27 
However, there is general consensus among analysts that the key objective 
for Russia was to ensure Ukraine’s membership of the CU. As the DCFTA 
negotiations between Ukraine and the EU progressed in 2013, Russia did 
not hesitate to use coercive measures: it intensified its border controls 
vis-à-vis Ukraine in the summer, thus damaging Ukrainian companies 
doing business with Russia and showing its potential to impose economic 
sanctions if Ukraine joined the DCFTA. The subsequent decision of Viktor 
Yanukovych to stop DCFTA negotiations was encouraged through a size-
able Russian loan. 
Thus, the general aspiration of Russia in the second half of the first 
decade of the 2000s for the West to perceive it as an equal power was 
one of the reasons why Eurasian regionalism evolved into a functioning 
organisation in some respects. At the same time, its desire for EU recog-
nition of Eurasian regional organisations forced Russia to adopt a kind 
of Eurasian EU, adhering even more closely to EU blueprints. This policy 
led to a paradoxical outcome: by design, EU-like regional organisations 
constrain their members. The CU and the EAEU are no exceptions: on 
occasions, Russia’s position in the EAEC and even Russian domestic legis-
lation are overruled by the supranational bureaucracy.28 Russia accepted 
this to ensure that the CU and the EAEU remained functioning – thereby 
26 Libman and Obydenkova 2018.
27 Ter-Matevosyan et al. 2017; Hayrapetyan 2015.
28 Vinokurov 2018. 
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serving larger geopolitical objectives regarding relations with the West. It 
is also ironic that the most functional (although naturally still limited) EU 
analogy in Eurasia emerged precisely when Russia’s stance towards the 
EU turned confrontational rather than cooperative (and precisely because 
of this transformation of Russian foreign-policy goals).
The analysis thus far has focused specifically on Russian goals and 
objectives. Although there were similar developments in some other 
Eurasian states (with the emergence of much more open, consolidated 
autocracies), few of them took a strong anti-Western stance. Imitational 
regionalism, however, was not necessarily restricted to Russia-centric 
organisations: the GUAM (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova) 
group, established in the 1990s, proclaimed the ambitious objectives 
of economic and political integration, but in reality this was limited to 
rhetoric that drew attention to the issue of frozen conflicts and Russia’s 
role in this context.29 As far as the other states were concerned, the more 
likely the CU and the EAEU were to become functioning regional organ-
isations, the more difficult was the choice for countries preferring the 
imitational approach: they either had to commit to the new regional 
organisations (ideally receiving some payback in the form of explicit 
and implicit Russian subsidies, as Belarus did) or to distance themselves 
from regionalism. 
The countries that remained active in Russia-centred Eurasian region-
alism (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and, to some extent, 
Tajikistan) were driven by a complex mix of objectives vis-à-vis regional 
integration. On the one hand, it was essential for most of them to protect 
their national sovereignty on both the practical and the symbolic level. 
This limited the form of regionalism: as we have pointed out, Kazakhstan 
rejected even limited forms of political integration in the EAEU. It also 
determined its governance: whereas the CU Commission used a weighted 
voting scheme skewed in favour of Russia, for example, each country in 
the EAEC has an equal vote, and smaller countries also insisted that all 
management positions should be filled based on the equal representation 
of all countries). On the other hand, these active countries attempted to 
reap practical economic or non-economic benefits from regionalism: 
access to Russian transportation and pipeline systems (Kazakhstan); 
access to the Russian labour market (Kyrgyzstan and Armenia30); mili-
tary security guarantees (Armenia); cheap finance through the Eurasian 
Fund of Stabilization and Development and bilateral credits (Belarus and 
Tajikistan); benefits from the redistribution of customs duties across CU/
29 Vinokurov and Libman 2017.
30 As well as, potentially, Tajikistan, if it ever joined the EAEU.
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EAEU members (Armenia and Kyrgyzstan); privileged access to Russian oil 
exports (Belarus); and continuing as an entry point for Chinese consumer 
goods en route to post-Soviet markets (Kyrgyzstan). 
Finally, we do not claim that Russia is the only force behind the EAEU 
and the CU: Kazakhstan played an equally important role, strongly sup-
porting the implementation of the CU in 2010. Moreover, although the 
Russian logic of geopolitical competition with the West is not applicable to 
Kazakhstan, some of the motives are similar: the Kazakhstani leadership 
pursues the clear objective of ensuring that the country is perceived as a 
significant actor in global politics. Numerous Kazakhstani initiatives, in-
cluding the OSCE and Islamic Conference presidencies, EXPO in Astana in 
2017 and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures 
in Asia initiated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, also fit into this agen-
da. Even the name Eurasian Union was suggested by Nazarbayev in 1994. 
The development of the CU as a functioning organisation (rather than a 
pure imitation) could also be attributed to the same logic. 
4.4 AFTER 2014: THE END OF IMITATION?
The 2014 crisis in Ukraine marked a twofold change in the development 
of Russian foreign policy: from the complex search for partnership and 
occasional criticism of the West towards open confrontation. Therefore, 
seeking recognition by the West and copying Western institutions as a 
tool for enhancing legitimacy became less attractive. 
Thus, the idea of a Eurasian EU should also be less interesting for the 
Russian leadership, which indeed seems to be the case. The EAEU treaty 
is already backing off in comparison with the CU on a number of signif-
icant institutional issues (such as reducing the role of the EAEU Court).31 
Although the member countries still formally reach the agreed milestones 
of regional integration (such as the new Customs Code and the common 
market for medical products), the content of the new agreements is much 
more vague and implies a lower level of intergovernmental policy coor-
dination.32 At the same time, the EAEU is slowly but surely disappearing 
from the rhetoric of the Russian leadership. In 2011, according to one of 
his programmatic newspaper articles published before the elections,33 
Putin considered the Eurasian Union a crucial element of Russian foreign 
policy, also emphasising its potential to become part of a greater European 
31 Dragneva 2016; Karliuk 2016; Kembayev 2016.
32 Vinokurov 2018.
33 Putin 2011.
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project based on more intensive cooperation with the EU. In his 2018 ad-
dress to the nation, however, he was much more eager to focus on Russia’s 
military capabilities, and barely mentioned the EAEU.34 
At the same time, Russia seems to be returning to the domain of im-
itational regionalism, although focusing on different blueprints – China 
rather than the EU. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is based on very 
different premises than the EU approach: it is a flexible structure rather 
than a well-defined organisation and puts more effort into the implemen-
tation of specific projects than into developing common norms and rules. 
The idea that projects should take precedence over norms was already 
prominent in Russian rhetoric in 2014–2015.35 In 2014, Russia initiated 
negotiations between the CU (later the EAEU) and China on the interface 
between the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt. These negotiations 
led to the establishment of a trade treaty in 2018, which nevertheless 
falls short of a free trade agreement and merely contains a number of 
trade-facilitation measures. At the same time, Russian rhetoric seems 
to refer more and more frequently to the rather opaque idea of a Great 
Eurasian Partnership – a flexible structure (not unlike the Belt and Road) 
connecting different countries of Eurasia. Given the current economic and 
political potential of Russia, as well as confrontation with the West, this 
Partnership is unlikely to be implemented, yet it features in the rhetoric 
of Russian leaders.36
None of the smaller Eurasian countries seem to follow Russia’s con-
frontational approach towards the West. It would thus seem that they 
are unlikely to embrace the new type of Russian integration rhetoric 
(although interaction with China within the framework of the Belt and 
Road is important for many of them). At the same time, the current sit-
uation in Eurasia hardly leaves any space for new integration projects in 
addition to the EAEU and the EU-led DCFTA. The only exception appears to 
be Central Asia, where there is some evidence of growing activism among 
member countries concerning a sub-regional integration initiative: even 
in this case, however, thus far there is no evidence of specific projects.
34 Putin 2018.
35 Libman et al 2016.
36 Tsvetov 2017.
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
In sum, Eurasian regionalism has been through three developmental 
phases. The predominance of imitational regimes in the 1990s aroused the 
interest of Eurasian countries in imitating the Eurasian EU to demonstrate 
that Eurasia was following global patterns – while at the same time pre-
cluding it from becoming functional. Russia’s desire for the West to treat it 
as an equal and its concerns about the expansion of the ENP motivated the 
transition to a new approach in the 2000s. This was a form of regionalism 
that still mimicked the EU, so as to be recognised by the West, but which 
was based on a much higher level of functionality: not to be dismissed as 
irrelevant by potential Western partners and readily allowing Russia to 
forge binding relationships with the Eurasian countries. The success of the 
CU and the EAEU could be seen as a product of this phase of development. 
Russia finally seems to have returned to integration rhetoric since 2014 
and is now using China (and not the EU) as a benchmark. 
Eurasian regionalism, itself a legacy of the Soviet past, was shaped 
throughout its development by various other real or ideational legacies of 
the USSR that explain the choices these countries made related to regional 
integration. Such legacies include the symmetric distribution of resources 
and bureaucratic capacity, the need to accommodate intensive economic 
and social ties between countries, the development of imitational regimes 
leading to imitational regionalism in the 1990s, and the return to Cold War 
thinking, which played an important role in how Russian elites shaped 
the country’s foreign policy in the 2000s. 
We are not suggesting that the EAEU is likely to become powerless or 
to disappear in the years to come. On the contrary, the lack of political at-
tention could be conducive to implementing low-level bureaucratic goals 
such as the harmonisation of standards. The EAEU has already achieved 
a substantial level of integration, and in the face of bureaucratic inertia 
is likely to stay at this level. 
At the same time, we suggest that both of the goals post-Soviet (and 
in particular Russian) leaders pursued while supporting regionalism in 
Eurasia in its “EU-like” form, namely demonstrating an ability to follow 
the same path as the European nations (in the 1990s) and confirming 
Russia’s great power status (in the 2000s), are unlikely to have an influ-
ence on Russian foreign policy in the future.
What does this analysis imply with regard to the main research ques-
tion addressed in this volume, namely what remains of the Soviet Union 
almost thirty years after its collapse? First, the existence of the post-So-
viet regional organisations indicates that Eurasia still, to some extent, 
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perceives itself and is perceived as a single region in world politics. The 
boundaries of this region are blurred, as several countries try to avoid 
being characterised as “Eurasian” (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) and 
limit their level of participation in Eurasian regionalism or remain out-
side it.37 Second, Eurasian countries are still economically and socially 
linked. These linkages, unsurprisingly, weakened during the post-Soviet 
era, partly because of the imitational nature of Eurasian regionalism and 
partly as an unavoidable consequence of constructing new independent 
polities, but they have certainly not disappeared. Examples include the 
vibrant labour migration from Central Asia and Armenia to Russia, and 
the continuing vital role of Russian foreign direct investments in many 
Eurasian countries. In many cases the persistence of these ties is much 
more an outcome of bottom-up processes as economic and social actors 
maintain their contacts, than of the top-down process of formal interna-
tional regional integration. In some cases, however, Eurasian regionalism 
as discussed in this chapter contributed to it as well: the visa-free regime 
between most of the CIS countries is conducive to labour migration, for 
example. In other cases, new economic ties emerged from the old legacies.
The political regimes currently in place in most Eurasian countries 
have evolved from the regimes that emerged after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (although some countries departed – or attempted to de-
part – from this tradition). At the same time, it should be borne in mind 
that Eurasia comprises countries that differ fundamentally in terms of 
economic development, history before incorporation into the Russian 
Empire or the USSR, and culture. This heterogeneity should lead naturally 
to very different trajectories of political and economic development. 
37 Kazakhstan, on the other hand, highlights its status as a “Eurasian” country, although it focuses less on the 
post-Soviet Eurasia and more on its position in the middle of the Eurasian continent: the alternative for 
Kazakhstan would be to be perceived as part of the Islamic world or the Middle East, which does not appear 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union was an energy giant, ranking first in 1989 in terms of its 
share of world primary energy supply. Several common characteristics 
of the Soviet energy system can be identified.1 Firstly, it consisted of a 
system of energy dependencies among the different territories and SSRs. 
Following the state electrification plan of the 1920s,2 many hydroelectric 
dams were built all over the Soviet territory alongside thermal power 
plants, and regional power supply systems were developed. Russian gas 
was progressively exported via Ukraine (preferred over Poland, which 
was not trusted) to the Warsaw Pact countries from 1949 onwards, and 
to Western Europe from the late 1960s. The commissioning of differ-
ent phases of the Brotherhood gas pipeline system from 1967 onwards 
marked another milestone in developing Soviet gas exports to Western 
Europe. With the development of the pipeline infrastructure, gas was 
then used in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia not only for industry, where it 
replaced oil and partly replaced coal, but also for the residential sector. 
As a consequence, Ukraine consumed 119 bcm of gas in 1990 (ranked 3rd 
in the world), including 91 bcm of Russian gas, and Russia consumed 490 
bcm (ranked 2nd in the world) that same year. Russian oil was supplied 
to Western markets mainly via the Baltic ports and via the Druzhba oil 
1 Gustafson 1989; Zumer 1989; International Monetary Fund 1991.
2 GOELRO (Государственная комиссия по электрификации России), or State Commission for Electrification 
of Russia. Supervised by Lenin, it was initiated and implemented in the 1920s and 1930s, with the Soviet 
territory divided into several regions with the objective of achieving complete electrification in order to 
foster industrial and social development.
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pipeline system through Ukraine and Belarus from 1964. Soviet oil exports 
increased rapidly and reached 215 million tonnes per year (mt/y) in 1989, 
representing 35% of total output. 
Another characteristic was inefficiency in producing and consuming 
equipment and technologies: in the 1970s and increasingly in the 1980s, 
oil, gas and coal production absorbed over 40% of the total industrial in-
vestment budget, while many of the energy-intensive industries were not 
energy efficient and also faced a sharp decline in productivity.3 Overall, 
energy policies had been predominantly supply-side-driven, with little 
or no focus on savings or efficiency on the demand side. Policies were 
centrally planned and designed, with little attention paid to varying tech-
nical or resource base constraints.
Thirdly, Soviet oil and gas exports were only oriented in the Western 
European direction: Asia was absent from the Soviet oil and gas export 
map and no pipeline or power infrastructure linked the Russian or Central 
Asian territories to China or other Asian countries.4
Lastly, the Soviet economy became increasingly dependent on oil and 
gas exports in the 1980s in order to keep its system afloat, to the extent 
that energy exports represented about 65% of hard currency earnings in 
the Gorbachev era. The system was also dependent on specific Western 
equipment imports that it could not produce, such as large diameter 
pipelines, pumps and compressors.5 Soviet oil production peaked in the 
mid-1980s at slightly over 600 mt, before plummeting to 360 mt in the 
mid-1990s (just under 6 million barrels per day (mb/d) as oil prices had 
fallen sharply since the early 1980s). 
This chapter examines the transformations that took place in the for-
mer Soviet Union’s energy sectors and their interconnections, with a 
focus on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The analysis starts by focussing on the 
role of energy in the economy of these independent states in order to 
set the scene. It then moves on to analyze how the newly-independ-
ent states organized their energy sectors and whether there is a Soviet 
imprint or legacy. In the third part, the chapter assesses how countries 
managed their mutual energy interdependences, what kind of strategies 
were implemented, and to what extent the old connections are still in 
place. Lastly, the analysis turns its attention to the international trade of 
hydrocarbons to ascertain whether new patterns have emerged, and the 
degree to which the Soviet export system is still in place.
3 Ermolaev 2017.
4 Henderson and Mitrova 2016. 
5 Central Intelligence Agency 1982.
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5.2 THE ROLE OF ENERGY IN THE ECONOMIES OF THE FORMER 
SOVIET UNION 
5.2.1 The energy and electricity mix
Russia’s energy mix still relies largely on gas (the share of which has 
increased slightly at the expense of coal and oil), on oil and nuclear, as 
well as coal and hydro beyond the Urals. Kazakhstan still relies on coal 
for the most part, which represents 50% of total primary energy supply 
(TPES – equivalent to total primary inland energy demand), yet the share 
of coal has decreased as gas has expanded at a quicker pace, with oil still 
at 20% of TPES; Belarus still relies predominantly on gas, followed by oil; 
Uzbekistan remains a country where gas is predominant, representing 
about 90% of TPES. 
A noticeable change occurred in Ukraine: coal represented 31% of 
TPES in 2010 but only 20% in 2016, while gas held a 40% share of TPES 
in 2010, down to 35% in 2016. This is a result of the externally driven 
price increases since 2006 and is also a consequence of the 2014 regime 
change, the war with Russia and loss of coal production facilities, as well 
as the related economic recession. Nuclear and renewables have largely 
made up the difference. Ukraine’s gas demand has diminished by 75% 
since 1991, down to 32 bcm in 2017, primarily due to the closure of the 
energy-intensive industries.
Overall, from 1990 to 2017, coal consumption for power generation 
and industry fell sharply in Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in Russia, but 
not in Kazakhstan where coal in power generation has increased by 25% 
over the past 15 years as about 72% of electricity generation is coal-based. 
Natural gas use for power generation has expanded in Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Gas remains 
the main fuel for residential sectors (heating and cooking) in almost all 
former Soviet republics, with a few exceptions such as Kazakhstan and 
Belarus.6 Relatedly, the use of oil for power generation has practically 
been discontinued in most of the former Soviet republics. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new nuclear power plants have 
been commissioned in Russia (with 35 reactors currently in operation), 
yet new construction plans in Ukraine (15 reactors currently in opera-
tion) did not materialize. In both countries, the share of nuclear in power 
generation has increased, representing around 17% of power generation 
in Russia and 55% in Ukraine in 2017. Rosatom is currently building a 
nuclear power plant in Belarus, while Uzbekistan signed an agreement 
in October 2018 for the construction of two reactors by 2028. 
6 See EU4Energy.iea.org.
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Non-hydro renewable energy sources are at an embryonic stage in 
most of the former Soviet republics. Following supportive policies, signif-
icant development nonetheless exists in Ukraine with over 1.5 gigawatts 
(GW) installed as of April 2018, and in Russia, which has set an objective 
to develop 5.5 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2024, compared to 1 
GW currently, and several projects in Kazakhstan, for example. 
5.2.2 Energy consumption and energy intensity
Energy consumption in all former Soviet republics fell sharply during the 
1990s in particular, before picking up again, driven by electricity demand 
as the situation stabilized after the post-Soviet transformation shock and 
the economy gradually recovered. The Soviet Union had been extremely 
energy-intensive (the amount of energy that is used to produce a unit 
of added value), but following the economic collapse of the 1990s, the 
scale of energy consumption per Gross Domestic Product (GDP) largely 
decreased. The sharp improvement in energy intensity since the fall of 
the Soviet Union resulted from the economic recession, which led to a 
steep decrease in energy demand. Yet in spite of these improvements, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Moldova (ranked in declining order of energy intensity) were still 
among the top 20 most energy-intensive countries in the world in 2014.7
Figure 1: Evolution of energy intensity in a selection of former Soviet Union countries and 
comparison with developed economies
Source: World Bank
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In most cases, the improvement in energy intensity has not result-
ed from energy-efficiency policies. Soviet energy policies were heavily 
supply-side driven, and that bias continued throughout the 1990s and 
2000s up until today. Whispers of change occurred at the end of the 2000s 
as energy import costs had been soaring and with the restructuring of 
industry sectors, the remaining companies had the capacity to invest 
and borrow in order to modernize their equipment. In Russia’s power 
sector, modern, highly efficient combined thermal heat and power plants 
were commissioned as Russia was concerned about the sharp increase in 
electricity consumption and feared that generation capacity would be 
insufficient.8 This also enabled the closure of ageing, inefficient power 
plants, although many of the remaining operating fleet have been in op-
eration for well over 30 years. 
Energy efficiency has slowly entered the energy policy debate in Russia 
and Ukraine, culminating in ambitious targets set by President Dmitry 
Medvedev in 2008 and 2009: reducing the energy intensity of GDP by 
40% by 2020 compared with 2007. However, Russia’s efforts have largely 
stalled since 2014 in the context of the economic recession and rouble 
depreciation. Belarus, where the economy is dominated by state-owned 
companies, has made a policy effort, while Ukraine is expected to show 
progress as a result of widespread international support received since 
2014, coupled with its Energy Community Treaty membership. 
The untapped potential in Ukraine is large: Figure 2 shows that in 2015, 
Poland and Ukraine had an equivalent energy consumption, yet Poland’s 
GDP was five times higher and its population 20% smaller, although both 
countries had very similar patterns by 1990.
8 International Energy Agency 2014. 
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The residential sector of former Soviet Union countries can be di-
vided into two categories: very large old Soviet building stock, which is 
poorly insulated and highly inefficient and usually connected to a cen-
tralized heating system, and new apartment blocks built since the 1990s. 
Centralized district heating systems are facing three fundamental chal-
lenges: ageing and inefficient infrastructure with massive losses; lack of 
viable business schemes that could lead to modernization investments 
and improve the quality of service; and overcapacities, as a consequence 
of disconnections and the switch to individual solutions, such as those 
in new buildings. 
The sharp fall in energy consumption has led to a corresponding de-
cline in greenhouse gas emissions of about 30% on average since 1990, yet 
Russia remains one of the world’s most polluting countries (ranked 4th). 
Russia has signed, but not ratified, the Paris Agreement.
5.2.3 Tariffs and metering
The Soviet economic system relied on the principle of heavily subsidized, 
practically unlimited and non-metered fossil fuel supplies. Following the 

































Figure 2: Comparison of Poland’s and Ukraine’s TPES and GDP, 1989–2015
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was maintained for social reasons and because the newly independent 
economies became barter economies as hyperinflation was making mon-
etary transactions futile. Once the economies stabilized towards the end 
of the 1990s, the priority was to collect payments and deploy meters, at 
least for industrial consumers. 
Two groups of countries could then be identified: those dependent on 
fossil fuel imports, notably from Russia, and those that had the resources 
to be self-sufficient. The dependent countries faced recurring payment 
crises (notably Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia) and in 
the early 2000s were forced to progressively raise industrial prices to mar-
ket levels (Ukraine, Moldova) alongside residential tariffs (Moldova and 
Georgia, while Ukraine only raised prices noticeably from 2014). Armenia, 
Belarus and Kyrgyzstan did not want to impose changes with such severe 
social and economic implications. As a result, Russian companies, notably 
Gazprom, progressively took over their energy infrastructure, in terms 
of gas transmission and distribution and power generation/distribution, 
for example. Ukraine and Belarus proved to be special cases due to the 
mutual energy interdependence that existed with Russia: both were 100% 
dependent on oil and gas imports from Russia, yet Russia needed their 
transmission infrastructure to export its oil and gas resources.
As a consequence, electricity and gas for the retail segment have been 
heavily subsidized in all of the former Soviet republics, yet at different 
levels and in different timeframes. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are 
clearly the three countries with tariffs that currently best reflect market 
levels – yet with social redistribution mechanisms still in place as the 
bulk of the population cannot afford to pay such tariffs. Turkmenistan 
stands out as, until June 2017, it provided free water, gas and electricity 
for its population. 
The social and economic challenges of subsidized energy supplies have 
also been on the Russian agenda. In 2006, the Russian government decid-
ed to change regulated tariffs to export netback levels by 2011 yet never 
implemented the change, and in 2013 a decision was taken to freeze regu-
lated tariffs as of July 2014 and limit their increase to the level of inflation. 
Overall, the challenge of changing to market-based prices must not 
be underestimated. Adjusting tariffs to account for the rise in dollar pric-
es and for the depreciation of the currency proved to be politically and 
socially fraught, notably in Ukraine, where regular democratic elections 
were held and where increasing heat supply tariffs was a very sensitive 
issue. Moldova and Georgia were the first, however, and Ukraine always 
attempted to gain time in its yearly negotiations with Russia. Since 2014, 
Ukraine has largely cut all direct gas consumption subsidies.
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A common feature emerged in all of these post-Soviet economies: the 
market segmentation between the residential sector, with low prices 
and poor revenue collection and a social obligation to ensure supplies no 
matter what, and the industry sector, with higher prices correspond-
ing to full supply costs (import costs + transport and distribution costs). 
When industrial consumers piled up debts, these could be offset with 
asset takeovers or cut-offs. 
Lastly, these price distortions and segmentations of the gas markets 
have had a major impact on the political economy of these countries. 
They have served as drivers of state capture and predation, which relies 
on the ability to control the gas supplies to the industrial segment and of 
well-connected individuals to divert heavily subsidized gas for the resi-
dential sector to the industry sector. Ukraine’s 2014 political leadership 
change and the new, transparent and effective management put in place 
within Naftogaz has certainly helped to contain this system for the most 
part. For example, gas demand for the residential sector in Ukraine fell 
from 16.8 bcm in 2013 to 11.2 bcm in 2017. This is not wholly attributable 
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Figure 3: Evolution of regulated gas prices in Ukraine, 2009–2016
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The battle to completely remove such schemes is still being fought with 
the regional gas distribution companies, however.9
5.2.4 Hydrocarbon production 
Last but not least, there has been a clear transformation from the Soviet 
era in terms of fossil fuel production levels. A combination of foreign 
and private sector investments (in Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan), 
rising oil prices, new technologies and field expertise, supportive fiscal 
rules and new managers succeeded in putting hydrocarbon production 
back on a virtuous growth path.10
Putin’s election as President marked the start of a nine-year period 
of rising oil prices, topping levels seen in the early 1980s. In addition, he 
managed to implement tough fiscal reforms as companies benefitted from 
rising prices and revenues. Russia’s liquids production reached 11.34 
mb/d in 2016 and 2017, approaching the Soviet level. Kazakhstan’s oil 
production has also been rising, from a low of 0.43 mb/d in 1994 to 1.72 
mb/d in 2017, as has Azerbaijan’s, up from 0.167 mb/d in 1996 to a peak 
of 1 mb/d in 2010, before declining to around 0.8 mb/d in 2017. 
The Soviet dependency on Western technologies has largely been 
overcome for conventional oil resources, and Russian steel mills are able 
to produce much of the equipment needed for conventional oil sector 
developments. Yet Western technologies are still needed for the safe and 
efficient development of hard-to-recover resources such as those deep 
offshore and in the Arctic, for tight oil, as well as for specific equipment 
for LNG terminals and efficient turbines for thermal power plants.
In the gas field, Russia’s production has remained steady at around 
630 bcm/y, yet changes were twofold: Gazprom has been successful in 
opening up new production sites in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region and Yamal 
peninsula regions (Zapolarnoe and Bovanenkovskoe respectively), as 
production from legacy fields has declined. Moreover, Gazprom’s share 
of total production has been declining, from a near monopoly position 
to around 63% in 2017 as other competitors have developed their market 
share, notably Novatek and Rosneft. 
Ukraine managed to stabilize its output at around 20 bcm/y, and 
Azerbaijan became a significant gas producer as associated gas and new 
offshore gas fields were developed. The same goes for Kazakhstan, where 
the giant Karachaganak oil and gas field was further developed in the 
2000s and where associated gas production from Tengiz in particular 
has been rising. Turkmenistan remains a special case: deprived of market 
9 Kyiv Post 2018.
10 Gustafson 2012.
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outlets, its gas production decreased sharply in the 1990s. The growth 
trend observed in the 2000s, driven by exports to Russia, was reversed 
when Gazprom ended its trading schemes involving Turkmen gas, before 
picking up again when supplies to China were started (see next chapter). 
Uzbekistan, which has the largest population in Central Asia, has seen a 
mild yet steady growth in gas production.
A common trend in these oil and gas producing countries is their 
continued economic dependence on fossil fuel resources production 
and exports, amounting to about 35% of Russia’s budget revenues in 
2017; 40% of Azerbaijan’s GDP and 90% of its exports; and about 30% 
of Kazakhstan’s GDP. This generates huge economic vulnerabilities from 
oil price fluctuations as the fall in oil prices from the end of 2014 until 
mid-2016 illustrated: Russia and Azerbaijan went into recession, while 
Kazakhstan’s GDP remained positive by a very thin margin. 
A fundamental issue is these countries’ ability to diversify their econo-
mies and develop the non-oil and gas economic sectors. Russia’s share of 
oil and gas in its budget revenues has declined in recent years to about 42% 
(from 52% in 2013), but much of this is not related to the development of 
new economic activities. Kazakhstan has recently accelerated prepara-
tions for a process of large-scale privatizations. In Russia, following his 
re-election in 2018, President Putin has set some new strategic economic 
targets which, if realized, alongside a major oil and gas sector tax reform 
(the so-called ‘fiscal rule’), could reduce the country’s exposure to oil 
market fluctuations.11 It remains to be seen whether the political econ-
omy of regimes in the region can make such a diversification successful. 
5.3 THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ENERGY SECTORS 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, each newly independent state was 
faced with the choice of how to restructure its energy sector. The Soviet 
system had been organized in terms of sectoral ministries for electricity, 
pipelines, oil and coal. Conversely, since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, leading producing countries in the region have set up ministries 
which ultimately have oil, gas, electricity and coal under the same um-
brella, as in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, for example.
Another post-Soviet characteristic is the creation of integrated oil 
and gas companies: Naftogaz in Ukraine (responsible for oil and gas 
production, transmission, distribution, and imports), KazMunaiGas in 
Kazakhstan, and Socar in Azerbaijan. In Russia, only Gazprom emerged 
11 Eyl-Mazzega (ed.) 2018b; The World Bank Group 2018.
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as an integrated company that handles production, transmission, dis-
tribution, and exports, as does Turkmengas in Turkmenistan. Separate 
state-owned entities have been established for oil transportation in Russia 
(Transneft) or for gas transportation in Kazakhstan (KazTransGas). 
The Russian oil sector was initially privatized to a large extent follow-
ing the breakup of the Soviet Union, before being progressively taken 
back under state control through Gazpromneft, and particularly through 
Rosneft’s expansion via various strategic acquisitions (Yukos, TNK-BP, 
Bashneft). There are only two major private producers left in Russia, 
Lukoil and Surgutneftegas, as Rosneft now produces almost half of the 
country’s oil and has become one of the world’s largest producers.12 
The creation and expansion of such vast state-owned companies was 
justified partly by social, financial and strategic objectives: ensuring stable 
and subsidized supplies for the population, jobs and regional development; 
channeling dividends into the budget; and realizing strategic political or 
geopolitical projects. Yet they also became a tool for the capture of these 
companies’ assets, financial flows or resources via inflated procurement 
contracts or direct theft, as the management was appointed by the Head 
of State or required his consent. Under Leonid Kuchma’s two terms (1994–
2005), Naftogaz became a state within the state, financing political cam-
paigns, enriching cronies and subsidizing selected industries. Gazprom 
was partly privatized under Rem Vyakhirev and Viktor Chernomyrdyn, 
before President Putin changed the company’s management.13 
Murky intermediaries such as Itera, Eural Trans Gas or RosUkrEnergo 
flourished as ruling elites and the management of state-owned companies 
set up schemes whereby they would capture and share part of the rents 
stemming from differences in price levels at the expense of the different 
state companies and, ultimately, the respective country’s taxpayers.14 
In the schemes involving Turkmenistan, Russia and Ukraine from the 
late 1990s until 2009, Gazprom and Naftogaz were the losers, while the 
hidden shareholders of the intermediary companies were the winners. 
Such schemes have come to an end, however, as the intermediaries were 
gradually forced out of business, yet a major weak point in the transparent 
management of state-owned companies in the regions remains the pro-
curement segment, where contracts can easily be inflated and awarded 
to preferred suppliers. 
Several factors have been driving change in this context as a whole. 
National oil and gas companies needed to become more transparent as 
12 Gustafson 2012.
13 Clover 2013.
14 Balmaceda 2004; D’Anieri 1999.
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they sought to access foreign credit and financial markets and establish 
partnerships with Western international oil companies (IOCs). Combined 
with the need to develop new, more complex and costly reserves (in 
Russia’s unconventional plays, Russia’s Arctic territory or offshore, or 
in Kazakhstan’s or Azerbaijan’s offshore) while mature fields have been 
progressively depleting, the fall in oil and gas prices in 2009, and especially 
since the end of 2014, has pushed these companies to seek to develop new 
partnerships with Western companies, or to create favourable conditions 
for production agreements to be extended and for new investments to 
be secured. 
The partnerships with IOCs have not always run smoothly, however. 
As several projects involving these IOCs did not produce the expected 
results, the governments in Russia and Kazakhstan, for example, sought 
to restrain their activities and to force them to engage in partnerships 
involving their national oil and gas companies, and to pay more taxes. 
The Kazakh government, for instance, inserted KMG into key oil and gas 
projects and entered into several tax disputes. Russia no longer resorted 
to Production Sharing Agreements, putting Gazprom and Rosneft at the 
centre of partnerships with foreign companies instead, and inserting 
Gazprom into Shell’s Sakhalin project, for example.
Last but not least, Ukraine is a special case: since 2014, under pres-
sure from the IMF, EU, and EBRD, and as part of its Energy Community 
Membership obligations, Naftogaz has been progressively transformed 
and restructured. It has lost its import monopoly, agreed to unbundle 
the gas transmission functions and give up its import monopoly, and has 
adopted Western corporate governance standards. 
Finally, the electricity sectors of former Soviet Union countries have 
undergone different processes with varying stages of liberalization and 
types of market structure. Overall, state-owned companies remain dom-
inant in most of these countries’ power generation segments (InterRAO 
in Russia, Energoatom in Ukraine, Belenergo in Belarus, Uzbekenergo 
in Uzbekistan, and Azerenerji in Azerbaijan), as well as dispatch and 
transmission segments. A remarkable development took place in Russia, 
where major foreign investments were attracted in the power generation 
and distribution segments (notably Finnish Fortum, Germany’s EON, and 
Italy’s Enel). 
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5.4 MANAGING THE MUTUAL GAS INTERDEPENDENCIES 
WITHIN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AREA
The Soviet gas supply, transmission and export system was designed and 
operated on the assumption that it would remain integrated. From 1991 
onwards, this system was divided into several parts within the boundaries 
of the newly independent states, with new legal entities set up that would 
take responsibility for the maintenance, management and operation of 
the infrastructure. This happened against a backdrop of hyperinflation, 
the demonetization of transactions, weak state institutions, and crimi-
nalization. The challenges were manifold, starting with metering at the 
border and setting up new legal entities and commercial relations. As 
an example, no gas meters have been installed as yet in Ukraine on the 
pipelines entering Ukrainian territory from Russia. Metering takes place 
in Russia, in the presence of both companies’ technicians.
Russia found itself dependent on the Baltic countries for a large part 
of its oil exports (as well as Ukraine and Belarus), and on Ukraine for its 
gas exports. Kazakhstan was dependent on Russia for its oil exports and 
on Turkmenistan for its gas exports, as was Azerbaijan. Central Asia and 
the South Caucasus turned into a knot of intricate relations for electricity 
and gas supplies. Most of Ukraine’s gas needs had to be met by imports 
from Russia or Central Asia, and the same went for Belarus. Moreover, 
the Russian united national power system (UPS) was connected to all 
of its neighbours, running in synchronous mode with the power sys-
tems of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Mongolia 
and Uzbekistan. 
This knot of mutual interdependencies had the potential to be highly 
conflictual. While it led to political tensions and numerous supply dis-
ruptions, the 1990s were characterized by mutual arrangements put in 
place and no real attention was paid to reorganizing this non-cash system 
where debts were piling up.
This changed during President Putin’s first two terms in office. He 
was intent upon pursuing several goals at the same time: controlling 
Russia’s oil and gas exports; diminishing Russia’s dependence on transit 
countries; increasing export capacities and outlets; and, lastly, maxi-
mizing Russia’s rent and economic benefits in developing new export 
routes and optimizing sales and export mechanisms. Putin developed 
the Baltic pipeline system (BPS), linking Russia’s producing regions with 
two new ports in the Gulf of Finland, Ust-Luga (700 kb/d) and Primorsk 
(1.5 mb/d capacity), thereby reducing oil volumes in transit through the 
Druzhba pipeline. In the 2000s, Gazprom developed the Yamal-Europe 
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gas pipeline to Poland and Germany, the Blue Stream pipeline across the 
Black Sea to Turkey, and the Nord Stream pipeline directly connecting 
Russia and Gazprom’s largest customer, Germany. In Belarus, Armenia 
and Kyrgyzstan, Russian state-owned companies took over large parts 
of the local energy sector, as these countries had huge debts and sought 
to enjoy privileged energy pricing. 
Russia’s determined strategy was also marred by failures. Gazprom 
failed to take over Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, and its attempt to build 
a second Yamal-Europe pipeline system, via Slovakia, or along the same 
route also failed. Neither the Burgas-Alexandropoulis oil pipeline project 
from Bulgaria to Greece nor the planned Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
through Turkey succeeded, Surgutneftegaz did not manage to take over 
MOL in Hungary, and Russia was unable to buy the Mazeikiu refinery in 
Lithuania in 2006. Putin also cancelled the 63 bcm/y South Stream pipe-
line project to Bulgaria in 2014. 
Yet the Kremlin has a good chance of success when it comes to building 
the 55 bcm/y Nord Stream 2 pipeline on the seabed in the Baltic (unless it 
is halted by US sanctions), and the TurkStream pipeline in the Black Sea 
(with two strings with a throughput capacity of 15.5 bcm/y each, con-
nected to Turkey). When operational, these pipelines will dramatically 
reduce Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Russia. Ukraine still handled 
about 93 bcm of Russian gas in transit in 2017, down from over 120 bcm 
in the 2000s, leading to a surge in hryvnia transit revenues as the transit 
tariff is in dollars and the hryvnia has depreciated sharply since 2014. This 
has brought some temporary relief for Naftogaz, fuelling unprecedented 
profits and a $3.9 billion dividend payment to the Ukrainian budget in 
2017.15 Trilateral negotiations involving Russia, Ukraine and the European 
Commission over the post-1st January 2020 use of the Ukrainian gas 
transmission system by Gazprom, when the current contract ends, got 
underway in July 2018 amid heightened tensions.16
Russia’s gas exports have been a foreign policy tool in its neighbour-
hood for many years. Russia sought to negotiate prices and discounts 
in return for political or economic concessions, on the one hand, and 
when there was a dependence on oil and gas transit, for cheaper tran-
sit conditions on the other. This proved to be conflictual in the case of 
Belarus (frequent oil and gas supply crises), Georgia (in 2006) and espe-
cially Ukraine, with two gas crises occurring in January 2006 and January 
2009. These winter crises were generally triggered by a mix of disputes 
over commercial and patronage schemes and exacerbated by geopolitical 
15 Naftograz Group 2017.
16 Eyl-Mazzega 2018a..
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factors – a rapprochement with NATO and the EU – and elections that 
brought reformers to power. Ultimately, all former Soviet republics buy-
ing Russian gas pay a market price. Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, 
which have benefitted from a discount as Customs Union countries, did 
not pay the export tax.
The contractual framework also changed: intergovernmental agree-
ments used to frame these commercial transactions on a yearly basis, with 
new negotiations taking place in the middle of winter, and with prices 
and tariffs being negotiated between heads of state in a highly political 
manner. This changed as relations shifted to long-term contracts with 
prices and tariffs set by formulas. 
Russia’s clients did not remain inactive. Following the 2014 crises 
triggered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine’s 
Donbas, Kyiv took decisive steps to end its dependence on Russian gas 
imports. With support from the European Commission, technical and 
regulatory steps were taken to access gas from EU markets via reverse 
flows, thereby completely terminating Russian gas imports at the end of 
2015 and fully integrating itself into the European gas market. Ukraine 
also stopped supplying electricity to the annexed Crimea in 2016. Not 
surprisingly, however, countries enjoying relatively privileged oil, gas 
and electricity supplies from Russia did not try to diversify away from 
the latter, as was the case with Belarus and Armenia.
Lastly, one needs to mention the Eurasian Economic Union and its 
plan to establish a single energy market (the exact timing is still unknown, 
but the Treaty mentions a single electricity market by 2019 and a single 
gas and oil market by 2025).17 In principle, this would enable the unre-
stricted transportation of coal, gas, oil and electricity across the single 
market. In reality, infrastructure bottlenecks, real or artificial, affecting 
rail freight or pipeline capacities, are expected to restrict this potential 
freedom of movement. 
5.5 INTERNATIONAL TRADE: TAPPING ASIAN MARKETS
The Soviet energy export system was geared towards Central and Western 
Europe. The most important change that has occurred since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union is that several states have developed new oil, gas and 
coal export outlets to Asian countries, not least with the support or direct 
participation of China, as well as to the Middle East.
17 Zemskova 2018.
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5.5.1 Russia developing routes for oil and gas exports to China
Russia exported about 0.25 mb/d of oil to China in 2008, and ten years lat-
er Russia has become the largest external oil supplier to China, with about 
1.2 mb/d exported on average in 2017 and 1.36 mb/d in Q1 2018. Overall, 
Russia’s crude oil exports to China currently account for about 23% of 
Russia’s total crude oil and products exports. The main export channel 
to China is the 4857-kilometre East Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, 
which was commissioned in 2009 and is being further expanded: the 
system has a direct spur to China and one that connects to the Kozmino 
seaport terminal. In addition, Rosneft is doing swaps with Kazakhstan 
to increase its oil exports to China. The ESPO system will also facilitate 
the delivery of more oil to two Russian refineries, Komsomolsk and 
Khabarovsk, and a new refinery (Far Eastern Petrochemical Company), 
which Rosneft and ChemChina intend to build near Vladivostok.
Russia also started electricity exports to China just after the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, and cross-border exports have been increasing since 
then alongside coal exports from new mines developed in East Siberia.18
Pursuing its goal of diversifying gas export markets and benefitting 
from the booming Asian gas markets, notably driven by China’s growth in 
demand and imports, tapping new gas reserves located in East Siberia and 
the Yamal peninsula, and fostering regional development in the Far East, 
in the 2000s Russia laid out a strategy aimed at developing its liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) and pipeline export potential towards the Asia-Pacific 
region. The implementation took a long time, but it is finally happening: 
following the liberalization of LNG exports, Novatek, a private company, 
developed the Yamal LNG terminal, a 16.5 Mt/y gas export project to-
gether with Total and CNPC. In spite of US financial sanctions and a harsh 
environment, the terminal was commissioned on time. A second project 
nearby, Arctic 2, is currently being developed and could take a final in-
vestment decision in the next two years. Gazprom has been developing 
several LNG export projects in addition to Sakhalin-1, which is already 
operational (in Vladivostok, again on Sakhalin and in the Gulf of Finland), 
but no investment decision has been made as yet. 
Gazprom has been more successful in developing the Power of Siberia 
pipeline system towards China. Following a landmark gas supply contract 
signed in 2014 between Gazprom and CNPC, the first 2200-kilometre 
section is currently being built, aiming to be operational by 2020. The 
pipeline system will ultimately be 3000 kilometres long and carry up 
to 38 bcm/y of gas to China. This pipeline is a game changer for Russia, 
China and for global gas markets as it will enable Gazprom to sell 20% of 
18 Henderson and Mitrova 2016.
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its total gas exports to China, while also enabling the latter to reduce the 
use of coal and limit the increase of its LNG imports, which have been 
soaring in recent times. While Russia has been successful in developing 
these exports to China, there are no equivalent projects for other Asian 
consumers, such as Japan or India, with the result that Russia’s export 
strategy to the region has actually been concentrated on China only.
5.5.2 Kazakhstan: still highly dependent on Russia, but opening 
to China
Facing an almost 100% oil transit dependency on Russia as a legacy of the 
Soviet Union, and in preparation for the commissioning of the Caspian 
offshore Kashagan field, Kazakhstan had plans to develop a Caspian trans-
portation system to ship part of its oil via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan 
and feed it into an expanded Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. Yet that 
has never materialized. Instead, Kazakhstan opted for the cheaper alter-
native of expanding the 1500-kilometre Caspian Pipeline Company’s (CPC) 
pipeline capacity (linking the Tengiz field to the Russian Black Sea port 
of Novorossiysk) to 67 Mt/y, thereby still strengthening its dependence 
on Russian transit. The counterbalancing strategy has involved bringing 
in more foreign investors in its upstream, including Chinese, in order to 
mitigate geopolitical risks and attract finance. 
As Kazakhstan’s oil production has been increasing, the country has 
sought to tap new markets and profit from the booming Chinese market 
at its Eastern border. Over the course of the 2000s, a 2228-kilometre 
pipeline was built in several sections from Atyrau to Alashankou by KMG 
and CNPC. Its capacity is currently 20 Mt or 0.4 mb/d. Exports picked 
up at first before falling again as Kazakhstan oriented its oil westwards 
(including oil produced by Chinese majors, which received better terms 
in exporting it to global markets rather than to China) and faced produc-
tion limitations. The bulk of Kazakhstan’s gas exports (around 17 bcm/y) 
are currently geared towards Russia, but the country’s growing export 
capacity in the coming years will enable it to start gas exports to China via 
a newly commissioned pipeline linking up with the Central Asia-China 
system – up to 10 bcm/y.
5.5.3 Azerbaijan: new oil and gas routes to Turkey and the EU 
Shortly after gaining its independence, Azerbaijan’s strategy was to attract 
international oil companies (including Russian companies) to develop its 
complex and costly offshore resources. Initial offshore gas discoveries 
were neglected, however, as oil was the target.
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Azerbaijan used to rely on the Soviet-era Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipe-
line, as well as on tanker shipments to Russia in order to export the bulk 
of its crude oil to markets. After independence, the country first devel-
oped the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline (operational in 1999, 833 km, 0.145 
mb/d capacity) and, with Western support, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline (operational in 2006, 1768 km, 1 mb/d capacity, currently 
loaded at 70%). 
As of 2006, production from the Shah Deniz gas and condensate field 
enabled the first gas exports to Turkey via a new South Caucasus pipeline 
(692 km), crossing Georgia to Turkey and having the capacity to ship 
around 9 bcm/y of Azeri gas to both countries (later augmented to 25 
bcm/y). Deliveries to Turkey are scheduled to start in 2018 (up to 6 bcm/y) 
and larger exports to the EU are expected at the end of 2019 (up to 10 bc-
m/y). A dedicated, 3500-kilometre-long new transport infrastructure is 
being constructed, the so-called Southern Gas Corridor, which links the 
Sengachal terminal near Baku to Italy via the upgraded South Caucasus 
gas pipeline, the 1841-kilometre TANAP pipeline through Turkey, and the 
878-kilometre TAP pipeline through Greece and Albania to southern Italy. 
5.5.4 Turkmenistan: opening to China and Iran 
Turkmenistan’s gas industry dates back to the Soviet period, yet the dis-
covery of the massive Galkynysh Gas Field in the mid-2000s propelled 
the country into the ranks of the world’s top five gas resource holders. 
In the 2000s, Turkmens and Russia had plans to expand Turkmen gas 
shipments to Russia via the Soviet-built Central Asia-Centre gas pipe-
line system (5 pipelines, 90 bcm/y capacity) through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, by building another pipeline along the coast of the Caspian 
Sea that would have further increased export capacity. The plans never 
materialized, however. Yet following commercial disputes with Gazprom, 
whose own gas resources were developing while demand for its gas was 
stagnating both in Russia and abroad, Gazprom ended its gas imports in 
2009. By that time, Turkmenistan had already signed large supply con-
tracts with China for up to 65 bcm/year of Turkmen gas by 2020 for 30 
years (partly from fields developed by CNPC and partly from gas supplied 
by Turkmengas), while the Chinese would fund, provide the equipment 
for, and construct a new mega gas transportation system to China. The 
latter is the 3666-kilometre-long Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, 
which was commissioned in 2009 and has undergone expansion since 
then, with the potential of carrying up to 85 bcm/y. This proved critically 
important for Turkmenistan’s attempt to diversify its export revenues, 
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especially since Iran has turned out to be a problematic customer. Hence, 
China is now the first importer of Turkmen gas. 
Further export diversification options remain uncertain, but the coun-
try was finally able to restart gas exports to Russia. It aims to develop the 
TAPI pipeline (1814 km, 33 bcm/y, $10 billion) through Afghanistan to 
Pakistan and India, yet after several years of preparations and in spite of 
an official construction kick-off ceremony, the prospects for the project 
are largely uncertain. Turkmenistan has also been engaged in negotiations 
with Azerbaijan, Turkey and the European Commission over supplying gas 
via a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline that would cross the Caspian Sea and turn 
Azerbaijan and Georgia into transit countries for Turkmen gas onwards 
to Turkey and the EU. This project has never made fundamental progress, 
however, for economic, political and commercial reasons. 
5.5.5 Uzbekistan: opening to China
Last but not least, Uzbekistan was the first former Soviet country to sup-
ply pipeline gas to China back in 2012. The country let Lukoil develop 
several of its gas fields yet, in the face of increasing domestic demand, 
Uzbekneftegaz had dramatically decreased gas exports to Russia and had 
to postpone the ramping up of gas deliveries to China under a framework 
agreement signed in 2010. The tiny volumes exported to neighbours have 
varied in past years. Yet following successful gas exploration and up-
coming new gas developments, the state-owned company has signed a 
commitment to supply 10 bcm/y to China by 2020. Total gas production 
reached 56.4 bcm in 2017 and is almost entirely absorbed by domestic con-
sumption. In terms of oil, the country faces a slow decline in production, 
resulting in petrol shortages and prompting the country to raise imports 
from Kazakhstan and Russia and build a new refinery that will be able to 
meet the country’s jet fuel needs.
5.6 CONCLUSION
The most important Soviet footprint in the region’s energy sectors in-
cludes the poor energy intensity record, the supply-side-driven energy 
policies, the struggle with regulated tariffs and social energy re-distri-
bution policies, the slow pace of ageing infrastructure modernization 
and replacement, opportunities for predation, capture and corruption 
stemming from the energy sectors, as well as the strong dependency 
of several oil and gas producers on oil sector tax revenues. Azerbaijan 
and, to a lesser extent, Russia and Kazakhstan, did not manage to revert 
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to their rentier state economies and are thus vulnerable to oil and gas 
market fluctuations.
Changes have been taking place, however, namely the shift to mar-
ket-based price levels for the industry sector, large foreign investments 
attracted in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as well as in Russia, and serious 
energy sector reforms that are being implemented in Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine as part of their Energy Community memberships. 
Ukraine and Georgia were able to critically reduce their dependency 
on gas supplies from Russia, and Azerbaijan on transit via Russia for its 
oil and gas exports. Kazakhstan remains dependent on Russia for its oil 
exports. Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan remain largely dependent on 
Russia for their energy supplies and have sold large parts of their stra-
tegic energy infrastructure. Ukraine still relies on transit revenues from 
Gazprom. Overall, Russia remains the dominant oil supplier for all net 
importing countries in the region.
Lastly, the most spectacular changes seen in the past 20 years are 
the development of new export routes to China from Russia, as well as 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Beijing has thus largely benefitted from 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, which was an opportunity to foster its 
energy security, diversify its own oil and gas imports away from maritime 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
The disintegration of economic blocs or countries always results in a sharp 
decrease in economic interaction between their past constituencies. These 
trends may vary regarding their speed, magnitude, nature, and the degree 
to which different countries are affected. The decline may last decades 
and have a sizeable underlying inertia. Hence, the main question concerns 
the way in which these disintegrative trends are managed, whether the 
partners can find alternative forms of cooperation, and whether the future 
development can counterbalance the centrifugal forces.
Accordingly, the likely professional hunch regarding the current 
economic trends in the post-Soviet space would be an ongoing gradual 
decline in cooperation. ‘Only’ 27 years after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, any other outcome of this research would constitute a major sur-
prise. Nonetheless, there are many forms and variations of decline, which 
is why the quantitative research has to be supplemented by a cautious 
and in-depth interpretation. What are the structural drivers, models of 
development and growth in the region? Are there any alternative powers 
of gravity? Do the countries try to suppress disintegrative trends, and 
how do they overcome their consequences? What role do the political 
considerations and the integration projects play? Looking beyond the 
statistics may provide a more justified view of where this long-lasting 
trend may lead, and what kind of sustainable cooperation can be formed 
between the post-Soviet countries in the years to come.
6. ADHESIVE AND CENTRIFUGAL FORCES 
IN THE POST-SOVIET ECONOMIC SPACE
András Deák 
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This chapter provides an overview of the economic interlinkages be-
tween post-Soviet countries and their major trends. Section one briefly 
outlines key economic drivers within the region since the early 1990s. 
Section two delves into the statistics of the issue, relying primarily on 
foreign trade indicators as the most reliable and accessible sources, but 
also foreign direct investments (FDI) and, where applicable and relevant, 
labour movements and financial transfers. The third section discusses the 
role of post-Soviet integration projects and simultaneously the issue of 
alternative gravity centres, like the EU and China. The chapter concludes 
by sharing some thoughts on the integrability of regional countries.
6.2 THE SPECIFICS AND DYNAMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET 
ECOSPHERE
There are two conventional views on post-Soviet economic coopera-
tion. The one with the stronger political-macroeconomic focus interprets 
regional ties as a Soviet legacy, where value chains and industrial ties 
inherited from Soviet Union times prevail. According to this view, this 
cooperation is doomed to decline since, with Soviet technology becoming 
increasingly obsolete, countries are turning to other, lucrative markets. 
Politics may slow down this process by making financial sacrifices, but 
in the longer run structural drivers point towards disintegration.1 The 
other view, based more distinctly on corporate strategies, looks at the 
region as a whole. Foreign multinationals, car makers, agricultural and 
pharmaceutical producers, and banks do not enter Russia, Kazakhstan 
or Ukraine separately. They establish their assembly lines for a handful of 
regional markets due to similar cultural segmentation of demand, lower 
customs levels, infrastructural and geographic proximity, or simply to 
gain access to bigger markets. For emerging local companies, foreign 
expansion almost always starts by entering the neighbouring countries 
through trade or investments. According to this discourse, some regional 
ties are normal and can be exploited with synergies, opening up possi-
bilities for a new kind of regional cooperation.2 
Elaborating on this scene, we have some ‘strange species’ in this re-
gion, like Belarus, which created its ‘long survival story’ with a partially 
upgraded, but unreformed economy.3 Preserving its Soviet industrial 
patterns, it launched a brutal export offensive based on the CIS area and 
1 Aslund 2013. 
2 Deuber and Romanova 2015.
3 See Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011.
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achieved relatively high growth rates. Belarus still conducts more than 
60% of its foreign trade with post-Soviet countries, and its share of total 
intra-regional turnover grew from 7.3% to 23.5% between 1994 and 2016.
Consequently, when one examines post-Soviet economic cooperation, 
it is reasonable to treat the region as a particular ecosphere with the local 
countries or corporations as its subjects. Each subject accommodates 
to its surroundings, implementing its strategy in a post-Soviet sphere 
that plays various roles in different contexts. Some may coexist with this 
environment, some have moved to the borderlands and only partially 
depend on it, while the larger subjects can even try to transform the 
place where they live. The totality of these strategies coupled with a good 
deal of path dependency constitute the region and determine its future 
patterns. Accordingly, it is important to take stock of these peculiarities, 
and identify some of the paradigms of the given ecosphere.
1. Russia has a monolithic share among the post-Soviet economies. In 
2017 it represented 75.3% (IMF data at current prices) of the regional 
GDP, up from 67% in 1992.4 The second-ranked Kazakhstan had a mere 
7.9%, despite steadily catching up after the Soviet breakup. For com-
parison purposes, it is like a European Union, where the 19 Eurozone 
countries (in 2016 their combined share was 72.9%) create a single 
entity and form an economic region with the other 9 EU members. 
The post-Soviet regional set-up is concentrated around Russia, in-
dependently of Moscow’s ambitions or policies.
2. The regional growth rate lags behind the global rate, as these coun-
tries could not establish a sustainable model for catching up. Between 
1992 and 2016, annual average growth rates were 2.2% within the 
post-Soviet area versus the global 3.7%. What is more, the post-Soviet 
recovery from the 2008–09 crisis was even more sluggish. The average 
annual regional weighted growth between 2008 and 2016 represented 
1.3%, two percentage points below the global level. All of this suggests 
that old cooperation patterns still retain some of their relevance, and 
have not been replaced by new mechanisms and development drivers. 
3. The only means of relative prosperity has been through hydrocarbon 
exports. If we add Belarus to the group of net energy exporters (from 
the macroeconomic point of view this is justified since its economic 
4 In terms of data sources, unless indicated otherwise, under post-Soviet space I have included the 12 former 
Soviet countries (not the Baltic states). I have used IMF World Economic Outlook and World Bank data for 
GDP and general macroeconomic indicators. For foreign trade and some intra-regional comparisons, I have 
referred to CISStat, which does not include data on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In this regard, unless 
indicated otherwise, post-Soviet (or alternatively CIS) foreign trade includes only 10 countries. The foreign 
trade data for Georgia after 2009 has been supplemented with data from the national statistical provider. FDI 
data has been collected from UNCTAD and some expert and national providers. Other sources are indicated in 
the text.
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growth has a slightly positive correlation with with oil price hikes 
due to Russian implicit subsidies5), the average performance of the six 
energy exporters exceeds one of the importers on a GDP PPP per capita 
basis almost threefold (17,198 USD vs 6273 USD in 2015). Hydrocarbon 
exports are strongly disintegrative in terms of regional cooperation. 
While in the short run they may provide a certain complementary 
impetus between exporters and importers due to high regional ener-
gy intensities and price hikes, in the medium and longer run exports 
go to the advanced economies outside the region. Furthermore, rent 
revenues from oil and gas push elite mindsets towards less cooperative 
outcomes, where national economies can stand alone and complex 
value chains in manufacturing and processing industries and services 
are less important.
4. Power legitimization through economic growth and prosperity have 
not become an exclusive priority in the region. While in Western de-
veloped countries elite legitimization tends to rely heavily on eco-
nomic performance, regional political systems often pursue nation 
building and/or great power agendas in order to maintain their social 
support. While in some cases local elites opted for economic consoli-
dation instead of national self-identification (Belarus in the 1990s and 
early 2000s) or could pursue these policies in parallel (Kazakhstan), 
these two trends often substitute each other. The wish for economic 
consolidation provided the most efficient stimulus for integration 
efforts by far.
5. The state remains a key actor in most of these countries independently 
of its capabilities. Paternalistic expectations are high in these societies, 
while dirigist solutions and heavy reliance on state ownership, when 
applicable, remain popular among the elites. At the same time, market 
reforms and liberalization are rare occurrences in the region (a partial 
exception being Georgia). These features correlate well with the more 
authoritarian political systems of the energy exporters, while lead-
ing to permanent economic and social imbalances in other countries 
(namely Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova). 
Although these characteristics paint a gloomy, inward-looking picture 
of the post-Soviet space, the regional megatrend had been one of liber-
alization and gradual opening until the 2014 sanctions and protectionist 
shifts in Russia. The combined foreign trade of the CIS countries (except 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) grew 8.3 times between 1994 and 2014, 
twice as fast as global trade. Eight countries from the region joined the 
5 According to the IMF, the 2015 oil price drop had a modest but negative impact on Belarusian GDP growth, 
ranging between 0 and 0.5 per cent. IMF Staff Report – Belarus 2015, p. 8. 
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WTO with significant liberalization commitments. The level of foreign 
direct investments caught up to the lowest level of the CEE range on a per 
capita basis after 2005 in the more developed countries, like Russia and 
Kazakhstan (UNCTAD). Keeping in mind the relatively slow average GDP 
growth and the low initial basis, the openness of these economies has 
grown significantly since the late Soviet years. This is natural given that 
the Soviet Union was a closed entity, only loosely connected to the world 
economy. After 1991, in the midst of the Soviet economic collapse, these 
countries were only able to find markets, capital and modern know-how 
outside the region.
At the same time, local economic setups have only partially evolved 
into export-driven models. Unlike the new EU member states from CEE, 
where foreign trade/GDP indicators have doubled or tripled and had risen 
above 150% (except in Poland and Latvia) by 2016, the post-Soviet average 
remained around 80% (World Bank). Foreign multinational companies 
have never acquired system-building characteristics in the local econ-
omies. While they could acquire significant shares in some sectors, the 
backbone of national performance was provided by companies with do-
mestic owners and by state-owned actors. Foreign multinationals engaged 
the region primarily driven by different motivations from those in the CEE 
countries. In the latter case efficiency-seeking, and access to a low-wage, 
educated workforce above all, constituted the primary objective, while 
in the post-Soviet space resource- and market-seeking considerations 
remained dominant.6 Apart from the quasi-unreformed Belarus and 
Turkmenistan, the region’s economies constitute various kinds of hybrid 
capitalist formations, where the mental and policy patterns of Socialism 
remain relatively strong, while the most fundamental systematic and 
institutional transformative steps have been taken and are effective.
Intra-CIS economic relations have to be examined on the basis of 
these ambiguous fundaments. With the exception of Belarus and some 
smaller states, economic opening meant that intra-CIS relations grad-
ually lost their importance within external ties. The regional share of 
intra-CIS turnover in total foreign trade decreased from 34.5% to 19.1% 
between 1994 and 2016. This did not indicate a decrease in absolute terms 
on the current USD basis, as the total trade volumes grew almost three-
fold. Compared to local combined GDPs, the share of intra-CIS trade has 
retained much of its share today, and in some cases it may even have 
increased since the early 1990s. This comes as no surprise given the high 
level of barter trade within the region, and particularly the artificially low 
energy prices until the late 2000s. These price rises influenced the data 
6 This hypothesis was also positively tested by broad surveys among companies in four CIS countries. See 
Kudina and Jakubiak 2012.
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tremendously both at the total foreign level, and at the intra-CIS trade 
levels in particular. 
Given the economic collapse in the 1990s and the determined search 
for alternative markets, the fall in regional cooperation during the first 
decade was understandable. What is more noteworthy is that the intra-CIS 
trade share was unable to grow thereafter during the years of recovery 
and high growth in the 2000s: it constituted 27.8% in 2000 and only 
21.5% in 2008. During this period, there was an opportunity to establish 
new forms of regional cohesion, and revitalize former value chains and 
sectoral cooperation. Nonetheless, economic consolidation brought a 
further decrease in post-Soviet trade and FDI flows, and external ties 
proved to be more sustainable than intraregional ones. A good explana-
tion for this is the intensive growth in the global economy. The decade 
preceding the financial crisis was the Golden Age of the world economy. 
An abundance of capital in advanced financial markets pushed Western 
FDI to semi-peripheral, emerging markets. High growth rates implied 
rising raw material prices, creating favourable conditions for energy and 
metal exports, and boosting local mining sectors. Between 2000 and 2007, 
Russian hydrocarbon exports increased by 42.5% in volumetric terms, 
Azeri oil production tripled, while Kazakh production doubled. During 
these years, external markets were in pretty good shape, explaining some 
of the decline in intra-CIS shares.
In this regard, the years after 2008 are particularly interesting. The fall 
in the intra-CIS share in total trade decelerated significantly, decreasing 
from 21.5% to just 19.1% between 2008 and 2016. The main decrease 
occurred in 2014, with the Russia-Ukraine conflict clearly playing a con-
siderable role. Nonetheless, some symptoms emerged before 2014. After 
the financial crisis, the risk appetite for emerging markets decreased 
considerably. Post-Soviet energy production also started to plateau: 
Russian export volumes grew by just 13.8%, Kazakh oil production by 
23.6% until 2017, while Azeri drilling started to gradually decline. This 
is a strong indication that the region is reaching the limitations of its 
extensive growth. It does not mean that high prices could not boost the 
region again temporarily. What it does mean is that regional countries 
cannot increase their production much further, their production costs 
will likely rise through reserve substitution, and these two factors will 
imply less rent and budgetary income measured at constant oil and gas 
prices in the years to come.7
2014 may constitute another milestone in terms of Russia’s shift to-
wards import substitution and a more protectionist stance. While this 
7 A more detailed analysis of Russia is provided by Gustafson 2012.
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trend has emerged in the wake of Western sanctions and Moscow’s coun-
ter-sanctions, the liberalization agenda had been losing ground prior to 
the Ukrainian crisis. The implementation of the WTO rules remained rather 
isolated and did not expand into a wave of economic liberalization, as in 
China. The protectionist agenda has long been propagated at the level of 
the Kremlin primarily by Sergey Glazyev, senior advisor to the President. 
Given the protectionist Zeitgeist even in the Western hemisphere, it is 
reasonable to say that protectionism will remain a major temptation in 
the post-Soviet space, and it remains to be seen how it will affect in-
tra-regional cooperation.
6.3 THE STEPPING STONES OF DECLINE
Foreign trade is the most accessible and reliable indicator of regional co-
operation. As Table 3 shows, the share of intra-CIS trade fell in all ten of 
the countries under study, apart from Tajikistan (for which, along with 
the Caucasus Republics, the base year of 1994 is somewhat misleading 
because of their respective armed conflicts). Nonetheless, the magnitude 
of decline is rather different from country to country. Belarus, and to 
a lesser extent Armenia, retained their heavy reliance on CIS markets, 
namely Russia to an overwhelming degree. Intra-CIS foreign trade is 
less concentrated in the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, for which 
Kazakhstan constitutes their biggest export outlet and the second larg-
est source of imports. In all of the other cases, the significance of the CIS 
decreased gradually with some fluctuations.
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The first factor worth examining is energy trade, as it constitutes the 
primary reason for decline. In the case of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 
the drop is most likely connected to the rise in their oil production. With 
Astana heavily and Baku excessively dependent on hydrocarbon exports, 
the bulk of their production goes outside the region,8 so their performance 
can easily be attributed to this single fact. This may also be true of Russia, 
although it has a more complex relationship in this matter due to its role 
as a major supplier of gas and oil to the region. 
Nonetheless, CIS energy trade has a high level of price responsive-
ness, and high energy prices may trigger a robust downward trend in 
trade volumes. In 2003, at a time of low energy prices, 43% of Russia’s 
exports to the CIS consisted of mineral fuels. Given the low gas and, in 
the case of Belarus, low oil export prices, these shares are comparable to 
the extra-CIS levels (the respective share for non-CIS exports was 59.5%). 
This went up to 55.3% (72.7%) by 2011, only to plummet by 2017 to 33% 
(63.4%). Nonetheless, while Belarusian and Armenian imports remained 
flat in terms of volume, Moldovan imports fell substantially and Ukrainian 
imports shrank even further, with the result that its consumption of oil 
and gas has practically halved during the last 15 years. The transformation 
8 In 2017, 89.5% of Azeri and 69.3% of Kazakh exports were mineral fuels. In the Kazakh case, only 4.4% of all 
mineral exports went to the CIS.
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Azerbaijan 53.2 39.6 37.8 20.9 23.3 25.4 26.0 7.2 14.4 10.8 9.4 16.0
Armenia 59.6 35.4 27.7 20.8 26.7 24.7 28.6 30.0 28.0 29.6 28.8 30.3
Belarus 64.0 66.2 68.6 65.5 62.4 63.4 54.9 56.0 56.8 58.2 59.1 60.9
Georgia** 78.9 45.0 34.8 34.7 40.4 39.4 38.8 33.7 32.6 31.7 31.3 28.9
Kazakhstan 59.6 60.3 43.1 36.6 32.2 31.1 26.9 26.2 26.2 25.2 23.7 28.5
Kyrgyzstan 65.8 65.5 49.4 48.3 45.8 51.6 52.1 54.0 50.1 53.5 49.7 42.3
Moldova 72.0 64.0 52.5 42.9 45.1 46.0 38.6 36.4 34.9 34.6 28.5 23.8
Russia 23.9 23.2 21.8 18.6 16.9 18.3 14.7 14.5 14.6 14.8 12.7 12.5
Tajikistan 31.3 49.6 49.6 64.0 50.5 44.3 41.2 44.1 44.8 45.0 45.6 50.1
Ukraine 64.0 58.1 44.3 43.9 38.2 38.5 39.4 37.6 40.5 38.9 29.7 19.3
Table 3: The share of intra-CIS trade in external trade, 1994–2016, %*
Source: CISStat, Geostat
* Complete data unavailable for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; 
** data for years after 2009 from Geostat.ge
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from low prices and high volume trade to global pricing had a negative 
effect on turnover. Soft pricing still plays a considerable role in keeping 
Russian exports to Belarus and Armenia high.
Besides and partly because of the shrinking share of energy in Russian 
exports, the product structure of Moscow’s foreign trade within the CIS 
remains relatively ‘evenly distributed’. It does not have a distinguished 
profile, hinting at the existence of complex value chains. This is in marked 
contrast to its non-CIS turnover. Russia’s energy supplier status vis-à-vis 
other, European and Asian countries is well-reflected in its trade statis-
tics: almost two-thirds of its exports consist of fuels and more than half 
of its imports comprise machinery and transport equipment (Figure 4). 
At the same time, the Russian CIS trade structure does not have the same 
trenchant features of division of labour. Due to the decreasing share of 
energy, little complementarity has remained in the intra-CIS trade struc-
ture. It looks more like trade between entities of similar economic setups. 
While this does not exclude the existence of some verticality of particular 
sectors, successful integrations are based on broad complementarity and/
or complex value chains, penetrating the whole economy. This might 
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Figure 4: The product structure of Russian foreign trade with CIS and non-CIS countries in 2017, %. 
Source: Russian Customs Service
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Another surprising phenomenon is the distribution of intra-CIS trade 
between countries. Normally when a system falls apart, the relations 
between its smaller and distinct entities suffer more than those with its 
bigger units. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 4, it was not Russia that was 
boosting its share within post-Soviet trade, but Kazakhstan and Belarus. 
The Kazakh data, as well as the steep decline in Ukrainian proportions 
can be partly attributed to their respective rise and fall in GDP shares. 
The Belarus data is somewhat misleading, as its intra-CIS trade almost 
completely covers Russia (above 85%). Furthermore, the relative rise in 
shares of EAEU members between 2005 and 2016 may be a result of trade 
diversion due to the customs union (as indicated later in this chapter).
The relatively low data for Russia, especially if compared to Moscow’s 
significantly higher share in post-Soviet GDPs, raises some doubts re-
garding the business underpinnings of its reintegration efforts. Despite 
all of the integration measures at the political and macroeconomic level, 
it was unable to boost its role as the centre of trade within the region. 
This is likely and primarily a consequence of Moscow’s political conflicts 
and economic statecraft policies, and the use of trade embargoes with-
in the region. Most notably, bilateral trade with Ukraine, once a major 
constituency of intra-CIS relations, fell by 74.2% between 2013 and 2016. 
Meanwhile, Russian trade ties with EAEU members or in politically neutral 
cases have remained intact or have even deepened, as was the case with 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Table 4: The distribution of CIS foreign trade between 10 countries, 1994–2016, %
Source: CISStat
 1994 2005 2016
Azerbaijan 1.6 2.0 2.1
Armenia 0.7 0.6 1.2
Belarus 7.3 15.5 23.5
Georgia 0.8 1.2 2.1
Kazakhstan 8.3 10.4 13.4
Kyrgyzstan 0.9 0.8 1.8
Moldova 1.8 1.2 1.1
Russia 50.2 43.8 44.5
Tajikistan 0.7 0.9 1.5
Ukraine 27.7 23.6 11.0
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Another important issue is inward foreign direct investments (iFDI) 
and their trade creation. Given the methodological and reporting prob-
lems, it would be difficult to identify FDI flows on a bilateral, or even on 
an intra-regional basis. Suffice it to say that according to the Russian 
Central Bank, the combined level of the CIS in Russian outward FDI was 
ranked in only 21st place on a nominal basis – an obviously absurd figure. 
Hence Table 5 presents only combined iFDI levels on a per capita basis, in 
an attempt to map out some possible ways in which foreign investments 
affected post-Soviet trade levels. As mentioned above, average post-Soviet 
iFDI levels remain moderate, suggesting that new value chains did not 
fundamentally reshape the economic landscape. Energy exporters tend 
to have higher iFDI stocks and this may play a role in changing economic 
orientations. Turkmenistan is the most radical example of how Chinese 
gas investments boosted iFDI and created a new and exclusive trade rela-
tionship in less than a decade (in 2017 83.6% of Turkmen exports went to 
China, and the Russian share in its foreign trade was 3.7%). However, in 
the case of the other countries, there are no convincing indications that 
iFDI influences trade and interconnects the subjects.
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6.4 THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION AND ITS POTENTIAL 
CHALLENGERS – THE EU AND CHINA
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a grand project to reintegrate 
certain regional countries, replaying the EU integration roadmap. It cur-
rently has five members – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Armenia. In 2010 the three former countries ‘recreated’ the customs un-
ion, and in 2015 they established the Eurasian Economic Union, formally 
introducing the common market with the ‘four freedoms’ (movement of 
goods, capital, services and labour) within it. The Union aims to abolish 
administrative and non-tariff barriers from trade and other movements, 
creating a single market by 2025.
 
1997–00 2001–04 2005–08 2009–12 2013–16
Azerbaijan 330.0 667.1 1,050.4 951.1 2,079.6
Armenia 92.3 254.9 793.7 1,571.6 1,551.0
Belarus 107.0 178.9 425.7 1,211.6 1,878.9
Georgia 111.8 285.2 1,030.3 2,121.9 3,185.0
Kazakhstan 494.1 1,129.8 2,575.9 5,787.0 7,260.4
Kyrgyzstan 78.0 100.2 179.0 371.0 703.0
Moldova 71.9 164.3 409.9 763.3 877.0
Russian Federation 126.8 577.2 1,995.6 2,930.8 2,446.2
Tajikistan 17.7 30.5 67.1 164.6 232.0
Turkmenistan 174.5 329.6 760.7 2,948.0 5,549.3
Ukraine 60.8 146.6 677.2 1,218.6 1,194.5
Uzbekistan 22.7 36.2 73.8 210.8 293.7
 
Post-Soviet average (12) 140.6 325.0 836.6 1,687.5 2,270.9
New EU-member average (11) 898.3 2,326.6 5,720.8 7,408.0 7,828.9
Baltic states average (3) 866.8 2,360.2 5,899.7 7,648.1 9,413.9
Table 5: Inward FDI stock per capita levels for the post-Soviet countries, 1997–2016, USD
 Source: UNCTAD FDI Statistical Database
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There are several doubts regarding the future of the EAEU, addressed 
in greater detail in Part One. The weightiest argument concerns the fate 
of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) between 2000 and 2010, 
which ended in total disarray. This was due to the fact that the EurAsEc 
applied the Russian tariff regime as the common external tariff, which was 
significantly higher than those in many other member countries. Hence, 
the EurAsEc raised significant barriers in and caused trade diversion 
from Central Asian states to Russia. At the same time, given the CIS free-
trade arrangements, EurAsEc members could enter each others’ market 
even before, providing no extra benefit for non-Russian producers from 
the customs union. Consequently, EurAsEc members did not apply the 
common tariff regime at their external borders in full but only selectively, 
causing a chain of trade wars within the region and ending up preserving 
internal customs practices.
The failure was instructive when establishing the EAEU. Obviously, 
Russia had to offer the other EAEU members some preferential access to 
its markets. This has been achieved by making three modifications. First, 
while the Russian tariff regime was taken as the basis for common external 
tariffs again, Moscow joined the WTO in 2012. This reduces unweighted 
(weighted) average tariffs, and common tariffs will decrease accordingly 
from 11.5% (13%) in 2011 to 7.9% (5.8%) by 2020. Consequently, even if 
tariffs may have risen moderately since 2015 for Kazakhstan, Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan, by 2020 they will erode back close to their former national 
levels. In this regard, the region remains on the path of economic opening. 
Second, the abolishment of non-tariff barriers is far more important 
than the decrease in the already diminishing customs tariffs. According 
to surveys and an econometric analysis conducted by the Centre for 
Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank in 2015, non-tar-
iff barriers amounted to 39.8% ad valorem in Kazakh exports to Belarus, 
14% of the value of its exports to Russia. Lower, but dimensionally similar 
values were published for other directions.9 The bulk of the trade dis-
putes since 2015 have been related to these non-tariff barriers, primarily 
referring to different technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards. 
Enhancing access to the Russian market would compensate for the tem-
porary Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Armenian loss on the tariff issue and provide 
them with long-term advantages. The major problem here is that the ef-
fective Soviet system of standards (GOST) stipulates mandatory technical 
regulations, while the WTO’s agreements apply SPS and TBT regulatory 
mechanisms, based on much more flexible voluntary principles. Most of 
the regional countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus accepted 
9 Vinokurov et al. 2015. 
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legislation calling for adherence to the EU’s SPS regulations. This would 
eliminate many of the current health and safety standard problems and 
enhance competitiveness both within the EAEU and outside. At the same 
time, the conversion is proceeding slowly and the establishment of the 
EAEU has created new problems, raising the issue of harmonization be-
tween the five members. Another option in order to speed up standardiza-
tion would be the use of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) regarding 
each other’s mandatory technical regulations. As the example of the EU 
shows, both of these practices may take decades, perhaps even between 
entities sharing a common past.10
The third issue among Russia’s economic offer is the broadening of 
the customs union to a common market with four freedoms. Obviously, 
these issues and the related risks were the major short-term motiva-
tions for some countries, most notably for Kyrgyzstan and Armenia to 
enter the EAEU. Given that the EAEU provides free movement of labour 
for members’ citizens, both countries received legal guarantees of free 
work migration to Russia and Kazakhstan. As Table 6 shows, remittances 
from Russia make a considerable contribution to local GDPs in the case of 
Armenia, Moldova and Uzbekistan, while they are essential constituencies 
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Those who joined the EAEU are equipped 
with some legal guarantees that these transfers remain largely free of 
labour force regulations. 
10 Tarr 2016.
Table 6: Net remittances from Russia and their share in the respective GDPs of post-Soviet 




 2013 2015 2017 2013 2015 2017
Armenia 1.41 0.66 0.69 12.67 6.25 5.97
Kyrgyz Republic 1.69 1.06 1.82 23.04 15.87 25.41
Moldova 1.18 0.48 0.43 14.78 7.89 5.32
Tajikistan 3.59 1.97 2.38 42.21 25.07 32.70
Ukraine 2.83 0.97 0.58 1.58 1.07 0.53
Uzbekistan 6.10 2.55 3.56 10.57 3.83 7.43
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With the exception of Russia, the EAEU amounts to the integration 
of the more interdependent countries within the CIS. Nonetheless, its 
integration levels remain far below the indicators of the European Union. 
In 2013, only three countries within the EU had more non-EU trade than 
intra-EU turnover (the UK, Malta and Greece), and the average share of 
intra-EU trade was 62%. At the same time, as can be seen in Table 3, only 
the Tajik and Belarusian intra-CIS trade levels exceeded 50% in 2016, and a 
major proportion of the respective national economic interests lay outside 
the CIS or EAEU. Hence, the EU may be a false benchmark both regarding 
expectations and as a future model for development.
There have been two major enhancers of EAEU progress to date. First, 
the formation of the EAEU went hand-in-hand with liberalization and 
global economic integration efforts. Russia’s WTO accession was a major 
game changer in the odyssey of post-Soviet economic integrations, while 
the future conformity with WTO/EU SPS standards would also mark a 
step towards the global competitiveness of local industries. Hence, if the 
EAEU were to become a facilitator of regional liberalization and potentially 
add some extras within its borders, it could preserve its role as a sizeable 
institutional entity in Eurasia. This effort has been further underlined 
by the recent EAEU trade policy offensive and conclusion of a free trade 
agreement with Vietnam, another cooperation agreement with China, 
and attempts to sign similar treaties with Iran and Serbia. Putin also 
offered free trade agreements to a number of partners in the name of the 
EAEU, such as Turkey and the EU. These measures and declarations to a 
great extent aim to broaden recognition of the EAEU and raise its pres-
tige. Consequently, their substantive parts have to be viewed with some 
caution at this point, and all the more so when considering that trade 
liberalization goes against Moscow’s current turn towards import sub-
stitution and protectionism. This may also become a major challenge for 
the EAEU. Theoretically, Moscow cannot raise its customs tariffs so easily 
because of its WTO and EAEU membership. Nonetheless, the protectionist 
stance may endanger the implementation of past EAEU commitments re-
garding trade facilitation or could make this process much more complex 
vis-à-vis other members. 
The negative results of Moscow’s protectionism can be counter-bal-
anced by the EAEU’s other enhancer, through access to the relatively big 
Russian market and even more importantly to Moscow’s concessions and 
subsidies. In this regard, the EAEU can also be seen as a quasi-Comecon,11 
11 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was an economic organization that existed between 
1949 and 1991, established by the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. While Comecon functioned as 
a way of dismantling Western economic influence within the Soviet Bloc, the Eastern European communist 
countries often used it as a channel for requesting additional Soviet aid and economic concessions.
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where the major rationale for member countries is to establish an en-
hanced dialogue with Russia and monetize its goodwill. This happens on 
a permanent basis with Armenia and Belarus, which receive low-price 
energy. Moscow also pledged development aid and preferential invest-
ments to Kyrgyzstan, and maintains security guarantees and access to 
the arms market in the case of Armenia. 
Despite all of these dedicated efforts on the part of Russia, past expe-
riences show that an integration trajectory cannot be maintained beyond 
certain limits by relying exclusively on ad hoc subsidies and sectoral co-
operation. In this regard, the future of the EAEU lies in the abolishment of 
trade and other barriers and the member states’ adherence to the rules. In 
this respect, the Russian ‘counter-sanctions’ since 2014 on a wide range 
of agricultural and food products from Western countries posed a major 
test. None of the member states joined the ban. This goes against the 
common trade policy principle, according to which all similar decisions 
should be taken at the EAEU level. Legally, the problem can be resolved 
by strictly applying the rules of origin agreement concluded within the 
CIS and in force in all EAEU countries. At the same time, local exporters 
in Belarus and potentially in other member countries slipped through 
these loopholes and re-exported Western products to Russia as domestic 
ones. Moscow had to react with the same technical and sanitary measures, 
repeating the problems that had arisen with the EurAsEc.
The analysis of EAEU achievements in the last three years is further 
complicated by the major economic fluctuations caused by the 2014 cri-
sis in Ukraine, sanctions, and the drop in the oil price.12 Nonetheless, one 
of the major issues concerning measurement relates to the way in which 
the EAEU rearranges the regional ties with alternative centres of econom-
ic gravity. On the Western frontier, the EU and its neighbourhood policy 
posed a challenge to Russian reintegration efforts, while in Central Asia 
China has become a huge magnet. Besides the EAEU, approximation to 
these economic entities is the driver that could change the post-Soviet 
inertia and may have a decisive role in the future of the region.
12 Vinokurov (2017) provides a positive assessment for the first couple of years.
  
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Georgia
CIS 40.2 38.6 39.2 37.1 37.0 41.8 35.9 30.4 32.4 34.7 29.6 32.8
EU 18.8 19.7 22.8 25.3 28.6 23.6 28.0 27.9 26.7 26.3 28.7 26.7
Moldova
CIS n/a 59.3 47.2 47.0 46.4 43.0 37.4 35.8 35.5 32.8 25.4 23.0
EU n/a 31.1 43.9 42.1 42.9 43.8 46.9 45.8 45.1 45.6 53.3 54.9
Ukraine*
CIS n/a 49.1 42.5 42.0 37.8 39.1 39.6 39.0 42.0 35.6 24.2 19.8
EU n/a 27.9 30.4 32.1 36.0 32.0 33.0 29.3 29.0 31.2 37.5 41.3
Table 7: EU and CIS shares in Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian foreign trade, 1995–2017, %
Source: National statistical providers
* Ukrainian data after 2014 excludes Crimea and the conflict zones of Eastern Ukraine
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As shown in Table 7, in the case of the three EU DCFTA countries, CIS-
EU competition tends to be in favour of the European Union. CIS shares 
from total foreign trade fell in all three cases and these decreases were 
intense, especially in Moldova and Ukraine after 2014. The EU grew in 
importance, although this was expected and partly the result of its en-
largement from EU15 to EU28. In the case of Moldova, one can speak about 
some sort of European orientation, albeit in a highly peripheral role. This 
was the only country out of the three EaP states that could compensate 
for the loss of its CIS trade in the European markets. 
In the case of Georgia and Ukraine, the combined CIS and EU shares 
cover only around 60% of total foreign trade, painting a more fragmented 
picture without clear trade policy profiles. Paradoxically, Georgian ex-
ports to the CIS grew substantially after Tbilisi exited the organization in 
2010. Given this setup, it is highly questionable as to what kind of benefits 
strict adherence to the EU acquis may provide if less than 24% of Georgian 
exports go to the Union. The case of Ukraine cannot be separated from 
its conflict with Russia and loss of major industrial centres. Foreign trade 
statistics between 2013 and 2017 very tellingly reflect these changes. It 
remains to be seen how the country will overcome the shock and whether 
it can enter the European markets in the longer run. 
Nonetheless, all three countries would need decades of robust growth 
and catching up in order to enhance economic convergence with the EU. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that economic development could 
be maintained in a macroeconomically stable manner. Without such de-
velopment, these countries may be stuck with their current status. Free 
trade with the EU without improving local competitiveness may have 
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disadvantageous effects and could fall short of society’s expectations. In 
such an environment, nostalgia for Soviet markets would remain a basic 
ideological and economic asset in the hands of Moscow, permanently 
challenging the adherence and integrity of institutional ties with the EU. 
Optimally, the EU and CIS market segments are complementary and 
can diversify local exports substantially. The CIS still represents markets 
for declining industrial sectors, especially in the Ukrainian case, can 
absorb agricultural and food surpluses from Georgia and Moldova, and 
may serve as a stepping stone for entering the post-Soviet space for EU 
investors in light industry or some manufacturing branches. Meanwhile, 
EU markets may save local economies from pro-cyclical crises stemming 
from Russia and still sweeping through the whole region, as happened 
in 1998 and 2014. Hence, the rivalry between Russia and the EU and the 
strict and short-term optionality between the EAEU and EU DCFTA was 
rather damaging from the economic point of view.
The coexistence of China and CIS/Russia in Central Asia has been sof-
tened by the lack of solid institutional optionality. While Moscow actively 
propagates the EAEU among these countries, China has not elaborated 
a similar integration pattern, and economic relations largely remain at 
the bilateral level. At the same time, the lack of visible conflicts masks 
an even more rapidly changing landscape and shifts in economic orien-
tations. As depicted in Table 8, China is a major trade partner in these 
countries, and became the biggest by far in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan. Chinese influence is not restricted to trade, however: it 
actively seeks access to local energy resources, invests in related sectors, 
acquires ownership through local value chains, especially in retail or light 
industry, and provides loans and infrastructure construction capabilities 
under the label of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Table 8: The foreign trade of Central Asian countries with China and the CIS, 2016, bln USD, %13
Source: CISStat, Observatory of Economic Complexity
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Total (bln USD) 62.11 5.57 3.93 11.83 24.31
CIS (%) 28.5 42.26 50.08 n/a 34.81
China (%) 13.62 48.48 44.79 45.04 14.52
13 Data from this region is highly contradictory, especially as far as Tajik, Kyrgyz and Uzbek providers are 
concerned. This might be partly due to the different registration of product flows for statistical and customs 
purposes. It is particularly true for Kyrgyz and Uzbek gold and precious metal ore exports, providing up to 
40% of the respective flows.
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The Chinese influence in the region has general characteristics similar 
to those of its penetration in Africa and Latin America. Beijing is success-
ful in engaging smaller and more vulnerable subjects. As far as the two 
smaller Central Asian countries are concerned, suffice it to say that China 
produces their respective annual GDP in less than six hours. The loyalty 
of the local elites can be bought relatively easily and even the smallest 
offers in terms of development aid can boost these countries substantially. 
The landscape becomes more balanced due to the more diversified ex-
ternal relations of the two regional majors, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In 
Kazakhstan, China’s role has been growing much more gradually than in 
the other cases. The reasons for this are manifold. Kazakh oil reserves lie in 
the Western part of the country, in the Caspian Basin, very far away from 
Chinese industrial centres. Furthermore, the Kazakh oil industry had been 
largely established and consolidated by the start of Chinese engagement in 
the mid-2000s. Moreover, the Kazakh leadership pursues a multi-vector 
foreign and foreign economic policy, where Chinese investments could 
have only a limited role. Accordingly, Chinese FDI amounted to only 14.8 
bln USD (around 7% of the total, or around 10% if Hong Kong is added), 
primarily concentrated in transportation, mining and finances. In the 
case of Uzbekistan, the country remained closed and hardly accessible 
for any foreign investments and with little export potential. The former 
feature may change due to the rotation in the presidential position, if it 
were accompanied by some change in economic policy. 
What is Russia’s stake, and how does the EAEU relate to the challenges 
posed by the EU and China in the respective regions? It is widely believed 
that the EAEU confronts Western and Chinese penetration in different 
ways in the member states. This has been achieved by mutually exclusive 
integration projects between the EU and EAEU and underlined by Russia’s 
deliberate efforts to articulate the EAEU’s position regarding Beijing’s 
initiatives. The member states try to retain their autonomy in external 
economic policy as far as possible: Armenia signed a Comprehensive 
and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in February 2017, and 
Astana objected to premature Russian statements on several occasions in 
the name of the EAEU and demonstratively expressed its wish to maintain 
its independence within the legal frames. Multi-vector reflexes are also 
present on the other side: in May 2018 the Moldovan president successfully 
applied for observer status within the EAEU.14
From a more analytical angle, Moscow’s challenge is much more 
complex. First, it has to deliver on its past pledges and abolish trade 
barriers within the EAEU. The fate of EurAsEc permanently haunts the 
14 The status of this action remains unclear since it needs internal approval and implementation by other 
constitutional entities.
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EAEU initiative and if the project fails to provide some benefits for the 
parties, its erosion will be inevitable. Moscow’s rush for international 
entrenchment of the EAEU, and the attempts to push for recognition in 
the EU and globally have been made in part to prepare for these negative 
outcomes. Second, Russia also has to take a position in the liberalization/
protectionism dilemma. At this point, it still seems to be easier to keep 
the EAEU together with a moderate liberalization agenda. The experienc-
es with Russian counter-sanctions, with partners taking considerable 
distance from Moscow, are highly indicative in this regard. The problem 
in this respect is that an opening up of the economy has become the less 
favourable choice in Moscow.
Third, and most importantly, Russia will represent its own economic 
interests within the EAEU and regarding CIS countries. As Table 9 shows, 
the CIS countries’ share has been decreasing consistently and substan-
tially in the last decade. The CIS region provides roughly just one-tenth 
of Russian foreign trade and minuscule proportions of FDI. This is in 
sharp contrast to Russian foreign policy priorities, where the region is 
designated as the most important area of Moscow’s interests. While the 
Kremlin certainly channels significant funds for these objectives, and 
Table 9: Russian exports to and imports from major regions of the world, 2005–17, mln USD, %
Source: Russian customs statistics
Exports 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Total (mln USD) 241,451.7 351,928.2 301,666.5 516,480.9 525,976.3 343,511.8 357,766.8
CIS (%) 13.5 15 15.5 15.4 14.1 13.1 13.4
EU (%) 55.2 55.7 53.3 51.6 537 48.2 44.6
APEC (%) 12.4 12.2 15 17.9 18.9 22.8 24.1
 
Imports 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Total (mln USD) 98,707.5 199,753.1 167,348 305,604.5 315,297.5 182,902.3 227,464.2
CIS (%) 19.2 15 13 14.7 12.4 11.6 10.9
EU (%) 44.2 43.7 45.1 41.7 42.6 38.4 38.2
APEC (%) 25.6 31.9 30.9 33.8 34.6 37.9 40.3
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state companies may sidetrack their normal business activities, limits are 
imposed. Hence, it is reasonable to say that CIS and EAEU policies cannot 
stray too far from mainstream foreign economic policies and definite-
ly cannot contradict them for a prolonged period of time. In the event 
of conflicts, Moscow will likely not harm its own business groups and 
self-serving interests. Russian foreign policy has to be adapted to struc-
tural economic processes from time to time. 
6.5 CONCLUSION
The forms of economic integration in the post-Soviet states are relative-
ly low. At the current stage, the common market, represented by the 
EAEU, is ‘state of the art’ regional integration, with reasonable doubts 
regarding its future potential and capabilities. At the same time, the al-
ternative integrative mechanisms in the region are also rather humble: 
the EU offers its Eastern partners free trade with legal approximation. The 
former is definitely loose cooperation in the age of global liberalization of 
trade, while implementation of the latter certainly exceeds local capacities. 
China does not try to integrate regional countries, but establishes bilateral 
ties and acts according to its interests. Chinese influence transforms the 
regional balance without harbouring transformative ambitions. In such 
a landscape Russia can maintain some of its economic leverage given its 
relative strength because of the lack of competition.
No swift change is to be expected in these respects. The post-Soviet 
region has a sui generis integrability problem. Political elites are inter-
twined with local businesses, corruption is rampant, the regional average 
TI Corruption Perception Index ranking is 123 out of 180, with all regional 
countries above 100 apart from Georgia and Belarus. Foreign companies 
enter the region in order to access its resources and tap local demand, 
but not in order to set up complex value chains and establish produc-
tion capacities with high human added value. The gradual erosion of the 
region’s weight in the global economy, the low competitiveness, and all 
the concerns regarding the decline of local processing industries are clear 
indications of this trend. The region will likely also reach its limitations of 
extensive growth in hydrocarbon production in the coming decade. The 
end of this megatrend, stretching from the 1960s through the collapse of 
the Soviet Union until today, may serve as the last wake-up call for local 
economic policies.
Given the lack of development drivers and complex, vertically inte-
grated value chains, the local economies provide little complementarity 
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for strong integration. They remain rent-seeking systems based on some 
sectoral cultures and their export potential. In such an environment, 
economic integration may prove useful, but limited in its scope. As the 
experience of APEC demonstrated, economic cooperation is possible on 
the basis of a system of dense bilateralism, without supranational integra-
tion mechanisms. The move away from multilateralism could be further 
accentuated by the current shift in the region’s economic focus towards 
the Asia-Pacific region.
This might change the standard business culture and economic behav-
iour of the region and Russia. Currently, much of the post-Soviet region 
distances itself from Europe in terms of foreign trade, FDI, and economic 
cooperation. Russian and Central Asian business cultures more closely 
resemble those in the Asia-Pacific region, where political ramifications 
are still important for business, megadeals with complex verticalities 
are present, state companies provide the negotiation benchmarks and 
business goes beyond economics. In this regard, the current regional 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
Demographic trends do not change overnight. Hence, the characteristics 
of mortality and fertility that were manifested in the late Soviet period 
were preserved in most of the republics even after the collapse of the 
USSR, when they became independent countries. Migration processes 
have had an increasing influence on the general population dynamics. 
For some (eastern) countries, these processes began to serve as a ‘valve’, 
allowing ‘superfluous’ (for the labour market) members of the population 
to exit, and, at least slightly, correcting the explosive population growth. 
For other (western) countries, migration has served as a stabilizer of 
the population, experiencing simultaneously both the effects of natural 
population decline and population ageing. This chapter is devoted to the 
analysis of demographic processes in the new independent states after 
the collapse of the USSR. It provides answers to the key demographic 
questions: whether and how the trends in population dynamics, mortality, 
fertility and migration have changed in the republics of the former USSR 
over the past 30 years.
It should be realized that any analysis of demographic statistics after 
the collapse of the USSR is seriously hampered both by the asynchronous 
nature of population censuses (being undertaken in different years), and 
by various principles applied when estimating the migration and thus 
the overall population balance. For example, the migration statistics of 
Armenia in the 1990s estimated the number of migrants according to 
transport statistics, while the statistics for Moldova allocate repatriates, 
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in addition to traditional emigrants and immigrants. A number of coun-
tries do not publish the population balance, while others (primarily 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) publish very limited demographic sta-
tistics. Hence, in some cases, the estimates are indicative.
7.2 THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF 
THE USSR
The last Soviet census took place just before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union on January 12, 1989, and in this sense it has become a milestone in 
the analysis of the demographic situation ‘before’ and ‘after’ the disso-
lution. The census recorded 286.7 million inhabitants.1 If a similar census 
were conducted today, 30 years later, and including each former repub-
lic of the USSR independently, the estimate would be about 295 million 
people (according to the current statistical data2).
Hence, the population of this huge area (once denoted by the expres-
sion ‘one sixth of the Earth’) has officially increased. However, this growth 
has been accompanied by simultaneous stratification: the republics of the 
western part of the former USSR, as well as Armenia and Georgia, expe-
rienced population decline during the entire period under review, while 
the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan witnessed pop-
ulation growth. Long-term trends in population dynamics as early as the 
1960s clearly indicated that, at the turn of the 1990s, the western repub-
lics of the USSR would face depopulation, while the eastern republics 
would enter a phase of active and sustainable population growth (Figure 5). 
The reason for this lies in the (timewise) different start of the demograph-
ic transition in the republics of the USSR.3 Although urbanization, a de-
crease in mortality and, subsequently, a decrease in birth rates began in 
the western republics much later than in many European countries, this 
still occurred much earlier than in South Caucasus, and even more so 
than in Central Asia.
1 Demoscope Weekly 2018g.
2 Population Reference Bureau 2018. 
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As a result, on the eve of the collapse of the USSR, the differences be-
tween the republics concerning the majority of demographic indicators 
were highly significant. For example, in terms of life expectancy, the dif-
ference was 7.37 years (between Armenia and Turkmenistan) for men, and 
7.97 years for women (Belarus and Turkmenistan). In terms of the total 
fertility rate, the values varied from 1.92 in Ukraine to 5.08 in Tajikistan.4 
Generally speaking, these differences could be attributed to the ‘west-east’ 
dichotomy, but in reality, there was no distinctly homogeneous ‘west’ 
and ‘east’ for most of the demographic indicators.
The accumulating differences in the reproduction regimes in the post-
war period caused significant changes in the ethnic structure of the popu-
lation of the USSR. By 1989, the share of the Central Asian republics in the 
natural increase in the population of the USSR had reached one-third; be-
tween 1959 and 1989 the population of its titular nation5 grew 2.6–3-fold, 
the Ukrainian population 1.18-fold, the Belorussian population 1.26-fold, 
and the Russian population 1.27-fold (Tables 10). The second consequence 
of the differences in reproduction regimes was the further divergence in 
the age composition of the republics.
4 Demoscope Weekly 2018e.














































































Figure 5: The population of the republics of the former USSR on 1 January, 1950–2016, thousands 
of persons 
Source: Demoscope Weekly
    FEBRUARY 2019    165
7.3 GENERAL PARAMETERS AND TRENDS IN POPULATION 
DYNAMICS BY COUNTRIES
Data on the natural population change shows that between 1990 and 1993 
there was a transition from growth to depopulation in Russia, Ukraine, 
and Belarus (and also in the Baltic countries), as well as in Moldova some-
what later. In Georgia and Armenia, the natural growth significantly 
decreased, although it did not become negative. The western republics 
of the former USSR experienced a natural population decline due to the 
deformations in the age structure of the population that occurred during 
the entire 20th century under the influence of the migration outflow to 
the periphery of the USSR, World War II (and, consequently, the decrease 
in the number of children born), and the transformation in reproductive 
behaviour. In some years and in some countries (Russia and Belarus), this 
was fully or partially offset by the growth in migration. In Ukraine, and 
especially in Moldova, natural loss was combined with migration loss. 
In Armenia and Georgia, a small natural inflow was accompanied by a 
significant migration loss.
Republic
The share of the republics in the natural growth of 
the population of the USSR for each period, %
1959–1969 1970–1978 1979–1989 
USSR 100 100 100
including:
RSFSR 43.8 35.2 33.0
Ukraine 14.8 11.6 7.3
Belarus 3.8 3.1 2.6
Moldova 1.9 1.9 1.8
Kazakhstan 9.1 10.7 10.8
Republics of Central Asia 16.7 26.9 33.6
Republics of South Caucuses 8.2 9.1 9.6
Baltic States 1.7 1.5 1.3
Table 10: Contribution of certain republics to the natural growth of the population of the USSR, 
1959–1989, %
Source: Zahkarova 1991
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Conversely, in Central Asia the natural growth remained positive (al-
beit decreasing) during the whole period. The reasons for this are initially 
very high parameters of natural growth (by the time of the collapse of 
the USSR), which being an evolutionary component never decreases 
instantly. The young age structure of the population contributes to both 
low mortality and high fertility. It was also reinforced by the migration 
of the Russian-speaking population (with an older age structure) from 
the Central Asian republics, which led to the higher concentration of 
the titular population, which was younger and characterized by a higher 
birth rate. Hence, natural growth continues to play a major role in the 
demographic balance of the republics of Central Asia, as was the case in 
the 1980s and 1990s.
The overall dynamics of the population in the respective countries 
was affected by different capacities and the often multidirectional effects 
of natural and migratory processes. Several groups of countries can be 
distinguished by the nature of their population dynamics for the period 
1990–2016:
• countries with a decline of more than 10% in relation to the population 
of 1990: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine;
• countries whose population declined by no more than 10%: Belarus 
and Russia;
• a country whose population increased by 7% (Kazakhstan);
• countries with significant (more than 30%) population growth: 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
In total, there was a population decrease in nine out of 15 countries in 
1989–2016, while in six countries the growth that had started earlier 
continued (Figure 5). During this period, the population of Tajikistan 
increased almost 1.7-fold, Uzbekistan 1.6-fold, Turkmenistan 1.5-fold, 
and Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan 1.4-fold. In effect, these countries ensured 
the total population growth in the post-Soviet area, as mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter.
The collapse of the USSR as a political event did not significantly affect 
the evolutionary demographic processes, but its indirect influence was 
noted in the form of postponed births and changes in timings, and the 
increase in mortality due to ‘additional’ stress factors. Furthermore, the 
collapse of the USSR has changed the nature and power of migration and 
the role of the migration component in the overall population dynamics 
of the new countries.
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Another important aspect concerns the shifts that occurred in the age 
structure of the population. In those countries where birth rates are low, 
and reproduction has either been below or just about at the replacement 
level for a long time, the proportion of the elderly has significantly in-
creased. This leads to demographic ageing of the whole population and 
its working proportion, and places an increasing demographic burden 
on the working age population. On the other hand, in Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan, where the number and share of young people have signifi-
cantly increased, the share of the working age population has decreased, 
and the concentration of the rural population, the demographic burden 
of children on the population of working age, and the demand for social 
infrastructure for children have all increased.
7.3.1 Features of mortality and fertility in 1991–2015
The dynamics of the birth rates in the western countries of the former 
USSR has long been close to the patterns of the developed countries glob-
ally. The long-term fertility decline, which began for real generations 
of Russians,6 as well as for Ukrainians7 even before the First World War, 
generally continued throughout the 20th century, despite short-term 
periods of growth. By the end of the 20th century, in addition to the 
evolutionary determinants, the decrease in the birth rate in the western 
countries of the former Soviet Union was also facilitated by structural 
factors, namely the low number of women of reproductive age, including 
the most active reproductive age. It was also suggested that the general 
stagnant atmosphere in the USSR in the 1980s slowed the evolution of the 
procreative behavioural pattern of the population that was developing in 
European countries, and which later accelerated, with a delay in Russia 
and other countries of the western part of the former USSR.
As a result, in 1997–2001 in Russia, in 1999–2002 in Ukraine and 
Armenia, and in 2002–2005 in Belarus and Moldova, the lowest values of 
the total birth rate of conditional generations (TFR) for each of these 
countries were recorded (Figure 6).8 Very few countries in the world had 
a lower birth rate than the western countries of the former USSR (Figure 7). 
The most significant and most rapid drop was in Moldova. Unlike women 
in Russia or Belarus, generations of Moldovans born in 1960 (real gener-
ations) continued to reproduce. But then, having started to decline later 
6 Vishnevsky (ed.) 2006.
7 Steshenko 2010.
8 In demography, the term ‘conditional generation’ is an abstract construct which implies that during its 
lifetime the intensity of demographic processes equals the one that is observed in a given year. People of 
different ages living in this particular calendar year are considered as belonging to the same generation. For 
more on this, see Medkov 2003, p. 149.
168    FEBRUARY 2019
than in the other western republics, the birth rates in Moldova dropped 
sharply and to lower values  than in the neighbouring countries. Today, 
Moldova has the lowest birth rates in the post-Soviet area, being addi-
tionally deprived of the opportunity to conduct an active pro-natalist 
policy per se.
Figure 6: Total fertility rate, 1958–2015, ‰
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Since the beginning of the 2000s, the TFR has exceeded its minimum 
level and is growing in all countries of the western part of the former 
USSR. However, both the current level of TFR for conditional generations 
(1.7–1.8 in Belarus, Georgia and Russia, 1.5 in Ukraine and Armenia, 1.3 
in Moldova) and the final birth rate for real (not conditional) generations 
indicate that the populations of these countries are not reproducing.
The model of the two-child or even one-child family (as in Moldova) 
is now dominant in the western countries of the former USSR. However, 
it must be acknowledged that this situation has persisted for quite a long 
time. The real changes are associated not so much with the number of 
children in families as with the change in the age profile of the birth rates 






































Figure 7: The total fertility rate in the countries of the former USSR in comparison with certain 
developed countries of the world, 2015, ‰
Source: Demoscope Weekly 2018e, 2018b.


























Figure 8: Age profile of the birth rate, 2000 and 2015
Source: Demoscope Weekly 2018c.
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In Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the TFR was more than 
4 in 1989, which predetermined significant reserves for its reduction. In 
Kyrgyzstan, which during the latter years of the USSR differed from the 
other Central Asian republics in its share of the Russian-speaking popu-
lation, the TFR was lower, albeit still high. In the 1990s and 2000s all of 
the republics in Central Asia, except for Kyrgyzstan, were quite actively 
reducing the birth rates. In the 2010s, this trend was replaced by new 
growth. The birthrate of conditional generations in Kyrgyzstan was the 
least affected: since 2010 it has been stable at the ‘more than three births’ 
level. Since the early 2000s, the birth rate in Kazakhstan has also been 
growing steadily.
The average age of a mother at the birth of the first child has now in-
creased everywhere, except for Azerbaijan. Yet in the Central Asian coun-
tries, unlike the western countries of the post-Soviet area, this increase 
is small (Figure 9), since with fewer children being born (the birth rates 
are really decreasing) no noticeable changes in the age patterns of fertil-
ity have occurred. These countries are now in the stage of demographic 
transition, during which the rejection of the birth of children of higher 
orders naturally leads to some rejuvenation of fertility.
The life expectancy (LE) curves in the republics of the former USSR 
fluctuated significantly (Figure 10), having increased and fallen several 















































































Figure 9: Average age of mother at birth of first child, years
Sources: CIS Statistical Committee 2017; Demoscope Weekly 2018a. 
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women is not shown by any of the republics of the former USSR. It is 
difficult to say with any certainty what has exerted a negative effect on 
the indicator: the general Soviet mentality, the unified principles of the 
healthcare system, the lack of active self-protective behaviour, the high 
volumes of consumption of strong alcoholic beverages, or the large im-
print imposed by the modern state on the economy and social infrastruc-
ture. In general, a growth in life expectancy – if it occurs – signals im-
portant changes in all spheres of society, and in this sense is an inform-




































































































































































































Figure 10: Life expectancy at birth, 1950–2015, years, men, women
Source: Demoscope Weekly 2018d. 
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The mortality statistics after the collapse of the USSR reveal a number 
of common features: deterioration in the quality of recording deaths, 
especially infant deaths, in the 1990s, followed by improvement since 
the 2000s; and the impact of migration processes and changes on the 
ethnic composition of the population. For example, the increase in emi-
gration of men of working age from the countries of Central Asia reduced 
the mortality of men of corresponding ages, while the departure of the 
Russian-speaking population with an older age structure from Kyrgyzstan 
contributed to the increase in LE.9
Similarly to the Soviet period, the republics of the former USSR are still 
at different stages of epidemiological transition. In accordance with the 
classic works,10 the stages of epidemiological transition are determined by 
the structure of causes of death and life expectancy. After accession to in-
dependence in almost all of the republics, despite the logic of the forward 
movement of the epidemiological transition, mortality rates deteriorated. 
LE and the average age of death from the main causes of death were de-
creasing almost everywhere until 1994–1995, and in some places even until 
2003–2005. Later, LE showed a restorative and subsequently real growth. 
Nowadays there are almost maximum parameters of LE in the majority 
of countries of the former USSR for the entire Soviet and post-Soviet 
history. For men, they came very close (Belarus, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan) to or even exceeded the values observed during the anti-al-
cohol campaign of the 1980s. For women, almost everywhere, except for 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, they have reached the maximum for the 
post-war period. However, LE for all studied countries is still lower than 
in the developed countries of the world (Figure 11). Meanwhile, female LE 
in the countries of the former USSR is generally closer to that of developed 
countries than male LE. Everywhere, apart from the Baltic countries, the 
difference in the LE of men and women is almost the highest in the world.
Differences between the countries of the former Soviet Union in 2015 
(not taking into account the Baltic countries) were 11.39 years for men 
(between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan), and 8.51 years for women (be-
tween Armenia and Turkmenistan). Hence, the range of LE increased in 
relation to 1989.
9 Denisenko (ed.) 2011, p. 148.
10 Omran 1977; Olshansky and Ault 1989; Horiuchi 1999. 











































































Figure 11: Life expectancy at birth in the countries 
of the former USSR in comparison with certain 
developed countries of the world, 2015 (marked * – 
2014), men, women, years
Source: Demoscope Weekly 2018b, 2018e.
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Some common characteristics were revealed during the course of 
the epidemiological transition when examining the overall picture of 
mortality in the republics:
• The proportion of deaths from external causes (accidents, murders, 
suicides, etc.), although declining, remains high in many republics of 
the former USSR in comparison with the developed countries of the 
world11 (it is traditionally low and therefore has hardly decreased in 
the countries of the Caucasus and in Tajikistan12). This reflects major 
general problems and significant reserves in reducing mortality, es-
pecially among men of active working age. The contribution of the 
reduction in mortality from external causes to the growth of LE in 
Russia in 2003–2013 was 2.56 years for men and 0.95 years for wom-
en.13 Among the republics in which such data is available, Belarus and 
Russia have achieved the greatest success in reducing mortality from 
external causes. In Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan, mortality from 
respiratory diseases has significantly decreased (Figure 12).
• The proportion of deaths due to infectious diseases – a key marker of 
the initial stages of epidemiological transition14 – is also declining, but 
in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Ukraine it is still significantly 
higher than in the developed countries.
• The reduction in mortality from external causes and infectious diseases 
is accompanied by a natural increase in mortality from diseases of the 
circulatory system and neoplasms. But in the countries of Central Asia, 
mortality from neoplasms still remained in third place in the list of 
key causes of death up to recent years (after diseases of the circulatory 
system and external causes), whereas in the countries of the South 
Caucasus and the Baltics, Ukraine, and Moldova, neoplasms have long 
taken second place both for men and for women. On average, people 
die earlier from external causes than from neoplasms. Therefore, a 
significant part of the population in the countries of Central Asia and 
(until recently) men in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan effectively ‘did 
not survive’ up to the age of mortality as a result of neoplasms. 
Hence, the different structure of mortality, even when analyzed by en-
larged classes, shows different age models of mortality for different coun-
tries of the former USSR. Unlike the situation in regard to fertility, the 
11 Data for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is not available.
12 In Tajikistan, there are currently very high mortality rates from undetermined causes of death.
13 Zakharov (ed.) 2017, p. 228.
14 Omran 1977.
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country differentiation in terms of mortality divides countries into eastern 
and western less clearly.
DCS – diseases of the circulatory system
N – neoplasms
EC – external causes
DRS – diseases of the respiratory system
DGS – diseases of the digestive system































Figure 12: Distribution of deaths by main causes of death* in the countries of the former USSR, 
2005 and 2014, %
Sources: Shcherbakova 2016; State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan; death rates 
by causes of death in Georgia, National Statistics Office of Georgia. 
.
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The division of countries into western and eastern is observed in child 
and infant mortality. In particular, since 2000 infant mortality has made 
the greatest contribution to the growth in LE in the countries of Central 
Asia, in contrast to the western countries of the former Soviet Union. For 
example, in Kyrgyzstan between 1999 and 2009, almost 50% of the in-
crease in life expectancy for men and 40% for women occurred at the age 
of one to five years.15 At the same time, infant mortality (up to one year) 
even reduced LE in the countries of the former USSR. Modern parameters 
of infant mortality reveal significant differences between the countries of 
the former USSR (Figure 13). In the best-performing countries (Belarus, 
Russia), it has already approached or even surpassed the average European 
values. In the countries of Central Asia, it still remains very high, and in 
all of the republics except Kyrgyzstan it is higher than the world average. 
Kazakhstan, the countries of the South Caucasus, and Moldova occupy 
intermediate positions between the western (excluding Moldova) and 
the eastern part of the former USSR. In all of the countries of the former 
USSR, but especially in Central Asia, there are significant reserves for the 
reduction in infant mortality, primarily due to the reduction in mortality 
from infectious diseases, the shift of deaths to the early neonatal age, and 
the widespread introduction of screening during pregnancy for early 
detection and treatment of pathologies.
15 Denisenko (ed.) 2011, p. 158.
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In addition to the reasons outlined above, the differentiation in the 
rates of fertility and mortality between the republics of the former USSR 
is influenced by the respective share of the rural and urban population, 
the age and ethnic composition of the population, and the migration pro-
cesses. The progress in mortality rates is also affected by the development 
of healthcare, its financing, health expenditure as a percentage of each 
country’s GDP, the promotion of a healthy lifestyle, and the introduction 
of healthy habits, diet and so forth, which is impossible without an in-
crease in the level of population well-being.
7.4 TRANSFORMATION IN MIGRATION PROCESSES
Unlike natural processes (fertility, mortality), migration changes quickly 
and regularly in response to political and socio-economic signals. This ex-
plains why the 1990s were a period of forced migration in the post-Soviet 
area, while in the 2000s the emphasis shifted to permanent migration,16 
the deeper reasons for which were not so much political as economic. In 
the 2010s, the main emphasis was on labour migration, while in recent 
years, this has unfortunately been supplemented once again by forced 
migration (from Ukraine).
In general, in a very short period of time, migration flows have 
changed from internal (intra-union) to external. This transformation was 



































































































Figure 13: Infant mortality rate in the countries of the former USSR, 2000, 2015, ‰
Source: Demoscope Weekly 2018f.
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accompanied by a change in the rules of entry and departure, migration 
accounting, the establishment of the procedure for acquiring citizenship 
and other possible statuses in each of the countries. Migration between the 
republics of the former USSR became latent to a very large extent due to 
open borders in most of the territory of the former Soviet Union; constant 
changes in the legislation of countries in matters directly and indirectly 
related to migration, and the lack of a coordinated migration policy in the 
CIS and Baltic countries; corrupt officials and police; institutional barriers 
to obtaining documents; or for individual economic motives.
However, despite the fact that with the collapse of the USSR, the pop-
ulation of each of its republics was able to participate in transnational cir-
culation (both as emigration and immigration countries) for the first time 
in almost 70 years, the potential for expanding the list of migrant partners 
was not realized. The contribution of the former Soviet republics both in 
terms of arrivals and net migration17 in Russia throughout all the years 
since the collapse of the USSR prevails and amounts to 90–95%. In other 
republics, it is also very large, but declining. The growing importance of 
temporary labour migration contributes to the gradual expansion of the 
circle of countries with which the republics have close migratory contacts. 
Moreover, the importance of Russia as the main migration partner for all 
of the countries of the former USSR18 has apparently begun to decline. 
Residents of Ukraine and Moldova are now actively participating in relo-
cation to Italy, Spain, Portugal, Israel, Germany, Poland, and also to the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. Citizens of the Central Asian republics are 
not only heading towards Russia, but also to Kazakhstan. The countries 
of the South Caucasus have also formed connections with the United 
States and France.
As a result, according to available data in 2011–2014, the share of the 
CIS countries among the arrivals decreased in Azerbaijan19 from 94.6% 
to 73.2% compared to 2000–2010, and in Ukraine from 83% to 58.7%.20 
In terms of emigration from Azerbaijan, the CIS countries reduced their 
importance from 96.7% to 84.7%, and in Ukraine from 61.5% to 41.6%. 
But for the residents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia the significance 
of the CIS as an area of entry has even increased.21
In general, the evolution of the migration in the area of the former USSR 
remains largely unclear, as countries are reluctant to publish information 
17 I.e. in long-term migration.
18 Possibly with the exception of the Baltic states.
19 Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2018.
20 State Statistical Service of Ukraine 2018.
21 Denisenko and Chudinovskikh 2018.
180    FEBRUARY 2019
about the migration situation, the migration balance and migration pat-
terns. People involved in migration remain ‘in the shadows’, since the 
relocations are most often conducted without any official legitimization 
of departure. In actual fact, migration flows are shaped by several ‘corri-
dors’: permanent migration, temporary labour migration, and sometimes 
humanitarian migration. Statistical information about different types of 
flows in almost all countries of the former USSR is not gathered by one 
department, the received information is fragmentary and incomplete, 
and the very concept of ‘migratory movement’ has numerous temporal 
and registrational connotations, which makes comparisons unreliable.
7.4.1 Migration balance of long-term migration
The statistics on migration growth (net migration) as they are reported 
only reflect the approximate scales of migration. The data presented in 
Table 11 suggests that in terms of international migration as a whole (that 
is, not only with the countries of the former USSR), a significant and 
growing net increase was experienced only by Russia. However, during 
this time, Russia has corrected or even significantly altered the migratory 
flow accounting. The last time it was conducted was in 2011. Starting 
from this year, all migrants registered in the country in a place of perma-
nent residence (as before) and in a place where they are considered to be 
staying temporarily for a period of more than nine months are regarded 
as immigrants. At the end of the registration period, these persons are 
automatically regarded as having left the country. Yet apparently, these 
departures often do not take place at all.22 As a result, while Russia be-
gan to grow in migratory terms due to temporary migrants, not only the 
arrivals, but also the departures became statistically significant.
It must be recognized that in the international net migration, the out-
flow to countries ‘further afield’ is seriously underestimated. Emigration 
flows are poorly recorded everywhere in the countries of the former USSR, 
so more accurate information on emigration is usually obtained from the 
statistics of entry countries rather than those of departure.23
22 See Chudinovskikh 2016.
23 Denisenko 2012. 
    FEBRUARY 2019    181
The dynamics of net migration, obtained within the CIS, shows that 
throughout 2000–2010, only Russia and Belarus experienced a net in-
crease. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine demonstrated unstable dy-
namics, and their migration balance with the CIS countries was both 
positive and negative. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, as well 
as, apparently, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were characterized by a net 
outflow. The parameters of Russia’s migration growth seem very high 
at first glance, but in relation to the population, this is not the case. The 
coefficient of migration growth in Russia in exchange with the CIS coun-
tries has never exceeded the 2.00‰ limit, which is only slightly higher 
than the corresponding coefficient for Belarus, and in comparison with 
the top-entry European countries appears rather modest.24
24 For comparison purposes, in Germany, the migration growth rate in 2015 was 5, in the UK 4, Norway 7, and 
Austria 6.
International migration Migration with CIS countries
2000–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 2000–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015
Azerbaijan -15.9  2  8.1 -17.1  0.8  4.7
Armenia* -147.9 -173.5 -110 -44.3 -18.6
Belarus  35.8  41  65  53.2  37.8  54.8
Georgia* -216.8 -121.3 -33.2
Kazakhstan -241.4  68.2 -22.3 -104  27.1 -31.3
Kyrgyzstan -140 -199.6 -66 -126.1 -197.9 -65.9
Moldova -28.9 -20.9  3.3 -23.3 -21.5 -4.3
Russia  545.8  1,019.9  1,436.3  742.5  996.4  1,338.8
Tajikistan -56.2 -37.1 -12 -56 -37.1 -12
Uzbekistan** -57.1 -39.7 -38.5
Ukraine -147.4  75.5  141.2 -14.6  68.8  100.7
Table 11: Net migration of the countries of the former USSR in terms of international migration 
(left) and in terms of migration with the CIS countries (right), 2000–2015, thousands of persons
* data on net migration with the CIS countries for 2011–2015 is not available; 
** only according to the data for 2000, 2010 and 2014
Data on Turkmenistan is not available.
Sources: Data gathered from national statistical agencies.
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The migratory exchange for permanent residence between remote 
and poorly connected republics of the former USSR is gradually dying 
out. Significant flows of permanent migrants link Moldova with Russia 
and Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with Russia and 
Kazakhstan, and the South Caucasus republics with Russia. Relatively 
close ties remain between the Slavic republics. Russia continues to play 
an important role in the area of the former USSR in long-term migrations.
It cannot be argued that Russia became the centre of migration in 
the post-Soviet space precisely and solely as a result of the collapse of 
the USSR. A turning point in the migration exchange with the republics 
occurred in 1975 when Russia experienced a net increase for the first 
time during a long period. In 1976– 1980, 87% of the population of the 
former USSR settled in Russia, being redistributed by migrations between 
republics, 85% in 1981–1985, and 72% in 1986–1990.25 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process strengthened, but 
Russia’s migration growth increased to a large extent due to a drop in the 
volume of migration flows from Russia to the CIS and the Baltic republics, 
rather than due to the growth of arrivals from there. A peak in arrivals to 
Russia was noted in 1994, after which a steady decline began. The decline 
was attributable to the change in the number of constraining factors (in 
Russia) and push factors (in the republics), which will be discussed below. 
Throughout this time, the share in the Central Asian direction was steadily 
increasing. The decrease in long-term migration was also affected by the 
increase in the impact of temporary migration.
Permanent migrations can be identified as such only to a certain extent, 
since temporary migrants registering in the country for 10 months, for 
example, clearly come under the statistics of permanent migration. The 
demographic composition of long-term migrants has also changed: in the 
flow directed to Russia the share of elderly and young migrants is growing. 
In the first case, this is partly a consequence of the difference in retirement 
age – which is earlier in Russia compared with other countries of the 
former USSR – and partly as a result of the ‘Compatriots’ programme.26 
In the case of young migrants, it is probably a matter of enhancing the 
attractiveness of acquiring an education in Russia.
Forced migration deserves special attention. Immediately after the 
collapse of the USSR, flows of forced migrants from a number of newly 
independent states moved mainly towards Russia, and to Ukraine and 
25 Zayonchkovskaya 1993.
26 The state programme facilitating voluntary resettlement into the Russian Federation of compatriots living 
abroad entered into force in Russia in 2007. Its goal was to stimulate and steer the process of resettlement, 
to promote the socio-economic development of Russia’s regions, and to help resolve demographic problems, 
above all in territories of priority settlement, by attracting people to reside permanently in the RF. See 
Ministry of Internal Affairs 2018.
    FEBRUARY 2019    183
Belarus to a lesser extent. The total number of forced migrants registered 
in Russia in 1992–2001 amounted to 1612 thousand people.27 By the second 
half of the 1990s, the capacity for forced migration from the states of the 
South Caucasus and Central Asia was largely exhausted, and migration 
from Kazakhstan could be considered ‘enforced’ only conditionally. The 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict of the mid-2010s brought the problem of 
forced migration back onto the agenda. At the beginning of 2015, 237,800 
people were registered in Russia as having received temporary asylum, 
while at the beginning of 2016 they numbered 313.7 thousand, and 249.3 
thousand on 1 October 2016. Hence, the increase in the number of people 
granted temporary asylum in Russia in 2016 declined in relation to 2015.28 
This provides hope that in the future, unless the situation deteriorates 
once again, the number of people in this category will decrease as they 
are settled in Russia (obtaining Russian citizenship), return to Ukraine, 
or reorient to other migration destinations.
7.4.2 Temporary labour migration 
In the early 2000s, temporary labour migration in the area of the former 
USSR began to increase sharply and replaced long-term migration to a 
certain extent. In addition, temporary migration is considered one of 
the preliminary stages for permanent migration today. The growth in 
temporary migration in the post-Soviet area went hand in hand with a 
general increase in the dissemination of temporary forms of migration 
around the world.
The main countries for the entry of labour migrants are Russia, 
Kazakhstan to a lesser extent, and Azerbaijan locally. The procedure for 
obtaining work permits has repeatedly changed in Russia and Kazakhstan. 
Nevertheless, problems relating to the legalization of labour migrants 
remain partly unresolved. The attractiveness of Russia or Kazakhstan for 
labour migrants is primarily a reflection of the difference in economic sta-
tus and employment opportunities in these countries and countries of exit 
(CIS countries for the most part), while legalization is largely determined 
by migration legislation and mechanisms that ensure its functionality.
Between 2015 and 2017, about 4 million migrants indicating ‘work’ as 
their objective were registered in Russia according to the Central Bank for 
Accounting of Foreign Citizens. It is estimated that another 0.5 to 1 million 
people are already working, having entered for private or tourist purpos-
es.29 The main suppliers of labour migrants are Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
27 Mkrtchyan 2002.
28 Florinskaya and Mkrtchyan 2016.
29 Demintseva, Mkrtchyan and Florinskaya 2018, pp. 10–11.
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Kyrgyzstan. The legalization of migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Belarus and Armenia is greatly facilitated, as these countries are part of 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). But people from Kazakhstan are 
not traditionally attracted to Russia for the purposes of labour migration.30 
The presence of workers from Belarus, Armenia, and especially Kyrgyzstan 
is growing. At the same time, it is shrinking for Moldova and Ukraine, as 
residents now have a legal alternative to work in the EU countries.
In the 1990s, especially during the first half of the decade, migra-
tion in the post-Soviet space was mainly determined by stress factors, 
with forced migrants from a number of emerging ‘hot spots’ moving 
to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. By the end of the 1990s, other, more 
‘normal’ factors began to emerge and increase in significance: in their 
migration decisions people began to focus on ‘weighing’ the benefits and 
costs of migration (work opportunities, buying or renting housing, etc.), 
and the prospects for children. 
Factors such as opportunities for a sober assessment of the potential 
of departure and entry countries; a revaluation of the significance of 
the Russian-speaking population in the newly independent states and 
opportunities for using the Russian language; the adaptation of Russian 
and Russian-speaking people to new living conditions in the republics; a 
reduction in the migration potential of the Russian-speaking population 
in the republics; strict legislation in the countries of entry; and the inten-
sification of migrantophobia, as well as other ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, all 
contributed both to the transformation of migration forms (for example 
to the growth of temporary migration) and to the decrease in the volume 
of permanent dislocations within the CIS.
The key determinants of both ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ are economic. 
Although the growth rates of the Russian economy have been and remain 
low, and are lower than in a number of post-Soviet countries, Russia’s 
socioeconomic indicators are much higher than in the former Soviet 
republics. Namely, the difference between per capita incomes and wag-
es, and unemployment indicators creates a ‘difference of potentials’ be-
tween countries, reflected both in permanent and temporary labour mi-
gration. In addition to the Baltic countries, only Belarus and, in part, 
Kazakhstan could compete with Russia in some social positions (Table 12). 
The crises of 2009–2010, as well as the current one, did not change the 
situation radically as the CIS countries were affected no less than Russia. 
In the context of temporary labour migration, crises have contributed to 
the fact that the already weak and dependent economies of the Central 
30 Sadovskaya 2013; Alekseenko, Aubakirova, and Sarsembaeva 2011.
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Asian countries were confronted with the ‘export’ of unemployment and 
could not resist it.
Number of unemployed 
according to ILO methodology, 
% of economically 
active population
GNI per capita, taking into account 
the purchasing power parity in 
current international prices, $ US










2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015 2011 2015 
Russia 10.4 6.6 6.8 5.3 6,650 11,540 19,860 24,060 100 41.2
Azerbaijan 13.9 8.5 6.5 5.9 3,340 6,280 14,690 17,100 55 …
Armenia 12.1 9.1 21.3 19.3 2,380 4,970 6,890 9,090 48 27.7**
Georgia 10.4 12.7 14.4 10.3 2,690 4,410 6,390 9,350 … …
Belarus 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.5 5,970 10,000 15,600 17,550 76 27.6
Moldova 6.6 6.0 5.8 2.9 1,870 3,300 4,150 5,410 37 29.7
Ukraine 10.1 6.8 6.8 8.1 3,690 6,380 7,550 7,850 52 24.3
Kazakhstan 15.1 9.6 6.6 5.7 7,350 12,920 17,110 23,550 75 27.8
Kyrgyzstan 8.5 9.0 9.9 9.0 1,550 2,030 2,560 3,310 23 20.8
Tajikistan 11.4 11.6 11.7 11.1 900 1,470 2,550 3,360 20 …
Turkmenistan 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 3,970 5,380 8,920 15,030 … …
Uzbekistan 8.2 8.1 8.0 7.8 1,950 2,730 4,280 6,200 … …
Latvia 13.4 10.0 16.3 8.6 8,010 13,700 17,800 24,400 91 35.5***
Lithuania 13.6 8.5 14.5 8.2 8,300 14,330 19,740 27,610 109 35.2***
Estonia 11.6 6.9 14.1 6.1 9,070 15,870 20,460 28,090 91 33.2***
Table 12: Some indicators of the socio-economic development of the post-Soviet countries, 
2000–2015*




Sources: The World Bank; Rosstat
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Other important determinants of migration in the post-Soviet space 
include:
A single linguistic area. Knowledge of the Russian language among cit-
izens of the CIS countries plays an important role in the formation of 
the Russian migration vector. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
almost all newly formed sovereign countries adopted laws on the 
status of their ‘titular’ languages  and the Russian language. But over 
time, the situation began to flatten out: the ideological dogma was 
replaced by a more pragmatic attitude towards the Russian language, 
although its usage, for example in schools, was greatly reduced. Today, 
Russian is recognized as a state language only in Belarus (along with 
the Belarusian language); in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, Russian 
is considered official (with legal restrictions); and in Tajikistan and 
Moldova as ‘the language of interethnic communication’. In other 
republics of the former USSR, the Russian language has the status 
of ‘foreign’, but in most cases it is quite widespread. However, even 
in the republics where the Russian language has a high status and is 
used officially, the inability to communicate in the titular language 
seriously impedes promotion in public service and building a career, 
as in Kazakhstan, for example.
Reassessment of the significance of the Russian-speaking population in 
the newly independent states. The rapid departure of the Russian-
speaking population in the 1990s left labour niches that had previously 
been occupied. Concern about this situation was stronger in those 
republics with a higher proportion of Russians and titular nations in 
the population. Above all, the situation was discussed in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan. For example, among those who left Kazakhstan in 
1996–2004 (over 15 years of age), 26% had a technical education, 21% 
pedagogical, 10% economic and medical, and 6.5% architectural and 
construction related. As a result, the number of doctors, engineers, 
and educators was significantly reduced, and ‘continuity in the sys-
tem of higher and secondary special education was lost’.31 With the 
recognition of economic interests as the main determinant of the de-
velopment, the pressure on the Russian-speaking population in some 
of the countries began to weaken.
31 Sadovskay 2009, pp. 286, 288.
    FEBRUARY 2019    187
Adaptation of the Russian-speaking population to new living conditions 
in the republics. During a long period of existence within the USSR, 
Russians occupied the leading positions in the republics. This was due 
both to ideological attitudes and norms and, as a rule, to a higher level 
of education and qualifications.32 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Russians and representatives of other non-titular peoples faced the 
need to adapt to the new economic and psychological realities. Some of 
them migrated in the 1990s. For those who stayed, there was a gradual 
reassessment of values (weighing the pros and cons in Russia and in 
those places where they were currently residing, as mentioned above), 
and a process of getting used to the new conditions. In particular, the 
data on Kazakhstan shows that many Russians in big cities were able to 
take up those niches that the local population did not apply for and to 
feel comfortable with them. Ideas of departure are linked to children 
and their probable education in Russian universities.
Decrease in migration potential and ageing of the Russian-speaking 
population in the republics. Migration processes, the demographic 
characteristics of the remaining Russian-speaking population (ageing 
and below-replacement reproduction), and assimilation significantly 
narrowed the migration potential of the republics of the former USSR. 
The repatriation of the Russian and Russian-speaking population be-
gan long before the collapse of the Soviet Union and embraced all 
non-Slavic countries.
During the entire post-Soviet period, the Russian population suffered 
particularly significant losses in active fighting in the 1990s in the repub-
lics of the South Caucasus and Tajikistan (Table 13).
32 Brusina 2001; Vitkovskaya 1993; Karachurina 2013.




Number of Russians 
according to the 
1989 census
Number of Russians 
according to 
national censuses
Number of the title 
population according 
to the 1989 census 




Russia 119,865.9 111,016.9 (2010) 119,865.9 111,016.9 (2010)
Belarus 1,342.1 785.1 (2009) 7,904.6 7,957.3 (2009)
Moldova 562.1 111.7* (2014) 2,794.7 2,068.1* (2014)
Ukraine 11,355.6 8,334** (2001) 3,7419.1 37,541.7** (2001)
Total 133,125.7 120,247.7 167,984.3 158,584.0
Azerbaijan 392.3 119.3 (2009) 5,805.0 8,172.8 (2009)
Armenia 51.62 11.9 (2011) 3,083.6 2,961.8 (2011)
Georgia 341.2 26.5 (2014) 3,787.4 3,224.6 (2014)
Total 785.1 157.7 12,676.0 14,359.2
Kyrgyzstan 916.6 419.6 (2009) 2,229.7 3,804.8 (2009)
Tajikistan 388.5 34.8 (2010) 3,172.4 6,373.8 (2010)
Turkmenistan 333.9 165*** (2010) 2,536.6 4,011.0*** (2010)
Uzbekistan 1,653.5 809.5****(2013) 14,142.5 24,858.2**** (2013)
Total 3,292.5 1,428.9 22,081.2 39,047.8
Kazakhstan 6,227.5 3,797.0 (2009) 6,534.6 10,098.6 (2009)
Latvia 905.5 557.1 (2011) 1,387.8 1,285.1 (2011)
Lithuania 344.5 176.9 (2011) 2,924.3 2,561 (2011)
Estonia 474.8 326.2 (2011–2012) 963.3 902.5 (2011–2012)
Total 1,724.8 1,060.2 5,275.4 4,748.6
TOTAL 145,155.5 126,691.5 214,551.5 226,838.2
TOTAL, WITHOUT 
RUSSIA
25,289.6 15,674.6 94,685.6 115,821.3
Table 13: Change in the number of Russian and titular nations in the republics of the former USSR, 
from 1989 to censuses at the turn of the 2010s, thousands of persons
* Without eastern counties and Bender municipality 
** A census was not conducted in Ukraine at the turn of the 2010s.
*** National composition of the population of Turkmenistan according to Joshua Project 
estimates; the results of the 2012 population census have not been published.
**** Censuses in Uzbekistan were not conducted, estimation for 01.01.2013 according to Materials 
of the State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. 01 / 2–05–05 / 3–50 of 
May 12, 2014, Yu. N. Tsyryapkina, ‘Uzbekistan: language practice and self-identification’ (on 
the example of field research in Fergana), Tomsk Journal LING and ANTR, 2015, 3 (9).
Sources: According to the national population censuses of statistical agencies
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By the end of the 2010s, there were less than 16 million Russians in the 
CIS and Baltic countries, and possibly even less taking into account the 
fact that we do not have up-to-date data on some of the republics. At the 
same time, the titular population of the republics of Central Asia, as well 
as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, had increased significantly.
The intensification of migrantophobia in entry countries and the 
increasing complexity of the legislation therein also affect the deci-
sion-making processes of potential migrants. If in the 1990s the migra-
tion legislation of Russia was quite liberal,33 after the 2000s it began to 
change with a certain regularity. The adoption of a fairly strict law ‘On the 
Citizenship of the Russian Federation’ (No. 62-FZ of May 31, 2002) was fol-
lowed by the adoption of a number of softening amendments to it and the 
start of the State ‘Compatriots’ Programme from 2007. Approximately the 
same path was followed by Kazakhstan. It is incredibly difficult to follow 
the nuances of regular law enforcement changes for potential migrants. 
Procedural intricacies stimulate additional corruption opportunities. 
Naturally, all of these factors also affect the migration mood in societies.
7.5 CONCLUSION
The development of demographic processes in the post-Soviet area 
demonstrates that a long existence within a single system determines the 
laws of the development to some extent even after 30 years. In particular, 
no matter how the geopolitical, economic and social conditions in the 
countries of the former USSR have changed, in the migratory sense they 
are largely ‘tied’ to each other. It may be argued that migration processes 
are still connecting the post-Soviet region. However, the modern form of 
migration processes would not be possible were it not for the profound 
differences in the demographic behaviour of the population of the former 
Soviet republics. 
When it comes to demography, diverging trends between countries 
of the Soviet Union started well before the dissolution of the latter; in 
fact, differences between the western and eastern republics (the latter 
meaning Central Asia and Azerbaijan) were visible as early as the 1960s 
in terms of reproduction rate, as well as average life expectancy. These 
trends resulted in significant changes in the ethnic composition of the 
Soviet Union even before 1989, with the share of titular nations increasing 
a lot faster in Central Asia than in Russia or Ukraine.
33 The migration policy of the first ‘Russian decade’ attempted to meet the challenges of forced migration.
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These trends were further strengthened by the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union: demographic indicators significantly worsened in the western 
part of the post-Soviet region, as well as in Armenia and Georgia, while 
other countries experienced population growth. The ethnic composition 
of the post-Soviet countries was further changed by the mass emigration 
of ethnic Russians back to Russia, mainly in the 1990s. 
Regarding this particular aspect, the research revealed that the num-
bers of ethnic Russians living in countries of the former Soviet Union have 
sharply decreased in the past three decades. While in 1989 more than 
25 million ethnic Russians lived in these countries, by the 2010s their 
numbers had dropped by nearly ten million, down to 15 million. The 
main reasons for this sharp decline included emigration back to Russia, 
assimilation, the lower fertility rate and, not least, higher natural mor-
tality, due to the fact that remaining Russians belong to older age cohorts 
on average. As there is no reason to believe that these trends will change, 
the presence of ethnic Russians in countries of the former Soviet Union 
is likely to gradually lose its significance as a cohesive force in the region.
The position of the Russian language as a lingua franca is different, 
however. Although in the 1990s the previously prioritized role of the 
language decreased significantly in line with the establishment of new 
states and identities, pragmatic considerations have still played a strong 
role in the preservation of the Russian language even throughout the 
2010s. Although Russian is recognized as an official state language only in 
Belarus and Kyrgyzstan in addition to the respective titular languages, it 
still serves as a language of international and inter-ethnic communication 
in the other post-Soviet countries as well. 
Hence, all in all, one may conclude that while demographic differ-
ences in the post-Soviet region are increasing and the number of ethnic 
Russians living in the successor states is sharply decreasing, migration 
patterns, as well as the important role of the Russian language still serve 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, it has become evident that the Russian state has borrowed 
religious-conservative rhetoric in its attempt to enhance the unity of 
the ‘Russian World’. Strengthening the cooperation with the Russian 
Orthodox Church both domestically and in the foreign policy sphere, the 
state wishes to portray itself as a global guarantor – and defender – of tra-
ditional, spiritual values. This chapter argues that religious bonds, even if 
they are truly important for many of the citizens of the post-Soviet space, 
are insufficient when it comes to holding the ‘Russian World’ together. 
First, the ‘spirituality’ that the Church and the political elites underline 
often reflects cultural affection rather than the personal religiousness of 
an individual, and second, the relationship between the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the national churches may turn into a conflict. Most impor-
tantly, the concept of the ‘Russian World’ in itself has acquired irredentist 
meanings after 2014, and can no longer work as a unifying feature in the 
post-Soviet space.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the religious revival of the 
post-Soviet space was actively discussed in scholarly circles. Even in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, religion was deemed to fill the ideological 
vacuum left by the demise of communism. To some extent, it did: as Pål 
Kolstø points out, the share of ‘believers’ in the former Soviet republics 
was soon higher than in the Western countries. However, in general, 
nationalism emerged as a stronger force to fill the vacuum, which was 
reflected in emerging religious national assertiveness in the former Soviet 
8. THE ‘RUSSIAN WORLD’ AND THE 
ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE POST-
SOVIET SPACE
Veera Laine
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Union countries: many post-Soviet countries soon formed national reli-
gious institutions, or aspired to do so.1
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is a national Church of the Russian 
Orthodox people and the main Church institution of Russian Orthodox 
eparchies abroad. During the past decade at least, the Russian Orthodox 
Church has aimed at increasing its status internationally. Alexander 
Agadjanian explains that the position of the ROC has gradually evolved 
into ‘a claim representing a growing moral majority in Russia and be-
yond’. Simultaneously, the Russian state has begun to stress the tradi-
tional ‘spiritual-moral’ value orientation as the key unifying feature of the 
Russian nation. Agadjanian suggests that the ‘tandem wave’ of religious 
and political global moral conservatism is part of a global Kulturkampf, 
targeting the typified Western liberal ethos.2 The cooperative relation-
ship between the state and the ROC has characterized Russian history for 
centuries, as the rulers of the secular power have enjoyed the support 
of the leaders of the spiritual power both domestically and abroad. The 
Soviet state ideology embraced atheism as a part of the official doctrine, 
and the Church faced severe repressions. Yet in the late Soviet era, key 
figures of the Orthodox Church were used as the Kremlin’s mouthpiece 
abroad. Today, amid growing tension in international politics, the state 
and the Church have found common ground in their attempt to portray 
spiritual bonds as the core of unity, not only for the Russian people, but 
within the ‘Russian World’.
This chapter discusses the spiritual ties between the post-Soviet coun-
tries and the way in which the Russian state has attempted to make use of 
them. First, the evolution and connotations of the Russian World (russkiy 
mir) concept will be elaborated: how it has been applied in Russia’s polit-
ical discourse, and whether or how it is different from the parallel concept 
of ‘Holy Rus’’ (svyataya Rus’), crucial for the Russian Orthodox Church. 
The connections of individual post-Soviet countries to this ‘spiritual’ 
Russian World will then be briefly discussed, focusing on those countries 
that have a strong tradition of Orthodox belief and/or close ties with the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Finally, the chapter analyses the question of 
how the Russian state, with support of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
has aimed at politicizing the spiritual bonds between the post-Soviet 
countries. The possible factors challenging this process will be discussed 
in the concluding section.
1 Kolstø 2000, pp. 53–56; 60–64.
2 Agdjanian 2017.
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8.2 THE ‘RUSSIAN WORLD’ AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT
The concept of the ‘Russian World’ (russkiy mir), used in the Russian 
political discourse for over 25 years, has become an important tool in 
Russia’s politics in the post-Soviet space. Most often, the concept refers 
in one way or another to Russians (Russian-speakers) who live outside 
the borders of the Russian Federation, or the Russian diaspora, but it has 
a broader meaning than the concept of ‘compatriot’ (sootechestvennik).3 
The latter entered the Russian political discourse in the early 1990s when 
Boris Yeltsin’s administration realized that their hopes for deep inte-
gration within the CIS countries – as well as their hopes for establishing 
dual citizenship in those countries – had started to crumble.4 Hence, the 
focus of the compatriot discourse has always been on Russians in the ‘near 
abroad’, in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and not so much 
on ‘global’ Russians who emigrated to other parts of the world (but who, 
nevertheless, can be interpreted as belonging to the Russian World).
The diversity of the Russians living outside today’s Russian Federation 
effectively makes it impossible to approach them as one group. In the 
discourse of the Russian state, that diversity is not really considered, but 
it does downplay the idea of Russians abroad as a potential ‘soft pow-
er’ instrument of the state. The ‘soft power’ interpretation leans on the 
perception that Russians living abroad are useful for the Russian state 
politically, which also explains why the discourse on compatriots (and 
defending their rights) has a weak linkage to Russian (re-)migration pol-
icies: since the early 1990s, Russians abroad have not been encouraged to 
move back to Russia. But, as Mikhail Suslov points out, the political lev-
erage of compatriots is limited: they are “not a stick but rather scattered 
legos, requiring much ingenuity to connect them together and attach to 
the Kremlin’s purposes”. In other words, the idea of a ‘mental’ Russia 
that extends beyond the borders of the Russian Federation has consid-
erable symbolic power but is complicated to use politically. Conservative 
historian Boris Mezhuev describes the Russian World as “capital which 
cannot be rejected nor spent”.5
In many contexts, the Russian World refers to a ‘mental landscape’, 
something more abstract than a command of the Russian language, place 
of birth, or (previous) citizenship. On the one hand, there is a tendency 
to define belonging to the Russian World as something voluntary: many 
see it as a ‘community’ with which one can identify, even without having 
3 Zevelev 2016.
4 See e.g. Tolz 1998.
5 Rossiya v global’noy politike 2018, pp. 2–3, 135.
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a connection to the Russian state in the strict sense.6 However, on the 
other hand, connecting the idea of the Russian World to the territory as 
a ‘Russian civilizational space (prostranstvo)’ also points to the imperial 
understanding of power: the Russian ‘state-civilization’ is the one unit-
ing and defining the Russian World. The Russian World is a conceptual 
tool, given various meanings in different situations. As John O’Loughlin 
et al. put it, “[...] the term has no fixed and essential meaning. Rather, it 
is a geopolitical speech act that either works or does not for individuals, 
both inside Russia and outside its borders”.7 From the point of view of 
the post-Soviet countries outside Russia, the popular resonance of this 
‘geopolitical speech act’ remains a critically important issue.
Mikhail Suslov explains the (post-Soviet) evolution of the concept in 
three periodical stages, where the first, emerging in the 1990s, was used to 
describe the ‘Russian archipelago’, the network of the Russian-speaking 
population in the Western countries. Russians abroad were interpreted 
as ‘alternative Russia’, perhaps even ‘better’ in the sense that they could 
influence the population living within the borders of Russia proper with 
their knowledge and potentialities. After the so-called Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine in 2004, the concept started to characterize Russia’s ‘soft 
power’ abroad. In this sense, the direction of the desired influence was 
reversed. At the same time, the idea of a ‘sphere of influence’ was em-
bedded in the meanings of the Russian World.
After 2009, the Russian World concept started to adjust to the civili-
zational discourse of the ‘new conservatives’, which the state had also 
begun to exploit. The discursive change to connect the meanings of the 
Russian World to the idea of ‘re-collecting Russian lands’ preceded the 
actual manifestation of this geopolitical interpretation, namely the an-
nexation of Crimea in 2014.8 Aleksei Miller says that to those who first 
came to know the term in 2014, it is a “concept of Anschluss”.9 In the 
2010s, the Russian World has thus been “re-territorialized as an irre-
dentist and isolationist project” which portrays Russia as an alternative, 
non-Western model of modernity. According to Mikhail Suslov, the con-
cept is even becoming an all-embracing ideology, suggesting that Russia 
is or should be politically and geographically bigger than the Russian 
Federation.10 Simultaneously with the process that Suslov describes, the 
discourse within the Russian state and the political elites has emphasized 
6 Ibid., pp. 125, 127.
7 O’Loughlin, Toal and Kolosov 2016.
8 Suslov 2018.
9 Rossiya v global’noy politike 2018, p. 128.
10 Suslov 2018, p. 330.
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the traditional ‘spiritual-moral’ values as the core of the Russian national 
identity. As will be shown below, the growing significance of ‘spirituality’ 
in Russian domestic and foreign policy has also tied the concept of the 
Russian World more closely to the concept of Holy Rus.
8.3 ‘SPIRITUAL’ RUSSIANNESS: ‘HOLY RUS’
The concept of Holy Rus (svyataya Rus’) stands for the spiritual connec-
tion between ‘all Russians’, but is most commonly used to describe the 
bonds between Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian people. For example, 
in 2009, in his speech given at the third assembly of the Russian World 
Foundation, Patriarch Kirill defined those three countries as forming 
the Holy Rus. He explained that the Russian Orthodox Church realizes 
its spiritual mission (pastyrskaya missiya) among those nations that 
“consider Russian spiritual and cultural tradition as the basis of their na-
tional identity”, and added that in this regard, it also includes Moldova 
as a part of the Russian World.11 The Patriarch stressed the sovereignty of 
countries that belong to the Russian World, and described the relations 
between these countries as a partnership.
The Holy Rus concept is close to the Russian World concept in the 
way that it stresses the spiritual unity of the (Russian) Orthodox people, 
and is less defined with regard to actual territory or states. The concept 
of canonical territory, then, is used more specifically to point to the ter-
ritory on which the Church operates. In principle, canonical territory 
would show the boundaries of the power of a certain Church, but to-
day, several Churches coexist in many areas. The Statutes of the Russian 
Orthodox Church limit the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church 
to including “persons of Orthodox confession living on the canonical 
territory of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, 
Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Estonia and also Orthodox Christians living 
in other countries and voluntarily joining this jurisdiction”.12 In practical 
terms, the Russian Orthodox Church seems to equate its canonical territo-
ry to the whole post-Soviet space, including, for example, the religiously 
mixed or secular Baltic states Latvia and Estonia and Catholic Lithuania, 
but excluding Georgia and Armenia. Georgia has a long tradition of its 
own Orthodox Church (which will be further discussed below), inde-
pendent from the Moscow Patriarchate. Armenia, being one of the most 
11 Internet Journal of the Russian Orthodox Church 2009.
12 Wasmuth 2014.
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ancient Christian countries, has its own national religious institution, the 
Armenian Apostolic Church.
However, the concept of canonical territory also includes those living 
in other countries but voluntarily joining the Church jurisdiction. In 
this sense, individual choice becomes important, as is the case with the 
Russian World concept. In September 2014, Patriarch Kirill once again 
explained his views on the Russian World by stressing that it is “not a 
political concept”, but a civilizational one, and that the Russian World is 
“a spiritual, cultural, and value-based dimension of a human personality”. 
In the same address, the Patriarch explained that even non-Slavic persons 
can belong to the Russian World if they embrace the cultural and spiritual 
basis of that world as their own – and, moreover, that those who speak 
Russian and identify as Russians might not belong to the Russian World 
if they live according to other principles and traditions.13 
As mentioned above, the Russian state discourse has portrayed the 
idea of traditional ‘Russian values’, distinctly different from the (mate-
rial and secular) values of the West, as a key feature of the Russian World. 
The increasing emphasis on the national-conservative line of thought as 
legitimizing national politics follows a global trend of stressing national 
sovereignty and national-conservative values in a situation where na-
tional identities and institutions risk losing some of their status,14 and, 
accordingly, Russian political discourse has portrayed its “defence of 
traditional values” as a global mission. President Vladimir Putin has de-
scribed Russia’s future mission as an “Orthodox power” (pravoslavnaya 
derzhava).15 In 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained 
that the Russian World is “part of our Foreign Policy doctrine of protecting 
compatriots, promoting the ideals and values of the ‘Russkiy Mir’ and 
representing our multinational culture”.16 Hence, the Russian World is 
understood – within the Russian political establishment – primarily as a 
value community that sees the Russian state as a defender of those values.
8.4 ‘SPIRITUAL BONDS’ WITHIN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
In general, the post-Soviet space is highly diverse religiously. In the fol-
lowing, I will briefly discuss the ‘spiritual ties’ within the post-Soviet 
space in those countries that have (or have had) close ties with the Russian 
13 Internet Journal of the Russian Orthodox Church 2014. 
14 See e.g. Cooley, A., ‘Countering Democratic Norms’, Journal of Democracy 2015 (26: 3), pp. 49–63.
15 Meeting of the ‘Valdai’ international discussion club 9.9.2013.
16 Gazeta.ru 2016.
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Orthodox Church – omitting the Baltic states, however, which are often 
considered culturally distanced from the post-Soviet space. Nor will 
Armenia be discussed here, as its religious stance is rather clear and in-
dependent from Moscow. While the five Central Asian countries are still 
home to many ethnic Russians,17 their religious landscape is dominated 
by Islam, which is why they are also omitted from the discussion.
8.4.1 Russia
In post-Soviet Russia, the Orthodox faith is intertwined with the Russian 
national identity and functions as one of the key frames for ‘Russianness’. 
At the same time, the country has always been home to several other 
confessions and religious groups. Since 1997, the federal legislation has 
acknowledged four traditional religions, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism 
and Judaism, all having equal status. However, the primacy of Orthodoxy 
is clearly articulated in this law as well as in several other documents.18
While a firm central religious policy is still absent, it is clear that the 
influence of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has recently increased 
in Russian domestic policy. The close relationship between the ROC and 
the state in its current form seems to have benefitted both institutions 
domestically. The ROC has gained a more visible if not directly privi-
leged status among other traditional religious communities, which it 
can use to influence political decisions and law-making. In addition to 
that, it has been guaranteed certain material benefits. The state, for its 
part, enjoys strong ‘spiritual’ and ‘moral’ support from one of the most 
trusted institutions19 in the country. Today, the politicization and even 
securitization of the conservative-traditional values in the Russian official 
discourse20 has increased the references to ‘spirituality’, which has duly 
reinforced the Church as a moral and political force within society. At 
the same time, the ‘Orthodox realm’, consisting not only of key actors 
in the Russian Orthodox Church but also Orthodox businessmen, poli-
ticians, film directors and the like, produces ideological content for the 
Kremlin’s ‘ecosystem’.21
Around 70 per cent of the Russian population identify with the 
Orthodox faith. According to a Levada poll conducted in June 2017, over 50 
per cent of Russians describe themselves as very or somewhat ‘religious’, 
17 On the shares of the (ethnic) Russian population in the post-Soviet countries, see Table 13.
18 Fagan 2013, pp. 3–17; Federal’nyi zakon‘O svobode sovesti i o religioznykh obyedineniyakh’ 1997. 
19 In September 2017, 48 per cent of respondents said they trust the Church. Levada Center Press Release 2017a. 
20 Østbø 2017.
21 Laruelle 2017.
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and the share has gradually increased since 2014.22 However, Levada 
researchers note that the result is indicative of collective social norms 
rather than the personal feelings of the respondents. ‘Religiousness’ in this 
sense does not translate into the active practice of religion. For example, 
only a small minority observe fasting or regularly attend church services. 
In a PEW survey, 52 per cent of Russian Orthodox participants said that 
their religious identity is a matter of ‘national culture or family tradition’, 
whereas 35 per cent stated that it is a matter of ‘personal faith’.23
8.4.2 Ukraine
The religious landscape in post-Soviet Ukraine is very complex. More than 
half of the population describe themselves as religious or as ‘believers’, a 
clear majority of whom are Orthodox. Less than ten per cent of the popu-
lation, residing mainly in the western and central parts of the country, are 
adherents of the Greek Catholic Church. Alongside these main religions 
there are several smaller religious communities in the country.24
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, schisms between (and within) 
communities have affected the number and functions of the Orthodox 
Churches in the country. Today, a total of three Orthodox Churches 
exist in Ukraine. In 1992, the then Kiev Metropolitan of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate Filaret (Denysenko) clashed 
with Russian Church leaders, and went on to found his own Church – 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kievan Patriarchate. At the time, 
Ukraine’s political leadership, and President Leonid Kravchuk in par-
ticular, supported the newly emerged Church and saw it as a welcome 
alternative, independent from Moscow.25 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
of the Moscow Patriarchate continued to exist, and has been headed by 
Metropolitan Onufry (Berezovsky) since 2014. The smallest of the three 
churches is the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, originally 
established in 1921 and existing in exile from the 1930s until the 1990s, 
which sees itself as the true successor of the Orthodox Church of the 
Kievan Rus’.
For the Orthodox world, only the (formally autonomous) Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is legally recognized, 
whereas both ‘national’ Orthodox churches remain canonically unrec-
ognized. In terms of the number of affiliated communities, the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is by far the biggest with 
22 Levada Center Press release 2017b. 
23 PEW Research Centre Publications 2017.
24 See e.g. Vasiutynskyi 2018.
25 Kolstø 2000, pp. 68–69.
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over 12,000 communities altogether, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of 
the Kievan Patriarchate being the second (4,921), and the Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church remaining rather marginal (1,188).26 In a study con-
ducted in 2016, 65 per cent of respondents across Ukraine (Crimea and 
occupied parts of Donbas excluded) identified themselves as Orthodox. Of 
them, 25 per cent stated they were adherents of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of the Kievan Patriarchate, 15 per cent of the Orthodox Church of 
the Moscow Patriarchate, 1.8 per cent of the Autocephalous Church, while 
21 per cent said they were ‘just Orthodox’ – not wanting to specify an at-
tachment to any particular Church.27 From the point of view of ‘spiritual’ 
belonging to the Russian World, the diversity of views reflected by the poll 
is crucial. On the one hand, these answers illustrate the relatively strong 
sympathy with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kievan Patriarchate 
in comparison to the Moscow Patriarchate, but, on the other hand, they 
show that not everyone wishes to choose between the two.
Even before the war began in Ukraine’s Donbas in 2014, the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate had been discussing the 
possibilities of wider autonomy from Moscow, but this developed no fur-
ther. At the start of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, the Russian Orthodox 
Church was rather cautious in its public statements and Patriarch Kirill 
made concessions to the Ukrainian clergy to keep them under the Moscow 
Patriarchate’s influence. The parishes in Ukraine make up approximately 
a third of all parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church, and losing even 
a part of them would constitute a serious financial defeat.28 Moreover, 
it would obviously signify a great loss of prestige. However, as Aleksey 
Makarkin writes, the conflict revealed the limits of the influence of the 
Russian Orthodox Church: it could not contribute to a peace-building 
process in a situation where political powers were colliding.29
In recent years, it has indeed been the political leadership – rather than 
the Church representatives – who have taken the initiative to strengthen 
the status of the ‘national’ Orthodox Church. In April 2018, President 
Petro Poroshenko, supported by all of the factions of the Ukrainian par-
liament, the Verkhovna Rada, put forward an initiative to create an au-
tocephalous national Church through pleading this directly from the 
Archbishop of Constantinople Bartholomew I. The endeavour was nothing 
new, as President Viktor Yushchenko had already made a similar request.30 
26 Vasiutynskyi 2018, p. 141; see also Gazeta Wyborcza 2018. 
27 Vasiutynskyi 2018, pp. 141–144.
28 The future of the Church property has already been disputed in the media, see e.g. Gazeta.ru 2018.
29 Makarkin 2014.
30 Kommersant 2018a. 
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According to the Moscow Patriarchate, only the Russian Orthodox Church 
would be entitled to guarantee the autocephaly, which would then have 
to be approved by the other Orthodox leaders. The Ukrainian political 
leadership supports the opposing interpretation of the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople, which maintains that it holds the exclusive right to make 
the final decision on the matter.31
In October 2018, the Patriarchate of Constantinople announced that 
it no longer considers Ukraine a part of the canonical territory of the 
Moscow Patriarchate by revoking the Synodal Letter of the year 1686. 
The statement indicates that Bartholomew I is ready to prepare the offi-
cial document, tomos, to confirm the autocephalic status.32 The Moscow 
Patriarchate reacted to the announcement by cutting off all ties with 
Constantinople. At the time of writing, it seems clear that Ukraine will 
be granted autocephaly, but the practical details remain unclear: How 
would the new Church be organized, who would lead it, and to what 
extent would the parishes currently following the Moscow Patriarchate 
join the new, national Orthodox Church? 
As the ROC is the spiritual home to approximately 150 million Orthodox 
believers, the recognition of the autocephalic Ukrainian national Church 
is a matter that concerns the entire Orthodox world, not just political 
and religious leaders in Ukraine and Russia. For the committed Orthodox 
believers, the canonical recognition of the church is principally important, 
as it is the only guarantee of the spiritual authority of the Church. In light 
of recent developments, it is nevertheless important to remember that 
even if some Ukrainians do feel strongly about the national Church, that 
certainly cannot be assumed to be the case for all of those who identify 
themselves as Orthodox.
All in all, the outcome of the clash may well be decisive for the whole 
notion of the ‘spiritual’ Russian World.
8.4.3 Belarus
In Belarus, the religious landscape is mixed. Historically, religion has been 
the means to divide the population: after the third partition of Poland in 
1795, all Roman Catholics were counted as Poles, and all Orthodox believ-
ers as Russians – regardless of the language they spoke.33 Ever since the 
Church reform in 1839, the Orthodox Church has been the most signifi-
cant religious community in the country in terms of membership. Today, 
around 60 per cent of the population say they are believers, and of them, 
31 Nezavisimaya gazeta 2018. 
32 Kommersant 2018b.
33 Kolstø 2000, p. 65.
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a clear majority (around 70 per cent) identify themselves as Orthodox. 
Around 14 per cent of those who consider themselves religious belong to 
the Roman Catholic Church, while Protestants make up one per cent of 
the believers.34 However, the trend has been that the number of adherents 
of the Catholic and Protestant Churches is growing quickly (they also 
attend religious services more actively than the Orthodox population).35 
Still, the share of those who do not consider themselves religious in any 
way is relatively high, up to 40 per cent.
Among the religious communities, the Belarusian Orthodox Church, 
belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate, has an institutional primacy in 
the country. It is considered an integral part of the canonical territory 
of the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, in 2009, Patriarch Kirill 
stated that Belarus is “a native land for all of us, and it is part of Holy Rus, 
historical Rus”.36 Neither Belarusian nor Russian political or religious 
leaders have truly challenged this view, even though the war in Ukraine 
made the ROC discourse more cautious in its references to the Holy Rus 
or Russian World. 
President Aleksander Lukashenko, who once reportedly described 
himself as an “Orthodox atheist”,37 has been in favour of close cooperation 
with Orthodox Church leaders. For example, in May 2014, Lukashenko 
stated that the state and the Church act together, and that the Church 
has a ‘colossal’ role in the life of Belarusian society. He also added that 
the Church is actually not separate from state affairs.38 According to 
Nelly Bekus, the ideology of the Belarusian state has included three basic 
values since the 1990s: strong presidential power, a socially oriented 
economy, and Christian – “or, to be precise, Orthodox” – values. The 
state ideology has been renewed and discussed several times, but the 
main values prevail.39
Portraying the country as straightforwardly Orthodox is a political 
choice of the state leadership rather than a reflection of the current re-
ality. The religious diversity of the country also partly explains why the 
Belarusian Orthodox Church does not act as a unifying factor for the whole 
society in a similar manner to national Orthodox churches in some other 
post-Soviet states. Yet what is more important, it is in the interest of the 
state that the Church does not act as a proactive institution: the clear 
34 Kutuzova 2013. 
35 Wilson 2012, p. 132; Bohdan 2012.
36 Bykovskij 2017.
37 Wilson 2012, p. 133.
38 Interfax.by 2014.
39 Bekus 2010, pp. 211–220.
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position of the Church under the Moscow Patriarchate means stability 
for the Belarusian political leadership as well.
8.4.4 Moldova
A clear majority of Moldovans, around 90 per cent, identify themselves 
as Orthodox.40 There are two patriarchates in the country, the Moldovan 
Orthodox Church under the rule of the Moscow Patriarchate, to which 
80 per cent of Moldovans say they belong, and the Bessarabian Orthodox 
Church that separated from the Moscow Patriarchate in 1992 in order to 
follow the Romanian Orthodox Church, to which 13 per cent of Moldovans 
adhere.41 Both patriarchates have been recognized canonically and enjoy 
autocephalous status.42 In a public opinion poll conducted in 2018, the 
respondents viewed both Churches very positively: 65 per cent regard-
ed the Moldovan Orthodox Church favourably, while for the Romanian 
Orthodox Church the share was 57 per cent.43
In general, the value orientation in society is conservative, and religion 
as such is perceived as important. In a poll conducted in November 2015, 
91 per cent of respondents stated that religion is a value that is either im-
portant or very important for them. However, the Orthodox identity does 
not necessarily translate into active participation in Church activities. In 
November 2014, 68 per cent said they go to church “less frequently” or 
not at all, 17 per cent “at least once a month”, and 14 per cent “often”.44
Moldova’s president since December 2016, Igor Dodon, has close rela-
tions with the religious leaders of the country, who, for their part, do not 
hesitate to comment on politics. The priests of the Moldovan Orthodox 
Church have taken a clear pro-Russian stance in foreign policy. For exam-
ple, Orthodox bishop of Balti Marchel Mihaescu has criticized Moldova’s 
deeper integration with the EU by stating that Europe “wants too much in 
return” for the money it has given: “It [Europe] demands that we pay with 
our souls, that we alienate ourselves from God. This is not acceptable”.45
The current political leadership of the country is pro-Russian, and the 
Moldovan Orthodox Church generally backs their policy. However, as 
Vladimír Baar and Daniel Jakubek note, the national identity in Moldova is 
divided between ‘Moldovanism’ and ‘Romanianism’, and this antagonism 
40 Valcov et al. 2017, p. 43.
41 Center for Insights in Survey Research (IRI) 2018, p. 61.
42 Baar and Jakubek 2017.
43 IRI 2018, p. 24.
44 IPP Internet data searches 2018.
45 Higgins 2016. 
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will remain in the future.46 The two Orthodox Churches in the country 
do not seek independence from either Moscow or Bucharest, nor are they 
challenged by any ‘national’ Orthodox patriarchates, but the national 
identity question may have an effect on the balance between them in 
the future.
8.4.5 Georgia 
The Georgian Orthodox Church is one of the oldest in the world. It is a 
source of national identity, and the most trusted institution in the country. 
It was the only national Orthodox Church that was retained through-
out the Soviet era as autocephalous.47 After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the Church quickly became one of the institutions contributing 
to the national unity of the country. In a PEW research poll, 93 per cent 
of Georgians stated that religion was very or somewhat important for 
them – the highest figure in that specific poll among all participating 
post-Soviet countries.48
Political analyst Ghia Nodia explained that even though the Church 
was seen as ‘outdated’ before 1991, it quickly regained credibility and 
status as the national Church after independence. The shift in attitudes 
was connected to President Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s emphasis on (ethnic) 
national movement, during which, Nodia says, “the concept that real 
Georgians are Orthodox Christians spread really fast”.49 Today, Patriarch 
Ilia II of Georgia is a highly respected figure in the country, and the Church 
has often functioned as a stabilizing force in politically divisive times. 
However, traditionalist and reformist views are competing within the 
Church, and as the Patriarch is 85 years old, the question of finding a 
successor who would be accepted by society as well as the Church is 
becoming increasingly significant.50
In light of the long tradition, there is a strong mutual understanding 
of the canonical territory between the Russian Orthodox Church and 
the Georgian Orthodox Church. In the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, 
the Church leaders from both countries took a clear anti-war position 
and, especially at the beginning of the war, the Churches were practi-
cally the only institutions keeping the communication line open.51 The 
mutual understanding has certain limits, for example, with regard to the 
46 Baar and Jakubek 2017, pp. 89–90.
47 Kolstø 2000, pp. 70–71.
48 PEW Research Center Publications 2017.
49 BBC News 2013.
50 Funke 2014.
51 Makarkin 2011.
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breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian Orthodox 
Church recognizes the regions as belonging to the canonical territory of 
the Georgian Orthodox Church, but nevertheless provides funds for the 
South Ossetian and Abkhazian Churches and educates their priests.52
The Georgian Orthodox Church stresses the conservative, traditional 
values and, for example, an anti-gay message similar to that of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, but it does not portray Russia(n state) as the guarantor 
of those values. In this sense, Georgia, despite being religious, traditional 
and Orthodox, is not part of the Russian World or the Holy Rus: its spirit-
uality relies on the distinctive Georgian national identity. For this reason, 
and because of Georgia’s long history of being religiously independent, 
Moscow does not challenge the institutional setting. Attempts to influence 
religious or political moods in Georgia would need to take place through 
the Georgian Orthodox Church, not by challenging its position.
8.5 RUSSIA’S WAYS TO POLITICIZE THE SPIRITUAL 
RUSSIAN WORLD
In the Russian state discourse, the diversity embedded in the Russian 
World concept, or the heterogeneity of Russians living abroad, is not taken 
into account. Rather, the state’s interpretation of the concept relies on the 
idea of ‘spheres of influence’ and perceives the Russian World as a com-
munity of people who, if not loyal to the Russian state, nonetheless share 
the traditional values the Russian state is pursuing. At the foreign policy 
level, the concepts of the Russian World and the Holy Rus have merged in 
their anti-Western tone. Both the political and the religious leadership in 
Russia continue using them despite the fact that, particularly after 2014, 
the meanings attached to these concepts have become irredentist for other 
post-Soviet countries. The ROC has tried to act cautiously concerning 
the political conflicts in the region, but when obliged to take a stance, it 
inevitably regards the unity of the Holy Rus as more important than any 
state sovereignty.53 There have been direct attempts to influence foreign 
political decisions by using ‘spiritual’ unity reasoning: For example, the 
Russia-led integration projects, mainly the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU), have been presented as culturally and spiritually more ‘suitable’ 
and ‘adjusted’ for countries such as Moldova (in whose case the Orthodox 
priests have been applying this discourse in particular).54
52 Stratfor Assessments 2011.
53 See e.g. Petro 2018, p. 224.
54 Calus and Kosienkowski 2018.
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At an institutional level, the Russian state utilizes certain mech-
anisms to enhance the unity of and the solidarity within the Russian 
World. By a presidential decree in 2007, a foundation named after the 
Russian World was established, the main task of which is to cultivate the 
Russian language and culture abroad. The activities of the foundation 
could be (and have been) compared with those of similar cultural initi-
atives, such as Goethe Institutes dedicated to the German language and 
culture abroad.55 Another such state institution, the Federal Agency for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living 
Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, more common-
ly known as Rossotrudnichestvo, was founded in 2008 and functions 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The spectrum of its activities is 
broader than that of the Russian World Foundation, ranging from inter-
national development aid programmes to the maintenance of historical 
monuments abroad, for example. Both institutions aim at nurturing the 
Russian language and culture abroad, and the latter specifically focuses on 
strengthening the ties between the CIS countries and compatriots abroad. 
These institutions have a significant role in upholding the symbolic power 
of the Russian World concept, and the Russian media habitually refers to 
them as ‘soft power’ instruments.
The funding of both institutions has been fluctuating according to 
the state budget situation as well as political priorities. According to the 
director of the Russian World Foundation, Vladimir Kochin, its budget 
was around 6.8 million US dollars in 2016, but as of then they expected 
a 6% cut to funding for 2017, and a 6–8% cut again in 2018.56 The bulk of 
the funding comes from the Ministry of Education. Rossotrudnichestvo 
receives more substantial funding, but the diversity of its listed activi-
ties is correspondingly broader. According to media sources, the funds 
allocated to the organization from the federal budget amounted to 54.6 
million dollars in 2017, with 51.8 million dollars earmarked for 2018.57 
State instruments like the Russian World Foundation and 
Rossotrudnichestvo promote ‘Russian values’ and seek to work for the 
benefit of the national interest of Russia abroad, but the efficiency of their 
work is hard to measure. In the work of these organizations, ‘spiritual-
ity’ might not be the primary concern, but they do rely on the shared, 
traditional values of the Russian World in their material and activities. In 
addition, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian World Foundation 
signed a cooperation agreement in 2009. Moreover, the ROC is the only 
55 E.g. Aleksei Miller makes this comparison. See Rossiya v global’noy politike 2018, p. 127.
56 Rbc.ru 2017.
57 Rbc.ru 2018.
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religious organization with representatives on the Foundation’s govern-
ing board.58
The Russian Orthodox Church, for its part, is a credible moral authority 
not only in Russia but also in the former Soviet Union countries. What 
makes the Church more ‘efficient’, perhaps, than the soft power insti-
tutions of the Russian state in promoting unity within the Russian World 
is its own motivation to conduct foreign policy in the region. Nicolai N. 
Petro explains that for the Russian Orthodox Church, “the term Russky 
mir is God’s project, since it is by God’s design that these nations were 
baptized into one civilization”. In the ROC’s perception, the Russian World 
is a far more important concept than national sovereignty, and conflicts 
within the Russian World – such as the war in Ukraine – are, by nature, 
civil wars.59
However, the ability of the Russian Orthodox Church to assist the 
Russian state in keeping the Russian World together is limited, as the 
currently unfolding schism in Ukraine has shown. More importantly, 
the Russian state might have certain reservations towards the Church, 
for which reasons it prefers to fund its foreign policy activities through 
the state institutions.60 Following a Byzantine ideal, the ROC aims at 
“state-society symphonia”, which would allow the Church and the state 
to “spiritually coordinate their service to the society”61 – but in practice, 
the political establishment has been assiduous in keeping most of that 
coordination to itself. Despite the mutually beneficial relationship thus 
far, there are reasons for both the state and the Church to be mindful of 
the limits of their cooperation. As Boris Knorre explains, “the state must 
refrain from using the Church as a conspicuous instrument of foreign and 
domestic policy”, just as the Church “must avoid being instrumental-
ised”.62 The war in Ukraine has shown that the foreign policy objectives 
of the Russian state and the ROC do not always coincide.
8.6 CONCLUSION
In recent years, the Russian state has started to apply the rhetoric of re-
ligious, conservative values as the unifying feature of the Russian World. 
This civilizational discourse has been essential for the Russian Orthodox 
58 O’Loughlin et al. 2016, p. 751.
59 Petro 2018.
60 Rbc.ru 2016.
61 Petro 2018, p. 219; Fagan 2013, pp. 39–41.
62 Knorre 2018, p. 111.
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Church, as it sees the Russian World as a common spiritual heritage of the 
peoples historically living in the area. Today, the Russian state presents 
itself as a defender of conservative, spiritual-moral values in the globalized 
world, and does so with the moral support of the ROC. Both the state and 
the ROC interpret the Russian World as a concept that extends beyond the 
borders of Russia proper, that is, to the area of the former Soviet Union.
However, the attempts to keep the post-Soviet space together with 
this ‘spiritual’ approach face several challenges. First, the Russian state 
discourse does not take into account the complexity of religious and na-
tional identity. Almost all of the surveys referred to in this chapter note 
that the religious attitudes of an individual remain extremely difficult 
to grasp. The fact that people identify as Orthodox does not necessarily 
indicate that they practise their faith. The actual commitment among 
the population to the ‘spiritual’ unity of the Russian World – or the Holy 
Rus’ as the Church portrays it – is hard to evaluate. While the role of truly 
devoted Orthodox believers in the post-Soviet societies should not be 
underestimated, their share might not be as considerable as the Russian 
Orthodox Church (or the Russian state) wishes to portray. In a similar 
manner, the institutional trust towards the Church should not be taken 
at face value. In Russia, for example, the great trust expressed towards 
the Russian Orthodox Church might be more indicative of (passive) ac-
ceptance instead of commitment, as views on the desired and suitable 
role for the church in society are much more diverse. The problem is 
partly methodological but might also signal a certain ‘Soviet legacy’, the 
conformist manner to perceive the role of an individual in society, or the 
preference for identifying with the (assumed) majority.
Second, the key concept of the common foreign policy, the Russian 
World concept, has become ‘tarnished’ in the eyes of post-Soviet coun-
tries since 2014. By annexing Crimea, the Russian state manifested its will 
and ability to interpret the Russian World as an irredentist foreign policy 
project instead of ‘mental’ Russianness. Even earlier, the concept as a 
foreign policy tool was of limited use because the meanings attached to it 
were vague, but particularly after 2014, any ‘return’ to the non-territo-
rial and ‘constructive’ meanings63 does not seem likely or even possible. 
Despite the negative connotations of the concept and suspicion towards 
those using it in the post-Soviet space today, both the Russian state and 
the ROC continue exploiting it because they consider it essential to the 
civilizational discourse. In other words, the friction between national sov-
ereignty and the Russian World cannot be evaded, which is now also being 
demonstrated in the struggle over a national Orthodox Church in Ukraine. 
63 This was suggested by Aleksei Miller. See Rossiya v global’noy politike 2018, pp. 127–8.
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In Ukraine, the ROC initially attempted to prevent the political conflict 
from evolving into a religious one, but did not succeed. Moreover, the 
peacemaking efforts of the ROC rest upon its perception of the Holy Rus, 
which, when used in parallel with the concept of the Russian World, has 
become attached to Russian political irredentism and thus cannot serve 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION
Answering the question of whether a more or less united organized 
crime world of the former Soviet Union still exists is a methodologically 
challenging task, mostly due to the obvious shortage of reliable primary 
sources. The fact that the organized crime world of the Soviet Union re-
ceived very limited scholarly attention from the West and was not publicly 
researched at all in the East, for evident political reasons, poses another 
significant hardship. Hence, it is not easy to define a solid starting point 
for a comparative analysis of the post-Soviet situation.
The present research relies on those factors and parameters that form 
the basis of existing scholarship, such as, first, the organizational mod-
els of criminal groups and, second, the fundamentals of their socializa-
tion and behaviour. A third research perspective is the territorial aspect, 
namely analysing the limitations and extent of the initial ‘all-Sovietness’ 
of recruitment and operations, and how the national (i.e. ethnicity and 
territory-based) background has become increasingly dominant.
9.2 SOVIET ORGANIZED CRIME: RATS IN THE WALLS
The striking lack of visibility of organized crime through most of the Soviet 
era meant that Western scholarship largely assumed it was non-existent, 
or at least irrelevant.1 This was far from the truth. Rather, it was to a large 
1 The particular exceptions were émigré scholars such as Valery Chalidze, and the evidence available in 
Gulag memoirs.
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extent hidden within the corrupt relationships between the Communist 
Party and state officials, and the entrepreneurs of the informal econo-
my, who were poised to emerge in the 1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
reforms unwittingly unleashed them, through his anti-alcohol cam-
paign, economic liberalization and subsequent political democratization. 
Together, they provided the gangsters with a ready market, the means 
to launder their new earnings, and freedom from the controls of a state 
which was in collapse.2
This was an underworld that was local in structure, but national in 
culture. Despite easy characterizations of the Communist Party as a 
‘Soviet mafia’, there were no national or even wider underworld struc-
tures beyond corrupted regional elites, which do not really fit the criteria 
of organized crime.3 Nonetheless, sometimes it was possible to discern 
national-level activities, such as gatherings of kingpins to resolve dis-
puted issues. In 1991, for example, such a skhodka was held precisely to 
decide how to respond to the potential collapse of the Soviet Union (they 
reached no firm decisions, which is in itself a telling sign of those chaotic, 
unpredictable times).
The reason why it was possible for the gangsters to even emerge was 
that, particularly as a legacy of the Gulag era, there was a strikingly co-
herent, Soviet-wide criminal culture, the vorovskoi mir, or ‘thieves’ 
world’. It had an essentially homogenous code of behaviour, its own 
slang, visual tattoo language and also its own mechanisms for enforcing 
agreements and resolving disputes.4 To a large extent, this was mediated 
through the underworld social elite of the vory v zakone (‘thieves in law’, 
best rendered as ‘thieves within the code’), who represented the judges, 
shamans, cultural leaders and role models of the vorovskoi mir. While 
there were some ethnic and regional variations on the theme, especially 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the overall culture, with its modes of 
organization and operation, was strikingly common across the USSR, 
permitting the easy movement and assimilation of criminals from region 
to region, and cooperation between groups.
2 This is explored further in Galeotti 2018, pp. 97–108.
3 True organized crime can be considered a continuing enterprise, separate from traditional and legal social 
structures, within which a number of persons work together under their own hierarchy to achieve power 
and profit for their private gain, through illegal activities. Circles of corrupt officials share many of these 
characteristics, but they are within, not separate from official authority structures.
4 Varese 2001; Serio 2008; Galeotti 2018.
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9.3 THE 1990s: THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONAL UNDERWORLDS
The dissolution of the USSR and consequent creation of new states trig-
gered three, often competing processes in the evolution of the region’s 
underworld. The first was ‘nationalization’. Suddenly, national borders 
appeared across existing turfs and smuggling routes. Old structures of 
local government and control began to reinvent themselves, often repudi-
ating existing deals and relationships, especially with actors now deemed 
‘foreign’, and in an effort to elevate their own clients and allies. Indeed, 
simply the ability to operate in non-Russian languages suddenly gained 
greater primacy and now mattered more than before. Taken together, 
these processes tended to mean that existing gangs simply redefined 
themselves, switching from ‘Soviet’ to local, and somewhat comparable 
to the way in which national elites reinvented themselves, from Party 
stalwarts to new-generation patriots.
Second, the 1990s also witnessed deliberate attempts at empire-build-
ing, whether the phenomenon concerned the so-called ‘Varangians’ 
(Varyagy) from European Russia seeking to assert their control over the 
Russian Far East and Ukraine, or a more general bid by Russian gangs to 
capture sources, routes and markets abroad through force and alliance. 
In the main, this involved not so much the physical elimination of local 
gangs and migration of Russians as the attempt to integrate the former 
into larger Russian networks, but in a decidedly subordinate manner. The 
Baltic states, for example, were early targets, relatively small yet well-
placed for operations in northern Europe, and the ‘Varangians’ were also 
quick to move into eastern Ukraine, Moldova, and northern Kazakhstan, 
areas with substantial ethnic Russian populations.
Third, much network-building reflected not conquest and coercion, 
but market integration. There were often good, practical reasons for 
organized crime groups in the fSU to cooperate. For example, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova provided entryways to the lucrative Western 
European markets for Russian gangs. Central Asia likewise provided ac-
cess to the opiates of Afghanistan. Cooperation across borders became 
widespread, facilitated by the common language and code of the Soviet 
vorovskoi mir. Whereas it sometimes led to the formation of wider, for-
malized cross-border groups and networks, at least as often it simply 
entailed the formation of strong trading relationships between still au-
tonomous market actors.
Throughout the 1990s, the second, ‘Imperialist’, model proved un-
sustainable. Even smaller, non-Russian gangs could often leverage local 
advantages to resist attempts at conquest. In the Baltic states, in particular, 
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the presence of Russian (and Chechen) gangs became a symbol of con-
tinuing foreign domination, and a tacit alliance of indigenous gangs and 
local security forces quickly managed to tame the Russians.5 Even where 
the response was less dramatic, however, the Russians often found them-
selves unable to maintain their initial gains. The gangs of Ukraine’s Donbas 
increasingly came to look towards Kyiv for opportunities and protection, 
even while gladly trading with their Russian neighbours, while the Kazakh 
security forces quickly made it clear that appearing to be a Muscovite fifth 
columnist was bad for a criminal’s health.6 Instead, nationalization and 
market integration shaped the fSU underworld.
9.4 VARIETIES OF VILLAINY
As a result, there are clear signs of divergence within what had been a rela-
tively homogenous Soviet underworld, to a large degree reflecting the dif-
ferentiation of political and economic systems within the region. Russia’s 
underworld, for example, is dominated by a number (estimates vary, 
but generally range from six to twelve) of typically very loose networks. 
Rather than being subject to strong central control, they are formed of 
autonomous local groups linked together by a common interest and, of-
ten, overlapping territorial and business interests. Overall, however, it 
is clear that the Russian underworld has accepted a social contract im-
posed by Vladimir Putin’s regime, which sets the limits when it comes 
to acceptable behaviour. Criminals will be criminals, and face the usual 
risks of arrest and imprisonment, but the moment they appear to be a 
challenge or embarrassment to the state, then they are treated as such. 
Hence, high-profile criminal leaders can operate with apparent impunity, 
until the moment that the state decides they have become a problem. 
When, in 2007, the so-called ‘Night Governor’ of St. Petersburg, Vladimir 
Kumarin (also known as Barsukov), leading light of the city’s dominant 
Tambovskaya crime grouping, was deemed to be inconvenient for fellow 
Peterburgian Vladimir Putin, a force of 300 police commandos was sent to 
arrest him. This was an act of law-enforcement overkill clearly intended 
to remind the underworld that it operated at the Kremlin’s sufferance. 
This is not a country that can neatly be labelled a ‘mafia state’, not least 
because there is a clear ideological and nationalistic dimension to Putin’s 
agenda, with the gangsters neither wholly controlled by the state nor 
5 This was evident in a number of cases in which the police were able to have a major impact. See: e.g. Saar and 
Markina 2004.
6 In a conversation with a Kazakh KNB security officer in Almaty in 2008, the author was told that “we simply 
had to make it clear: you could be a gangster, but you had to be a patriotic one”.
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dominating it. Nonetheless, it is a kleptocracy, in which organized crime 
is once again beholden to a corrupt elite, reminiscent of late Soviet times.7
Conversely, Ukraine may be a sluggishly-reforming state and Belarus 
still an autocracy, but in each case, their gangs are still to a considerable 
degree moulded by the economic opportunities of working with their 
Russian counterparts, in a dynamic relationship reflecting changing mar-
ket realities. The local gangs have contacts and freedom of movement, 
but the ‘Varangians’ tend to have the money and the opportunities to 
maximize those advantages. The Russian Solntsevo network, for example, 
long maintained a relationship with the criminal-political ‘Donetsk clan’ 
from which former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych drew much 
of his support. What Taras Kuzio has called his ‘neo-Soviet mafia state’ 
may have fallen8 – although Ukraine is still a long way from being truly 
purged and reformed – but in any case, the 2014 ‘Revolution of Dignity’ 
and undeclared Russian war in the Donbas would seem at first glance to 
have done little to change the fundamentals as far as the criminals are 
concerned. The Donbas war has not, for example, substantially affected 
westward flows of heroin through south-eastern Ukraine (drugs represent 
70% of all smuggling through Ukraine, according to the State Customs 
Committee9), demonstrating that the Ukrainian gangs handling the final 
leg of smuggling into Europe are still willing to work with their Russian 
counterparts. Indeed, the tit-for-tat sanctions regimes in place follow-
ing the worsening of Moscow’s relations with the West have also made 
Belarus an increasingly important hub for smuggling goods into Russia 
and laundering money out. 
Nonetheless, these relationships are pragmatic, rather than enforced. 
The gangs of Belarus and Ukraine work with the Russians when and be-
cause it suits them. A number of gangs in western Ukraine, for exam-
ple, are now reorienting themselves, cutting ties with the Russians not 
for economic reasons but because they fear such connections may at-
tract greater adverse official attention. According to conversations with 
Ukrainian law enforcers, this has not triggered any kind of retribution 
from their former Russian allies.10 In short, despite the presence of gangs 
with very close links to Russia, the underworlds of Ukraine and Belarus 
are independent.
In Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Moldova, however, a combination of 
economic and political weakness and limited opportunities has kept 
7 Dawisha 2014.
8 Kuzio 2011.
9 Organized Crime Observatory 2015, p. 37.
10 According to conversations in Kyiv, December 2017.
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indigenous organized crime groups relatively weak and primitive. As a 
result, their underworlds have been more prone to being dominated by 
foreign – largely but not exclusively – Russian groups. In Moldova, for 
example, Russian and Romanian influence is evident in the underworld. 
In Kyrgyzstan, where there is a marked overlap between criminal or-
ganizations and radical Islamist movements conducting illegal activities 
to raise funds, there is also concern about the replacement of influence 
from Russia with that of larger criminal-religious-political groups in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.11 That said, this does not mean that there has 
been outright ‘colonisation’ of these countries’ underworlds by outsiders. 
Instead, the foreigners seek to work through local allies and clients, who 
remain the only fishes within their small ponds. 
By contrast, in Georgia – a country long almost synonymous with 
corruption and the underworld – the government’s successful expul-
sion of most of the Georgian vory v zakone following the 2003 ‘Rose 
Revolution’ means that while organized crime continues to exist, it is 
relatively fragmentary and in the shadow of corrupt officials and business 
figures.12 The die-hard vory fled, especially to Russia and Europe, and 
with them the complex network of contacts and shared understandings 
that linked them with their criminal brethren abroad. The new generation 
of organized crime is much more national in form and interests, more 
closely connected with the rising Georgian political and business elite 
than with networks in Russia.
If reform brought ‘nationalization’ to Georgia, the irony is that in the 
other nations of Central Asia13 and in Azerbaijan,14 authoritarian gov-
ernment and rent-seeking control of the economies had much the same 
effect. In these nations, organized crime exists largely at the sufferance of 
predatory local and/or national elites.15 Beyond drug trafficking, which 
has a weight all of its own because of the profits it generates, gangs are in 
many ways confined to a subservient role to the state, again as in Soviet 
times. Thus, despite much attention now being paid to a real, but largely 
over-stated ‘crime-terror nexus’, organized crime is largely an annex to 
the other activities of corrupt officials.16
11 Kambarov 2015; Marat 2007.
12 Slade 2012.
13 Although it may be worth noting that in recent years the pattern in Kyrgyzstan has begun to resemble that 




16 De Danieli 2014.
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Finally, the level of organized criminality in many of the various unrec-
ognized states and regions of the fSU such as the Transnistrian Moldovan 
Republic (TMR), South Ossetia and Abkhazia tends to be high.17 Their 
status is apt to mean a lack of legitimate economic opportunities, espe-
cially due to sanctions, and consequently less of an incentive to play by 
the rules. These regions thus become hubs for smuggling, often as deni-
able turntables for gangs in their patron state – Russia. In most cases, the 
gangs therefore echo their leaderships in looking to Russia for political 
and criminal allies, economic opportunities and guidance. If the model 
of the TMR can be generalized, however, over time this diminishes, as 
underworld elites and businesses become more directly incorporated 
into their upperworld counterparts, forming more coherent, resilient 
and autonomous pseudo-national economies. 
After the 1992–93 Georgian-Abkhaz war, for example, Abkhazia 
underwent a purge of Georgians that also drove out the Georgian 
Sukhumskaya criminal grouping that had been locally dominant.18 The 
irony is that the Sukhumskaya had worked very well with Russian gangs, 
acting as middlemen with the rest of the Georgian underworld. In their 
place emerged a local criminal network that, while including many ethnic 
Russians, is arguably more independent than ever because of its close ties 
to the region’s elite as well. 
Crimea can also effectively be considered another of these pseu-
do-states and, ironically enough, it has already made quite a rapid start 
on this process with the post-2014 political settlement. While ‘Varangians’ 
have moved into the peninsula, they have been forced to deal with local 
gangs, especially the ‘Bashmaki’ and the ‘Seilem’ groups, not least because 
of the patronage of a Crimean administration heavily recruited from the 
region’s business-criminal elite.19
9.5 THE EURASIAN (CRIMINAL) ECONOMIC UNION?
Despite the divergent paths different national underworlds have taken, 
however, and the extent to which they have also forged connections with 
markets and sources outside the fSU, there would seem to have emerged 
a specific and distinct regional, Eurasian criminal marketplace. Within 
it, alliances are particularly dense, transactions are often strikingly fric-
tionless, and communications easy. Putin may be having trouble turning 
17 The exception would be Nagorno-Karabakh, perhaps both because of its lack of smuggling opportunities and 
also due to the fact that it is virtually under a form of martial law.
18 Slade 2013, p. 99.
19 Galeotti 2014. 
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his dream of a Eurasian Economic Union into a truly working reality, but 
have the criminals stolen a march on him?
Obviously, the main reason is the self-interest of the criminal actors 
concerned. Operating transnationally is a necessity for some, an advan-
tage for almost all. For example, beyond embezzlement from respective 
states, the criminal activity with the greatest turnover is narcotics, most 
notably the trade in Afghan heroin. Around a third of the total Afghan 
opiate export passes through the so-called ‘Northern Route’ via the fSU, 
a proportion that is rising.20 The source is to the south; the main mar-
kets are Russia (which has the world’s highest consumption per capita) 
and Western Europe, with China and cocaine-for-heroin swaps with 
Latin American gangs steadily growing too.21 Given that the cheapest 
and safest routes are by land, by definition almost all of this trade will 
be cross-border. Given the challenges involved in trying to drive supply 
routes through hostile and alien territories, what has emerged instead are 
chains of loosely-allied gangs responsible for handling individual stages 
of the process. A gang in Uzbekistan may acquire opium from Afghan 
warlords and sell it to Kazakhs to refine into heroin, which would then be 
traded to a Russian gang which might sell it on the streets or move it all 
the way to Europe itself, but which more likely would sell it on to another 
gang in turn, as the drugs travel to wealthier regions and countries. These 
supply chains link Europe and other markets with Afghan and Central 
Asian gangs in relationships which can become routinized. In the main, 
however, they are temporary, and characterized by a pervasive lack of 
trust between the parties, only overcome by an awareness that each link 
profits most by the chain remaining intact. Nonetheless, the result is a 
series of pragmatic business relationships binding gangs across the fSU.
Likewise, although in most money laundering cases the aim is ulti-
mately to move funds into the most secure jurisdictions of North America, 
Europe and sometimes the Middle East, there is clear evidence of circles 
of reciprocal financial cooperation across the fSU. Recent high-profile 
cases such as the so-called Russian laundromat (which saw more than 
$20 billion washed on its way out of Russia especially through Moldovan 
banks), and the infamous Magnitsky case (where financial institutions 
in Kyrgyzstan played a pivotal role in moving $230 million in tax fraud 
profits) have emphasized the importance of these intra-Eurasian flows 
of dirty money, at least to ‘pre-wash’ the funds before they move further 
afield.22 However, these major cases are only one part of much wider 
20 UNODC 2018.
21 According to successive US State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports and, in a rare 
example of agreement, Russian Interior Ministry annual assessments. 
22 See e.g. OCCRP 2017; Luhn 2013.
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illicit financial networks and flows, operating through not just banks but 
the operating funds of companies, intricate debt structures, and direct 
transfers of legal and illegal goods. In the words of a Europol financial 
crime analyst, “the region is just swirling with dirty money, flowing over 
borders as if they did not exist”.23
These relationships are facilitated by the continued use of Russian as a 
regional lingua franca of the underworld, just as in the upperworld,24 and 
the remnants of the coherent culture of the Soviet vorovskoi mir. While, 
as will be discussed below, its culture is increasingly anachronistic, its 
ways, modes of behaviour and rituals do still have some power among the 
older generation of gangsters, who are still dominant within the regional 
underworld. Finally, the relative ease of moving across borders (as well as 
the poor controls over many crossings) also encourages this flow of money, 
goods and people. The Eurasian Customs Union (which creates a free trade 
zone incorporating Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia) 
and the presence of numerous visa-free regimes (only citizens of Georgia 
and Turkmenistan need one to travel to Russia, for example) add a further 
practical logic to the continuance of this underworld market identity.
One aspect of this is the considerable ethnic interpenetration, the 
result of Soviet and pre-Soviet migrations, as well as the pressures of 
disparities in employment supply and demand. As Andrei Yakimov has 
said, “the post-Soviet space still exists as a bloc in phantom form – a 
‘migration space’”.25 From the ethnic and linguistically Russian citizens 
of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, through the Central Asian labour migrants 
of Russia, to those displaced by the Donbas war, the nations and thus 
underworlds of the fSU are still threaded together by ethnic ties than 
cross political borders. Nonetheless, there are several serious challenges 
affecting this regional market identity and criminal space that are already 
making it less and less important.
9.5.1 The Russian hub versus decentralized supply chains
The Soviet legacy, both infrastructural and psychological, as well as the 
initial dominance of its gangs, meant that Russia started with a dispro-
portionately central role in the underworld of the fSU. After all, in 1991, 
when the Soviet Union was dismembered, it accounted for half its total 
population, almost three-quarter of its area, and a GDP per capita second 
23 Conversation, The Hague, 2013.
24 This may be a declining factor, but just as the importance of trade with Russia is a good index of continued 
tolerance for the use of Russian in official circles, much the same can be said of criminal ones. Liu, Roosevelt 
and Wilson Sokhey 2017.
25 Yakimov 2018.
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only to Kazakhstan.26 According to one scholar at the Russian Ministry 
of Internal Affairs (MVD) Academy, as a result, “just as the Soviet Union 
was on paper a federation of equals, but in practice an empire ruled from 
Moscow, so too was the criminal milieu which survived it”.27 This was 
hyperbole, but understandable. 
Russia was, after all, where ambitious criminals would seek to go, not 
least helping to explain the particular multi-ethnicity of its underworld. 
Failing that, it was where ambitious criminals would look for allies, pa-
trons and backers. It was the hub for criminal trafficking of goods and 
services of every kind. Furthermore, its gangs had funds, often more 
than they knew what to do with, and so in the early 1990s they also often 
assumed the role of investors and lenders within the fSU’s underworld. 
In 1994, Viktor Ilyukhin, chair of the parliamentary Security Committee, 
claimed that organized crime controlled 55% of capital in Russia and 80% 
of all voting stock, while another estimate had it controlling 15–25% of 
Russia’s banks.28 Again, while the detail is questionable, the underlying 
point is not: for a time, the Russian gangs were extravagantly rich, and 
this made them the most attractive partners in the region.
This would not last forever, however. The 1998 financial crisis, while 
weathered by those gangs with significant assets in non-rouble form, 
nonetheless brought an end to the era of ‘cheap illegal money’. In addition, 
other countries’ economies stabilized and underwent their own privatiza-
tion campaigns, which similarly enriched the gangsters with political con-
nections, and which tended by definition to be locals. Ukraine underwent 
a similarly flawed privatization programme, especially during 1995–98 
for example, and Kazakhstan from 1993. In the short term, this stretched 
the criminals’ treasuries, but as they were able to exploit, plunder and 
often re-sell those assets to a new, emerging oligarch class, they reaped 
the profits. Furthermore, as the heroin trade across the fSU also matured, 
more and more groups began to be able to take advantage of it and acquire 
independent wealth. By the 2000s, the age of the Russian gangs as illegal 
financiers to their neighbouring underworld was all but over.
More broadly, while Russia still looms large, over time new routes and 
connections have been forged which bypass Russia, some even stretching 
outside the fSU, such as Afghan heroin flows into China via Kazakhstan, 
and smuggling routes to and from Turkey via Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
Even in Ukraine and Moldova, in tandem with wider processes of seeking 
to align themselves with Europe, national underworlds which once saw 
26 Pak 2016.
27 In an unpublished internal paper, dated 1994, seen by the author in 2011.
28 Ilyukhin made these comments to the ITAR-Tass news agency on 13 May 1994. For the other estimate, see 
Nezavisimaya gazeta 1997.
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the greatest advantage in acting as middlemen for Russian gangs or on 
trans-Russian routes, are increasingly seeking to diversify their business-
es. Moldovan criminals today, for example, are more likely to smuggle 
counterfeit and untaxed cigarettes and other commodities from Ukraine, 
or bought in from countries outside the fSU such as Turkey, China and 
India, than Russian goods.
This relates primarily to goods, of course. Russia remains dispropor-
tionately significant in the provision of criminal services in the region, 
from money laundering to cybercrime. For instance, until its apparent 
disappearance in 2007 (almost certainly to reinvent itself with a low-
er profile as a series of other sites), a notorious online outfit called the 
Russian Business Network provided not just secure platforms for an es-
timated 60% of all cybercrime in the fSU, but for three-quarters of all 
securely hosted criminal sites used for selling goods and coordinating ac-
tivities across the region.29 Russia remains a disproportionately significant 
cryptomarket for sales of drugs and other services.30 However, as this is 
a global market, the Russians themselves are keen to develop markets in 
more affluent regions than the fSU. While Russian cybercriminals became 
the service providers of choice for the world’s criminals, from breaking 
into police databases for the Japanese Yakuza to moving dirty money for 
Australian gangsters, this pivot towards new clients inevitably left their 
older ones in some cases looking for new suppliers.31
9.5.2. Bandits versus businessmen
To an extent, this last point reflects the ascendance in many countries 
of the fSU of more entrepreneurial and globally-minded underworld 
leaderships. In Russia, Ukraine and some other countries, the dominant 
organized crime figures are no longer old-school Mafiosi steeped in the 
lore of the vorovskoi mir, but a new generation of criminal businessmen. 
They typically have a portfolio of interests stretching from the wholly ille-
gal to the essentially legitimate, and do not necessarily identify themselves 
with the underworld. This is a younger generation, not just less socialized 
by the Soviet experience, but also more likely not to have spent lengthy 
stints in prison, with the shadow socialization that implies. When the 
balance of risk and reward indicates illegal business, so be it, but they 
have no qualms about operating in the legitimate sector, too. Rational – if 
morally-challenged – actors, they are businesspeople operating in envi-
ronments where there are too few legal, practical and social barriers to 
29 Warren 2007; conversation with Russian police analyst, Moscow 2015.
30 Demant et al. 2018.
31 The Economist 1999; McCombie et al. 2009.
228    FEBRUARY 2019
operating in illicit sectors. As a result, they are motivated less by custom, 
traditional alliances and a sense of common community, but purely by 
the needs of the moment.
Polled in 1995, only 5.1% of Russians surveyed thought that honesty, 
ability and hard work were the way to prosperity; 44.2% cited illegal 
speculation and 20.4% money laundering.32 While times have changed, it 
was nonetheless this era, in which the path to success was seen as winding 
through crime, albeit essentially business-oriented rather than ‘street’ 
crime, that created this new generation of gangsters. In Russia, they are 
known as avtoritety, ‘authorities’, in contrast with the more thuggish 
and obvious bandity. They tend to be risk-averse, eager to develop status 
and security within legitimate political and economic circles, and actively 
shun and disparage the old ways of the vorovskoi mir. In the words of one, 
“the old guys, the bandits, they thought their real lives were the ones in 
[prison], that what mattered was the thief’s code. That’s just stupid. Me, 
I’m happy to make sure I never get sent to a [labour] camp”.33
Whether avtoritety or bandity, however, the new generation of crim-
inals are, in many ways, less different by far from their counterparts 
in Europe and North America than their predecessors. The code of the 
vorovskoi mir is now largely ignored; the complex language of tattoos 
and the criminals’ distinctive argot have lost their exclusivity. There are 
still gangsters calling themselves vory v zakone, especially Georgians and 
others from the Caucasus, but what was once a mark of broad authority 
within the underworld, requiring a consensus based on the individual’s 
record of rigid adherence to the code, is now effectively a vanity title. 
Vory v zakone ‘crown’ their friends and cronies with little heed to anyone 
else’s opinion, and the title consequently means nothing.
Even in those countries of the region where less developed or more 
constrained underworlds are dominated by more traditional criminals, 
the criminal element no longer seek to assert cultural separation from 
mainstream society, but try to blend in instead, engaging with upper-
world politics and society, seeking power but also legitimacy and security. 
In the process, the old ponyatiya, or understandings, which provided 
not just a common conceptual language across the borders of the fSU 
but also mechanisms to resolve disputes and miscommunications, have 
broken down.
Of course, the gangsters of post-Soviet Eurasia are still different from 
those of Europe, China or the Americas, shaped by the rather different 
political, economic and law enforcement environments in their home 
32 These poll results were reported by the Interfax news agency on 21 July 1995.
33 From a conversation with the author, 2014.
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countries. However, as the underlying systems evolve centrifugally, mov-
ing away from the old Soviet model, so too do their underworlds. For 
criminals now motivated by rational self-interest and economic oppor-
tunity rather than tradition, this means that they only cooperate within 
the fSU and the bounds of the old vorovskoi mir when it is absolutely to 
their perceived advantage. In short, as new opportunities emerge outside 
the region, they have no reason not to pivot to seize them.
9.5.3 Command and control versus supply and demand
Hence, as the bonds of common identity and shared culture recede, mar-
ket relationships come to the fore. Who ‘runs’ this market? Back in the 
1990s and 2000s, the Russian networks, especially Moscow’s Solntsevo 
(which had powerful allies and clients in Ukraine and Moldova, as well as 
a strong role in the regional drug trade) and St. Petersburg’s Tambovskaya 
(which was also strongly connected in Belarus and had alliances with 
gangs in the Caucasus) were able to exert disproportionate influence. 
They may not have been able to control the market, but they could to an 
extent set the common rules and enforce them. 
With the relative power of Russian gangs in decline now, and no other 
structures able to assume a leadership role, it is increasingly clear that 
simple market economics rather than organizational power is shaping this 
underworld phenomenon. The barriers to market entry are falling, with 
Russians unable to control what happens in local underworlds. In 2018, 
for example, a major skhodka, or godfathers’ summit, was held in Erevan, 
with reportedly 600 Armenian criminals in attendance to address pressing 
concerns, from disputes between gangs to how to respond to the change 
in government.34 What was striking was that while they conducted their 
gathering po-Russkiy, ‘Russian-style’, whereas once representatives of 
Russian gangs that had interests involved would have been present, this 
time none were. Even where the apparent forms of a vorovskoi mir that 
once enshrined Russian cultural superiority within the fSU’s underworld 
are still present, they no longer embody the same hegemony.
More importantly, there are growing practical reasons to build bi-
lateral connections and agreements without a Russian role, and to de-
velop markets and suppliers outside the fSU. Often this is a question 
of opportunities. Commerce Turkey and Azerbaijan, for example, has 
encouraged a reorientation of the latter’s criminals to the south, and 
talk of new Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Iran trade highways is likely to 
only strengthen this trend. Likewise, in western Ukraine, and Moldova, 
34 Sputnik-Armenia 2018.
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groups have been taking advantage of the liberalization of controls with 
the European Union likewise to orient themselves in that direction.35 
There are also risks associated with close ties to Russia. Since 2011, the 
US Treasury has been using its powers under Executive Order 13581 to 
target specific organized crime ‘kingpins’ for asset freezes. The extent to 
which criminals associated with Russia – whatever their ethnicity – are 
facing particular pressure has not gone unnoticed.36 This makes them 
toxic as partners and associates, and it is clear that the targeted individ-
uals have been much less able to work outside Russia. More recently, as 
Moscow has become increasingly assertive within what it considers its 
‘zone of privileged interests’ – the fSU with the exception of the Baltic 
states – and as its worsening relations with the West and occupation of 
Crimea have led to economic sanctions, this has raised new concerns 
about criminal cooperation with the Russians. 
Besides, the Russian gangs themselves are in many cases abandoning 
their old focus on the fSU. In particular, China’s role as an as yet under-
developed criminal market will prove especially important. Early fears in 
Moscow that Chinese gangs would ‘colonize’ Central Asia or the Russian 
Far East (RFE) through mass legal and illegal migration have proved ex-
aggerated and groundless. However, Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District 
has an area of 6.2 million square kilometres, but a population of just 6.3 
million as of the 2010 census – half of the city of Moscow’s – and a regional 
GDP of $62 billion. Meanwhile, China’s three neighbouring Manchurian 
provinces, Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, together have a population of 
almost 110 million and a GDP of $821 billion. From the small-scale shut-
tle traders bringing cheap food and goods to major investment projects, 
China has become increasingly important to the RFE, something that, 
despite some nationalist concerns, most local authorities and businesses 
have welcomed. 
The economic disparity has a force of gravity all of its own, however, 
which is also evident in criminal connections. Chinese gangs cooperate 
with their Russian counterparts in smuggling people, drugs and other 
goods, not least looting Siberia’s natural resources, from timber and 
endangered species to fish and gold. Beyond that, however, the Chinese 
gangs are both physically present in border cities such as Vladivostok, 
Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk, but also – and much more importantly 
– a growing source of investment in illegal, as well as legal businesses in 
the RFE. As a result, local gangs increasingly seek to orient themselves to-
wards the Chinese market and the gangs who control access to it. Not only 
35 Consider, for example, the case of Moldovan kingpin Ion Druta – also known as Vanea the Writer, wanted for 
arranging an attempted contract killing in Bucharest. OCCRP 2014.
36 For a discussion on this campaign, see In Moscow’s Shadows 2013 and 2011.
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does this alter the old balances of wealth and power – the ‘Easterners’ are 
getting wealthier and more able to resist the ‘Varangians’ from European 
Russia – but it also brings with it new market rules and political assump-
tions: what matters in Moscow is less important at least for some criminals 
in the RFE than what happens in Beijing.
Indeed, the Chinese are not unique. Japanese organized criminals, 
having initially cooperated with Russian gangs in such areas as trading 
methamphetamines for stolen cars, have begun investing and setting up 
their own operations along Russia’s eastern coast, notably in the fishing 
and banking sectors. Nor is this confined to Russia. Chinese gangs are 
also active in Kazakhstan, for example, while Romanian criminals are 
now ensconced in Moldova.37
9.6 CONCLUSION
It is increasingly anachronistic to talk about ‘post-Soviet organized crime’, 
as since 1991 the underworlds of the various states of Eurasia have taken 
different trajectories, often determined above all by the nature and in-
volvement of the state. Even the role of Russian gangs – or rather, gangs 
from Russia – is by now much less dominant. While they have not in-
tegrated organizationally, however, a Eurasian criminal market space 
has emerged, one that stretches beyond the borders of the former Soviet 
Union (fSU). Within this, Russia still exerts a considerable gravitation-
al force as a crucial source, destination, and transit zone. Nonetheless, 
there is increasing differentiation, and the emergence of new routes and 
markets, especially concerning China, will likely make the ‘post-Soviet’ 
label less and less meaningful.
The experience of the underworlds of the fSU supports the notion that 
the current experience of organized crime worldwide is characterized 
by what has been called ‘glocalization’, simultaneously globalizing yet 
at the same time (re-)affirming their particular, local characteristics.38 
The initial coherence of the post-Soviet underworld was the result of a 
shared legacy both of criminal culture and political and economic systems, 
reinforced by the salience of the Russian gangsters.
Over time, however, the political, economic and criminal character-
istics of the post-Soviet states have diverged, and with them the interests 
and cultures of the gangsters. As crime became nationalized – in the sense 
of demonstrating national characteristics – the coherence of the fSU as a 
37 Nurgaliyev et al. 2014.
38 Hobbs 1998.
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criminal market space came to depend on interests rather than sentiment 
and cultural hegemony. As a new generation of criminals has arisen, for 
whom the customs of the vorovskoi mir are an anachronism and for 
whom political legitimacy and economic advantage are paramount, it has 
become clear that although alliances with the Russians remain important 
for many, new considerations have arisen.
In particular, the unity of the former Soviet underworld is being split 
three ways by the rise of China, the opportunities of Europe, and the 
continuing dynamism of the Russian underworld. More generally, there 
is a genuine globalization at work. Alexander Cooley and Jason Sharman’s 
work on transnational corruption in Central Asia,39 the emergence of 
non-Russian gangsters around the world, the universality of illicit money 
laundering, and the penetration of the fSU by external underworld inter-
ests, all emphasize the degree to which these legal and illegal economies 
now operate in global contexts. Russian and other regional criminal actors 
are welcome to engage in these economies, but they must pay to play, and 
not assume that traditional connections, a shared culture and history or 
a lack of alternatives continue to ring-fence the region.
Overall, then, it is clear that the identity of the post-Soviet space as 
a distinctive unit is increasingly historical, and there is little likelihood 
of this process reversing itself. The vorovskoi mir is dead; the ‘Eurasian 
Criminal Economic Union’ under pressure; and the respective national 
underworlds of Eurasia are, like their host nations, to be considered on 
their own terms, not as remnant fragments of an integrated Soviet legacy.
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The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991. However, even though 
de jure it disappeared, its nearly seven-decade existence has left its mark 
on the region as a whole. While the fifteen republics that composed the 
former Soviet Union differed from each other in terms of ethnicity, re-
ligion, culture, level of development and in numerous other factors, the 
Soviet Union as a unified framework had a strong homogenizing effect on 
all of these differences. Hence, it is hardly surprising that many still refer 
to the former Soviet republics collectively as the ‘post-Soviet region’, due 
to similarities and interconnections that characterized the period which 
ended in 1991. 
The main objective of the present Report has been to assess how ap-
propriate it still is to speak about this region as a complete, unifying, or 
at least largely recognizable entity now, nearly three decades after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The three Baltic states, that is Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were 
excluded from the analysis, primarily due to the fact that their accession 
to the European Union, NATO and the eurozone have made all three of 
them integral and inseparable parts of political Europe, contrary to the 
other twelve former Soviet republics. For this reason, the Baltic states are 
referred to in the Report only when necessary to enhance understanding 
of the overall framework of the analysis. 
Regarding the other twelve states, the Report selected nine themes, 
and looked at them from the perspective of how strong the connections 
and similarities are that still exist between countries of the former Soviet 
Union. The main findings confirm that the question of whether it is still 
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justified to speak about the post-Soviet region as a somewhat united 
entity is indeed legitimate.
In terms of constitutional structures, as Peter van Elsuwege points 
out, nowadays a highly diverse picture can be observed in the post-Soviet 
space. Divergence started as early as the adoption of the new constitu-
tions in the successor states after the dissolution of the former Soviet 
Union and has manifested in the emergence of highly different political 
systems, ranging from strong presidential and authoritarian systems to 
semi-presidential and semi-parliamentary ones. The internal dynamics 
of the development of the constitutional systems has also demonstrated 
considerable variability: some countries have become significantly more 
authoritarian, like Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia itself did, while others 
have been on a reverse track, having gradually shifted from a strongly 
presidential system to a less authoritarian one, as happened in Ukraine 
or in Moldova.
Diverging trends are likely to continue, particularly because external 
factors, such as the influence of regional integration processes, foster 
further constitutional differentiation. For instance, the conclusion of 
bilateral association agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova 
and Georgia sparked a process of constitutional revision in each of the 
associated countries, whereas the establishment of the EAEU challenges 
the interpretation of national sovereignty in the participating countries 
(Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan).
Regarding military and defence ties, Gudrun Persson argues that Russia 
perceives the CIS region as its own zone of influence, and military power 
constitutes a key tool for exercising this influence. However, multilateral 
approaches to defence cooperation brought only limited results, mostly 
due to the diverging national interests of the post-Soviet countries. The 
CSTO has thus far failed to provide collective security for its member states, 
as the crises in Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have demonstrated, although 
from 2016 onwards new attempts have ostensibly been made to achieve 
gradual consolidation of the organization.
In view of the inadequacy of an all-inclusive multilateral approach, 
Russia has opted for a differentiated, dominant bilateralism. The core 
group of Russia’s partners in defence cooperation consists of Belarus, 
Armenia and Kazakhstan as they play a key role in the three main strategic 
directions: Belarus to the West, Armenia to the South and Kazakhstan 
towards Central Asia and the wider East. The second, considerably looser 
cooperation group is composed of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where Russia 
maintains bases and elements of military infrastructure on the ground. 
However, these facilities, as well as the CSTO mechanisms, can be seen 
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more as tools for exercising Russian influence there than as providers of 
security and stability for these allies of Moscow.
While Uzbekistan has long maintained distance from Russia in terms 
of defence, 2017 brought the first joint Russian-Uzbek military exercise 
since 2005, indicating a trend of gradual approximation. Meanwhile, 
compared to the other four Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan con-
stitutes a notable exception, as the isolated country has no meaningful 
military relations with Russia.
Despite this complex network of defence ties, the main reason why the 
post-Soviet space can no longer be handled as a collective region in terms 
of defence policy lies in the open opposition of Georgia and Ukraine to 
Russia. Although both paid a high price, Tbilisi and Kyiv denounced Russia 
as a menace, and keep pursuing a defence policy openly oriented against 
Moscow. Notwithstanding this situation, in the foreseeable future Russia 
will uphold its military dominance in the CIS region, and will continue the 
militarization of its foreign policy, maintaining and exploiting unresolved 
conflicts, preserving its military presence, and strengthening the CSTO. It 
is also very likely that Russia will use this multilevel dominance to slow 
down the disintegration of the region, particularly in security and defence.
The picture is similarly diverse in terms of foreign policy. As Sergey 
Utkin writes, every post-Soviet country has had its own separate path of 
political evolution, and this included foreign policy as well. Depending on 
the political regime and the immediate geographical surroundings, dif-
fering foreign policy choices have been and are being made. The strongest 
similarity is that all of these states regard foreign policy as a manifestation 
of their sovereignty, and as a way to strengthen it. Sovereignty implies 
the development of national elites, including in foreign policy, who are 
motivated to defend their country’s national interests. This even applies 
to those countries that have the heaviest dependence on Russia in terms 
of security and defence, such as Belarus and Armenia. 
Membership in various multilateral institutions and integration pro-
jects is no different, as it is also merely a tool for serving national interests. 
Therefore, the least likely scenario would be for the post-Soviet countries 
to give this up for the sake of a hypothetical Eurasian political union. This 
also implies that the post-Soviet regional organizations will continue 
to develop as flexible, sometimes amorphous frameworks, leaving their 
members enough room for manoeuvre.
Although all post-Soviet countries were faced with similar challenges 
initially, such as the transformation to a market economy, both the chal-
lenges and the responses to them subsequently turned out to be highly 
divergent. In the early 1990s, all post-Soviet states intended to strengthen 
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cooperation with the West in order to foster their own transition and 
to benefit from closer ties both politically and economically. Over time, 
the expectations became more realistic, in addition to the fact that the 
increasingly uneasy relationship between Russia and the West could not 
be ignored by other post-Soviet states, if they tried to avoid negative 
repercussions for themselves. This is different for Ukraine and Georgia, 
which have already become embroiled in a tug-of-war with Russia to 
an extent that makes them believe that institutionally joining the West 
would be the only workable security guarantee for them.
Various Russia-led integrational projects in the post-Soviet region 
were analyzed by Ekaterina Furman and Alexander Libman, who conclud-
ed that the development of these projects had three distinctly different 
phases. In the 1990s, in parallel with the strong focus on the West, most 
post-Soviet states had become interested in imitating a kind of ‘Eurasian 
EU’, in order to demonstrate that the region follows the global patterns. 
In reality, however, they had no intention of giving up even parts of their 
sovereignty for the sake of any integration, so cooperation remained at 
an intergovernmental level. 
The situation changed in the 2000s, when Russia, clearly the most 
powerful country in the region, sought to be treated as equal to the 
European Union. In line with this intention, the development of Russia-
led integration projects also gained significant momentum. This resulted 
in a much higher level of functionality, concerning mostly the Customs 
Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. However, since 2014, Russia has 
reverted to its original integrationist ideas, but using China and not the 
EU as a benchmark instead, and has further intensified the development 
of its main project, the EAEU. The results already achieved, including 
the fact that some elements of the EAEU have reached the supranational 
level, are likely not only to be preserved, but even developed further – 
partly because of Russia’s political will to do so, and partly due to pure 
bureaucratic inertia. One needs to point out, however, that the EAEU no 
longer intends to integrate the region as a whole. Instead, it is geograph-
ically a much narrower, albeit deeper form of cooperation, while other 
post-Soviet countries – primarily Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – have 
been pursuing fundamentally different integration projects and declared 
the goal of joining the EU.
András Deák argues that economic factors are also key to understand-
ing why no integration similar to the European Union has emerged in the 
post-Soviet region. The level of economic integration in the post-Soviet 
states is relatively low. Even when it comes to Russia, despite all of its 
rhetoric about the importance of the area for its interests and thus in 
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contrast with its declared foreign policy priorities, the share of the CIS in 
the country’s foreign trade and FDI has been significantly decreasing in 
the last decade. In order to upgrade the EAEU cooperation to a functioning 
common market, single market or even monetary union as planned, the 
parties should intensify their cooperation drastically, which is unlikely 
to happen. 
No swift change is to be expected in this regard. The post-Soviet region 
has a sui generis integrability problem. Political elites are intertwined 
with local businesses, while corruption is rampant. Besides, given the lack 
of development drivers and the presence of complex, vertically integrat-
ed value chains, the local economies provide little complementarity for 
strong integration. Hydrocarbon exports constitute another factor un-
conducive to closer regional cooperation. While in the short run they may 
provide some complementary impetus between exporters and importers 
due to high regional energy intensities and price hikes, in the medium and 
longer run the exports go to the advanced economies outside the region.
At the same time, the alternative integrative mechanisms in the re-
gion are also rather humble: the EU offers its Eastern partners free trade 
with legal approximation, but the implementation suffers from several 
drawbacks. The question of China as a potential alternative to Russia is 
slightly more complex. On the one hand, China is a major trade part-
ner for many CIS countries, and it has become by far the biggest one in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Moreover, Chinese influence 
is not restricted to trade. China actively seeks access to local energy re-
sources, invests in related sectors, acquires ownership through the local 
value chains, especially in retail or light industry, and provides loans 
and infrastructure construction capabilities under the label of the Belt 
and Road Initiative. On the other hand, China does not try to integrate 
regional countries, but establishes bilateral ties and acts according to 
its own interests. In such a landscape, Russia can maintain some of its 
economic leverage given its relative strength, mostly because of the lack 
of any meaningful competition.
Significantly less change has taken place in the field of energy. 
According to Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, the most significant and lin-
gering Soviet footprint in the region’s energy sector includes the poor 
energy intensity record, the supply-side-driven energy policies, the 
struggle with regulated tariffs and social energy re-distribution policies, 
the slow pace of ageing infrastructure modernization and replacement, 
opportunities for predation, capture and corruption stemming from the 
energy sector, as well as the strong dependency of several oil and gas 
producers on oil sector tax revenues. Azerbaijan and, to a lesser extent, 
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Russia and Kazakhstan did not manage to revert to their rentier states 
economies and are thus vulnerable to oil and gas market fluctuations.
Added to this, Kazakhstan remains dependent on Russia for its oil ex-
ports as well. Furthermore, Russian influence has become even stronger 
in Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, which not only remained dependent 
on Russian energy supplies, but have also sold large parts of their stra-
tegic energy infrastructure to Moscow. While Ukraine and Georgia were 
able to critically reduce their dependency on gas supplies from Russia, 
Ukraine still strongly benefits from transit revenues from Gazprom. In 
turn, Azerbaijan was successful in decreasing its dependence on Russia in 
terms of transiting its oil and gas exports. However, all in all, Russia re-
mains the dominant oil supplier to all net importing countries in the region.
Certain shifts have been taking place, however. For example, there 
has been a move towards market-based pricing for the industry sector 
in the whole region. Large foreign investments have been taking place in 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, as well as in Russia, and serious energy sector 
reforms are underway in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as part of their 
Energy Community membership. Lastly, the most spectacular changes 
seen in the past two decades are the development of new export routes 
from Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China. In this sense, Beijing 
has largely benefited from the breakup of the Soviet Union, as it was able 
to foster its energy security, diversify its oil and gas imports, and develop 
its investments in the post-Soviet countries.
In terms of demography and migration, as argued by Liliya Karachurina, 
the long existence within a single system keeps determining the paths 
of development to a certain extent even three decades later. Diverging 
demographic trends within the region started not in 1991, but a lot earlier. 
This applies particularly to the reproduction patterns, determined by 
mortality and fertility rates, where differences between the western and 
eastern successor countries of the former Soviet Union are very significant. 
Another highly visible and centrifugal trend is the spectacular decrease 
in the number of ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet region. The reasons 
for this are manifold, ranging from mass emigration in the early 1990s to 
gradual assimilation and the change of national identity in the subsequent 
decades. As a result, the presence of ethnic Russians as a connecting factor 
in the region has clearly been losing the importance it once had. Labour 
migration, however, is still a factor that connects the post-Soviet space 
as countries with higher fertility rates remain a source of migrants. 
Regardless of how the geopolitical, domestic political, economic and 
social conditions have changed in the twelve countries under study, in 
terms of labour migration they are still closely connected to each other. 
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The important point is that these contemporary migration trends would 
no longer exist if the very political, economic and other differences be-
tween the post-Soviet countries were non-existent. In other words, the 
still close migration-related ties are actually a result of the increasing 
differences within the region. 
The influence of Russia’s soft power, and particularly of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, is weakening. As pointed out by Veera Laine, the 
Russian state borrows the religious-conservative rhetoric in its attempt to 
enhance the unity of the ‘Russian World’. Strengthening the cooperation 
with the Russian Orthodox Church both domestically and in the foreign 
policy sphere, the state wishes to portray itself as a global guarantor – and 
defender – of the traditional, spiritual values. However, this resonates a 
lot less in other post-Soviet countries than the Russian Orthodox Church 
or the Kremlin would like to portray. 
This is particularly so because the Russian state discourse does not 
take into account the complexity of religious and national identity. In the 
cases of Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia, being Orthodox is a part of national 
identity and cultural tradition and does not automatically imply loyalty 
to Russia. Besides, many people who declare themselves Orthodox do not 
practise regularly (or often even at all), which decreases the influence of 
the ROC. Added to this, although protecting conservative values is a key 
element of the Russian World concept, the very idea has become ‘tar-
nished’ in the eyes of many post-Soviet countries since 2014. This is well 
demonstrated by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s struggle to achieve 
autocephaly from the Moscow Patriarchate, which, if successful, will 
deliver a severe blow to the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church 
and, by implication, also to that of the Kremlin.
When it comes to the lesser known, and evidently under-researched 
question of connections in terms of criminal ties, according to Mark 
Galeotti, the initial coherence of the post-Soviet underworld was the 
result of a shared legacy both of criminal culture and political and eco-
nomic systems, reinforced by the salience of the Russian gangsters. Over 
time, however, the political, economic and criminal characteristics of 
the post-Soviet states have diverged, and with them the interests and 
cultures of the gangsters. As crime became nationalized – in the sense 
of demonstrating national characteristics – the coherence of the former 
Soviet Union as a criminal market also diminished. Moreover, a new 
generation of criminals has emerged, for whom the old code of conduct 
– the so-called vorovskoi mir – is an anachronism, and for whom polit-
ical legitimacy and economic advantage are paramount. Hence, it has 
become clear that although alliances with the Russians remain important 
244    FEBRUARY 2019
for many, the orientation of criminal gangs has changed and become di-
versified as, along with the Russian underworld, China and Europe have 
also become directions and cooperation channels. As a result, one may 
conclude that the identity of the underworld of the post-Soviet space as 
a distinctive unit is becoming increasingly historical, and there is little 
likelihood of this process reversing itself. The vorovskoi mir is defunct, 
and the respective national underworlds of Eurasia should, like their host 
nations, be considered on their own terms, not as remnant fragments of 
an integrated Soviet legacy.
All in all, one may conclude that while traces of the Soviet Union’s 
seven decades are still very much in evidence and are far from disappear-
ing, the remnants of the common heritage reveal themselves differently 
depending on the field. In terms of political ties, Russia-led integration 
efforts managed to hold together just a handful of countries in the region, 
and even they interact within a lot less integrated framework than the one 
formed by the Soviet Union. Even in the field of defence, where the CSTO 
is supposed to constitute a close military alliance, the crises in Kyrgyzstan 
and Armenia demonstrated that in reality the organization faces serious 
coherence problems. Inherited post-Soviet bonds are also rapidly weak-
ening in terms of demography and church-related connections.
Changes are taking place much more slowly in terms of the econo-
my and energy, as the region is still largely dominated by the Russian 
Federation, although the strengthening presence of China is posing an 
increasingly serious challenge to this privileged position, particularly in 
Central Asia. Another weakening factor is the low level of internal eco-
nomic interconnectivity that seriously limits the integration potential of 
the EAEU. Regarding energy security, Russia has remained a dominant 
player, both as a supplier and, to a lesser extent, as a transit country but, 
as mentioned above, no longer throughout the whole post-Soviet region. 
All in all, divisions inside the region are widening, and although Russia 
is still a dominant player, it is no longer able to exercise this power over 
the whole region.
A post-Soviet legacy still exists, manifested among other things in the 
similarly relatively poor scores of all of these countries in major glob-
al indexes on the rule of law, democracy, corruption and governance. 
However, these inherited similarities bind the region together mostly in 
the eyes of external observers, while not generating much internal coher-
ence. The economy and energy are the only two sectors where most of the 
region is still closely tied together, but Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are 
evidently ebbing away from Russia, and Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are 
also decreasing their dependencies on Moscow. Even though migration 
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ties are still strong, these connections are actually a result of the increasing 
economic differences between the countries; in other words, migration 
connections are not integrating factors, but indicators of the gap in the 
levels of economic development.
The main question addressed by this Report has been whether it is still 
reasonable to speak about the post-Soviet space as a united region. Based 
on all of the factors described above, in all probability the answer is that, 
factually, it is less and less justified to approach the region as a single en-
tity, particularly when it comes to politics, security and defence-related 
issues, as well as demographic and social connections. Disintegration has 
progressed rather far and is continuing. However, inherited similarities 
between these twelve countries are still easy to detect, while economic 
and energy ties are significant. In all likelihood, considerable time will 
have to elapse before it will be possible to conclude that the ‘post-Soviet 
space’ has become relegated to history in the same way as the Soviet 
Union itself.
However, irrespective of the speed of the continuing erosion, political 
implications are evident even at this point. Since the area is continuing 
to disintegrate, and there are no apparent factors or powers to stop or 
reverse this process, the time may be ripe to admit that post-Soviet coun-
tries deserve an increasingly individually-tailored approach, that any 
attempts to group them together in expectation of positive spillover and 
regional synergy will be futile, and that cooperation with them – or in 
some cases preventing instability – will require their purposeful inclusion 
in other regional formats, which will have nothing to do with the residual 
concept of post-Soviet space. Indeed, the more external actors shape 
the outcomes of constitutional, socio-economic and political-security 
developments in the area, the less temptation there will be universally 
to rely on Russo-centrism in practical policy.
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Almost three decades have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the mean-
time, a whole new generation has grown up with no personal memory of the Soviet era. 
However, the disintegration of a former superpower cannot happen in such a manner 
that its heritage disappears without a trace. 
The aim of this report is to take stock of the process of erosion in the post-Soviet space 
that has been going on since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. The authors ana-
lyse the remaining material and other structural legacies of the USSR to find out, among 
other things, whether re-integration of the post-Soviet space, or a part thereof, around 
Russia is still possible and what kind of centrifugal and centripetal forces are still at play.
The authors approach the research questions from the perspective of cross-cutting 
issues that encompass the region as a whole. The aim is not to study how the post-Soviet 
states are faring almost three decades after the transition. Instead, the focus is on key 
themes such as defence relations, energy and economic ties, as well as on various efforts 
to create integration structures that would again unite at least parts of the region.
The report is divided into three thematic parts. The first part concerns the structural 
issues of post-Soviet politics and policies. The second part comprises two studies dealing 
with the economic ties that still exist among the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
The third part deals with the societal aspects of the question.  
